2,377 research outputs found
A Labelling Framework for Probabilistic Argumentation
The combination of argumentation and probability paves the way to new
accounts of qualitative and quantitative uncertainty, thereby offering new
theoretical and applicative opportunities. Due to a variety of interests,
probabilistic argumentation is approached in the literature with different
frameworks, pertaining to structured and abstract argumentation, and with
respect to diverse types of uncertainty, in particular the uncertainty on the
credibility of the premises, the uncertainty about which arguments to consider,
and the uncertainty on the acceptance status of arguments or statements.
Towards a general framework for probabilistic argumentation, we investigate a
labelling-oriented framework encompassing a basic setting for rule-based
argumentation and its (semi-) abstract account, along with diverse types of
uncertainty. Our framework provides a systematic treatment of various kinds of
uncertainty and of their relationships and allows us to back or question
assertions from the literature
A probabilistic deontic argumentation framework
RĂ©gis Riveret: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Validation, Writing - original draft, Writing - review & editing. Nir Oren: Validation, Writing - original draft, Writing - review & editing. Giovanni Sartor: Conceptualization, Validation, Writing - original draft, Writing - review & editing.Peer reviewedPostprin
A probabilistic analysis of argument cogency
This paper offers a probabilistic treatment of the conditions for argument cogency as endorsed in informal logic: acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency. Treating a natural language argument as a reason-claim-complex, our analysis identifies content features of defeasible argument on which the RSA conditions depend, namely: change in the commitment to the reason, the reason’s sensitivity and selectivity to the claim, one’s prior commitment to the claim, and the contextually determined thresholds of acceptability for reasons and for claims. Results contrast with, and may indeed serve to correct, the informal understanding and applications of the RSA criteria concerning their conceptual dependence, their function as update-thresholds, and their status as obligatory rather than permissive norms, but also show how these formal and informal normative approachs can in fact align
Bayesian Argumentation and the Value of Logical Validity
According to the Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, the norms by which everyday human cognition is best evaluated are probabilistic rather than logical in character. Recently, the Bayesian paradigm has been applied to the domain of argumentation, where the fundamental norms are traditionally assumed to be logical. Here, we present a major generalisation of extant Bayesian approaches to argumentation that (i)utilizes a new class of Bayesian learning methods that are better suited to modelling dynamic and conditional inferences than standard Bayesian conditionalization, (ii) is able to characterise the special value of logically valid argument schemes in uncertain reasoning contexts, (iii) greatly extends the range of inferences and argumentative phenomena that can be adequately described in a Bayesian framework, and (iv) undermines some influential theoretical motivations for dual function models of human cognition. We conclude that the probabilistic norms given by the Bayesian approach to rationality are not necessarily at odds with the norms given by classical logic. Rather, the Bayesian theory of argumentation can be seen as justifying and enriching the argumentative norms of classical logic
Bayesian Argumentation and the Value of Logical Validity
According to the Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, the norms by which everyday human cognition is best evaluated are probabilistic rather than logical in character. Recently, the Bayesian paradigm has been applied to the domain of argumentation, where the fundamental norms are traditionally assumed to be logical. Here, we present a major generalisation of extant Bayesian approaches to argumentation that (i)utilizes a new class of Bayesian learning methods that are better suited to modelling dynamic and conditional inferences than standard Bayesian conditionalization, (ii) is able to characterise the special value of logically valid argument schemes in uncertain reasoning contexts, (iii) greatly extends the range of inferences and argumentative phenomena that can be adequately described in a Bayesian framework, and (iv) undermines some influential theoretical motivations for dual function models of human cognition. We conclude that the probabilistic norms given by the Bayesian approach to rationality are not necessarily at odds with the norms given by classical logic. Rather, the Bayesian theory of argumentation can be seen as justifying and enriching the argumentative norms of classical logic
Strategic Argumentation is NP-Complete
In this paper we study the complexity of strategic argumentation for dialogue
games. A dialogue game is a 2-player game where the parties play arguments. We
show how to model dialogue games in a skeptical, non-monotonic formalism, and
we show that the problem of deciding what move (set of rules) to play at each
turn is an NP-complete problem
Norms of public argumentation and the ideals of correctness and participation
Argumentation as the public exchange of reasons is widely thought to enhance deliberative interactions that generate and justify reasonable public policies. Adopting an argumentation-theoretic perspective, we survey the norms that should govern public argumentation and address some of the complexities that scholarly treatments have identified. Our focus is on norms associated with the ideals of correctness and participation as sources of a politically legitimate deliberative outcome. In principle, both ideals are mutually coherent. If the information needed for a correct deliberative outcome is distributed among agents, then maximising participation increases information diversity. But both ideals can also be in tension. If participants lack competence or are prone to biases, a correct deliberative outcome requires limiting participation. The central question for public argumentation, therefore, is how to strike a balance between both ideals. Rather than advocating a preferred normative framework, our main purpose is to illustrate the complexity of this theme
- …