The development of metaphorical language comprehension in typical development and in Williams syndrome

The domain of figurative language comprehension was used to probe the developmental relation between language and cognition in typically developing individuals and individuals with Williams syndrome. Extending the work of Vosniadou and Ortony, the emergence of nonliteral similarity and category knowledge was investigated in 117 typically developing children between 4 and 12 years of age, 19 typically developing adults, 15 children with Williams syndrome between 5 and 12 years of age, and 8 adults with Williams syndrome. Participants were required to complete similarity and categorization statements by selecting one of two words (e.g., either “The sun is like ___” or “The sun is the same kind of thing as ___”) with word pairs formed from items that were literally, perceptually, or functionally similar to the target word or else anomalous (e.g., moon, orange, oven, or chair, respectively). Results indicated that individuals with Williams syndrome may access different, less abstract knowledge in figurative language comparisons despite the relatively strong verbal abilities found in this disorder

Mind: meet network. Emergence of features in conceptual metaphor.

As a human product, language reflects the psychological experience of man (Radden and Dirven, 2007). One model of language and human cognition in general is connectionism, by many linguists is regarded as mathematical and, therefore, too reductive. This opinion trend seems to be reversing, however, due to the fact that many cognitive researchers begin to appreciate one attribute of network models: feature emergence. In the course of a network simulation properties emerge that were neither inbuilt nor intended by its creators (Elman, 1998), in other words, the whole becomes more than just the sum of its parts. Insight is not only drawn from the network's output, but also the means that the network utilizes to arrive at the output.\ud It may seem obvious that the events of life should be meaningful for human beings, yet there is no widely accepted theory as to how do we derive that meaning. The most promising hypothesis regarding the question how the world is meaningful to us is that of embodied cognition (cf. Turner 2009), which postulates that the functions of the brain evolved so as to ‘understand’ the body, thus grounding the mind in an experiential foundation. Yet, the relationship between the body and the mind is far from perspicuous, as research insight is still intertwined with metaphors specific for the researcher’s methodology (Eliasmith 2003). It is the aim of this paper to investigate the conceptual metaphor in a manner that will provide some insight with regard to the role that objectification, as defined by Szwedek (2002), plays in human cognition and identify one possible consequence of embodied cognition.\ud If the mechanism for concept formation, or categorization of the world, resembles a network, it is reasonable to assume that evidence for this is to be sought in language. Let us then postulate the existence of a network mechanism for categorization and concept formation present in the human mind and initially developed to cope with the world directly accessible to the early human (i.e. tangible). Such a network would convert external inputs to form an internal, multi modal representation of a perceived object in the brain. The sheer amount of available information and the computational restrictions of the brain would force some sort of data compression, or a computational funnel. It has been shown that a visual perception network of this kind can learn to accurately label patterns (Elman, 1998). What is more, the compression of data facilitated the recognition of prototypes of a given pattern category rather than its peripheral representations, an emergent property that supports the prototype theory of the mental lexicon (cf. Radden and Dirven, 2007).\ud The present project proposes that, in the domain of cognition, the process of objectification, as defined by Szwedek (2002), would be an emergent property of such a system, or that if an abstract notion is computed by a neural network designed to cope with tangible concepts the data compression mechanism would require the notion to be conceptualized as an object to permit further processing. The notion of emergence of meaning from the operation of complex systems is recognised as an important process in a number of studies on metaphor comprehension. Feature emergence is said to occur when a non-salient feature of the target and the vehicle becomes highly salient in the metaphor (Utsumi 2005). Therefore, for example, should objectification emerge as a feature in the metaphor KNOWLEDGE IS A TREASURE, the metaphor would be characterised as having more\ud features of an object than either the target or vehicle alone. This paper focuses on providing a theoretical connectionist network based on the Elman-type network (Elman, 1998) as a model of concept formation where objectification would be an emergent feature. This is followed by a psychological experiment whereby the validity of this assumption is tested through a questionnaire where two groups of participants are asked to evaluate either metaphors or their components. The model proposes an underlying relation between the mechanism for concept formation and the omnipresence of conceptual metaphors, which are interpreted as resulting from the properties of the proposed network system.\ud Thus, an evolutionary neural mechanism is proposed for categorization of the world, that is able to cope with both concrete and abstract notions and the by-product of which are the abstract language-related phenomena, i.e. metaphors. The model presented in this paper aims at providing a unified account of how the various types of phenomena, objects, feelings etc. are categorized in the human mind, drawing on evidence from language.\ud References:\ud Szwedek, Aleksander. 2002. Objectification: From Object Perception To Metaphor Creation. In B. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk and K. Turewicz (eds). Cognitive Linguistics To-day, 159-175. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.\ud Radden, Günter and Dirven, René. 2007. Cognitive English Grammar. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company\ud Eliasmith, Chris. 2003. Moving beyond metaphors: understanding the mind for what it is. Journal of Philosophy. C(10):493- 520.\ud Elman, J. L. et al. 1998. Rethinking innateness: A connectionist perspective on development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press\ud Turner, Mark. 2009. Categorization of Time and Space Through Language. (Paper presented at the FOCUS2009 conference "Categorization of the world through language". Serock, 25-28 February 2009).\ud Utsumi, Akira. 2005. The role of feature emergence in metaphor appreciation, Metaphor and Symbol, 20(3), 151-172

Metaphor as categorisation: a connectionist implementation

A key issue for models of metaphor comprehension is to explain how in some metaphorical comparison , only some features of B are transferred to A. The features of B that are transferred to A depend both on A and on B. This is the central thrust of Black's well known interaction theory of metaphor comprehension (1979). However, this theory is somewhat abstract, and it is not obvious how it may be implemented in terms of mental representations and processes. In this paper we describe a simple computational model of on-line metaphor comprehension which combines Black's interaction theory with the idea that metaphor comprehension is a type of categorisation process (Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990, 1993). The model is based on a distributed connectionist network depicting semantic memory (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986). The network learns feature-based information about various concepts. A metaphor is comprehended by applying a representation of the first term A to the network storing knowledge of the second term B, in an attempt to categorise it as an exemplar of B. The output of this network is a representation of A transformed by the knowledge of B. We explain how this process embodies an interaction of knowledge between the two terms of the metaphor, how it accords with the contemporary theory of metaphor stating that comprehension for literal and metaphorical comparisons is carried out by identical mechanisms (Gibbs, 1994), and how it accounts for both existing empirical evidence (Glucksberg, McGlone, & Manfredi, 1997) and generates new predictions. In this model, the distinction between literal and metaphorical language is one of degree, not of kind

Metaphor and the \u27Emergent Property\u27 Problem: A Relevance-Theoretic Approach

The interpretation of metaphorical utterances often results in the attribution of emergent properties; these are properties which are neither standardly associated with the individual constituents of the utterance in isolation nor derivable by standard rules of semantic composition. For example, an utterance of ‘Robert is a bulldozer’ may be understood as attributing to Robert such properties as single-mindedness, insistence on having things done in his way, and insensitivity to the opinions/feelings of others, although none of these is included in the encyclopaedic information associated with bulldozers (earth-clearing machines). An adequate pragmatic account of metaphor interpretation must provide an explanation of the processes through which emergent properties are derived. In this paper, we attempt to develop an explicit account of the derivation process couched within the framework of relevance theory. The key features of our account are: (a) metaphorical language use is taken to lie on a continuum with other cases of loose use, including hyperbole; (b) metaphor interpretation is a wholly inferential process, which does not require associative mappings from one domain (e.g. machines) to another (e.g. human beings); (c) the derivation of emergent properties involves no special interpretive mechanisms not required for the interpretation of ordinary, literal utterances

The Relevance-Based Model of Context in Processing Puns

While the essential role context plays in the understanding of expressions and utterances has never been questioned, the way it is perceived has evolved from a static factor established prior to the process of utterance interpretation, indeed a prerequisite for processing information, to a dynamic entity which emerges in this process. The latter view is espoused by relevance theorists, who define context as “the set of premises used in interpreting an utterance” (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 15) and treat it as a mental construct undergoing diverse modifications as the comprehender of an utterance processes and interprets incoming verbal information and other communicative signals supplied by the communicator. The aim of this paper is to consider the usefulness of this model of context for analyzing the derivation of meaning in puns, i.e. utterances in which, instead of its usual function of allowing the comprehender to resolve ambiguities ubiquitous in language and communication, the context plays a different role of leading him to entertain, and often to accept two diverse readings[…

Corpus Analysis and Lexical Pragmatics: An Overview

Lexical pragmatics studies the processes by which lexically encoded meanings are modified in use; well-studied examples include lexical narrowing, approximation and metaphorical extension. Relevance theorists have been trying to develop a unitary account on which narrowing, approximation and metaphorical extension are all explained in the same way. While there have been several corpus-based studies of metaphor and a few of hyperbole or approximation, there has been no attempt so far to test the unitary account using corpus data. This paper reports the results of a corpus-based investigation of lexical-pragmatic processes, and discusses the theoretical issues and challenges it raises

Invisible Net

In the past, several studies have found empirical support for the psychological notion of foregrounding. In this paper we will present the results of a reading experiment investigating descriptive and evaluative reader reactions to a poem, both in its original form (containing rather heavy foregrounding, both deviation and parallelism) and a version (from which all foregrounding has been removed). In this sense the research presents a replication of earlier experiments as well as a comparison with some more recent ones that failed to find empirical evidence for the notion of foregrounding. It will also cast light on Bortolussi and Dixon’s rereading paradigm. The results will be combined with a reconsideration of the concept of literariness, which will be confronted with the variety within a reader population, as well as with the diversity within a text corpus. The latter will be confronted with Van Peer’s (1991) effort to develop a descriptive definition of literature, incorporating the heterogeneous nature of the corpus of texts that are regarded as literary. Revisiting these aspects of texts and their reception may illuminate persistent problems in the theory of literariness