Monitoring-Based Commissioning: Tracking the Evolution and Adoption of a Paradigm-Shifting Approach to Retro-Commissioning

Proceedings of the 2012 ACEEE Summer Study (Panel 4, Paper 1130). Monitoring-based commissioning (MBCx) emphasizes permanent energy performance metering and trending—for diagnosis of energy waste, for savings accounting, and to enable persistence of savings. Emphasis on monitoring represents a paradigm shift for the retro-commissioning (RCx) industry, which has traditionally relied upon test protocols and modeled savings estimates. Since 2004, a major monitoring-based commissioning program at twenty-five California university campuses has evolved to meet the changing needs of university and utility partners. More recently the monitoring-based approach has been adopted by third-party programs in California. We present information on the progression of program design and results for the multiple phases of the original program, along with a look at third-party and other programs adopting similar program features

Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches

Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac

Combining Spot and Futures Markets: A Hybrid Market Approach to Dynamic Spectrum Access

Dynamic spectrum access is a new paradigm of secondary spectrum utilization and sharing. It allows unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to exploit opportunistically the under-utilized licensed spectrum. Market mechanism is a widely-used promising means to regulate the consuming behaviours of users and, hence, achieves the efficient allocation and consumption of limited resources. In this paper, we propose and study a hybrid secondary spectrum market consisting of both the futures market and the spot market, in which SUs (buyers) purchase under-utilized licensed spectrum from a spectrum regulator, either through predefined contracts via the futures market, or through spot transactions via the spot market. We focus on the optimal spectrum allocation among SUs in an exogenous hybrid market that maximizes the secondary spectrum utilization efficiency. The problem is challenging due to the stochasticity and asymmetry of network information. To solve this problem, we first derive an off-line optimal allocation policy that maximizes the ex-ante expected spectrum utilization efficiency based on the stochastic distribution of network information. We then propose an on-line VickreyCClarkeCGroves (VCG) auction that determines the real-time allocation and pricing of every spectrum based on the realized network information and the pre-derived off-line policy. We further show that with the spatial frequency reuse, the proposed VCG auction is NP-hard; hence, it is not suitable for on-line implementation, especially in a large-scale market. To this end, we propose a heuristics approach based on an on-line VCG-like mechanism with polynomial-time complexity, and further characterize the corresponding performance loss bound analytically. We finally provide extensive numerical results to evaluate the performance of the proposed solutions.Comment: This manuscript is the complete technical report for the journal version published in INFORMS Operations Researc

TumbleBit: an untrusted Bitcoin-compatible anonymous payment hub

This paper presents TumbleBit, a new unidirectional unlinkable payment hub that is fully compatible with today s Bitcoin protocol. TumbleBit allows parties to make fast, anonymous, off-blockchain payments through an untrusted intermediary called the Tumbler. TumbleBits anonymity properties are similar to classic Chaumian eCash: no one, not even the Tumbler, can link a payment from its payer to its payee. Every payment made via TumbleBit is backed by bitcoins, and comes with a guarantee that Tumbler can neither violate anonymity, nor steal bitcoins, nor print money by issuing payments to itself. We prove the security of TumbleBit using the real/ideal world paradigm and the random oracle model. Security follows from the standard RSA assumption and ECDSA unforgeability. We implement TumbleBit, mix payments from 800 users and show that TumbleBits offblockchain payments can complete in seconds.https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/575.pdfPublished versio

Sustaining the Medical Home: How PROMETHEUS Payment Can Revitalize Primary Care

Argues for reforming the current fee-for-service payment system on the PROMETHEUS model of budgeting for a comprehensive episode of care for a condition. Analyzes the implications for a sustainable patient-centered medical home model of care delivery

Pricing and Hedging GLWB in the Heston and in the Black-Scholes with Stochastic Interest Rate Models

Valuing Guaranteed Lifelong Withdrawal Benefit (GLWB) has attracted significant attention from both the academic field and real world financial markets. As remarked by Forsyth and Vetzal the Black and Scholes framework seems to be inappropriate for such long maturity products. They propose to use a regime switching model. Alternatively, we propose here to use a stochastic volatility model (Heston model) and a Black Scholes model with stochastic interest rate (Hull White model). For this purpose we present four numerical methods for pricing GLWB variables annuities: a hybrid tree-finite difference method and a hybrid Monte Carlo method, an ADI finite difference scheme, and a standard Monte Carlo method. These methods are used to determine the no-arbitrage fee for the most popular versions of the GLWB contract, and to calculate the Greeks used in hedging. Both constant withdrawal and optimal withdrawal (including lapsation) strategies are considered. Numerical results are presented which demonstrate the sensitivity of the no-arbitrage fee to economic, contractual and longevity assumptions