The Problem of Analogical Inference in Inductive Logic

We consider one problem that was largely left open by Rudolf Carnap in his work on inductive logic, the problem of analogical inference. After discussing some previous attempts to solve this problem, we propose a new solution that is based on the ideas of Bruno de Finetti on probabilistic symmetries. We explain how our new inductive logic can be developed within the Carnapian paradigm of inductive logic-deriving an inductive rule from a set of simple postulates about the observational process-and discuss some of its properties.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729

Complexity Characterization in a Probabilistic Approach to Dynamical Systems Through Information Geometry and Inductive Inference

Information geometric techniques and inductive inference methods hold great promise for solving computational problems of interest in classical and quantum physics, especially with regard to complexity characterization of dynamical systems in terms of their probabilistic description on curved statistical manifolds. In this article, we investigate the possibility of describing the macroscopic behavior of complex systems in terms of the underlying statistical structure of their microscopic degrees of freedom by use of statistical inductive inference and information geometry. We review the Maximum Relative Entropy (MrE) formalism and the theoretical structure of the information geometrodynamical approach to chaos (IGAC) on statistical manifolds. Special focus is devoted to the description of the roles played by the sectional curvature, the Jacobi field intensity and the information geometrodynamical entropy (IGE). These quantities serve as powerful information geometric complexity measures of information-constrained dynamics associated with arbitrary chaotic and regular systems defined on the statistical manifold. Finally, the application of such information geometric techniques to several theoretical models are presented.Comment: 29 page

Eternal Inflation: When Probabilities Fail

In eternally inflating cosmology, infinitely many pocket universes are seeded. Attempts to show that universes like our observable universe are probable amongst them have failed, since no unique probability measure is recoverable. This lack of definite probabilities is taken to reveal a complete predictive failure. Inductive inference over the pocket universes, it would seem, is impossible. I argue that this conclusion of impossibility mistakes the nature of the problem. It confuses the case in which no inductive inference is possible, with another in which a weaker inductive logic applies. The alternative, applicable inductive logic is determined by background conditions and is the same, non-probabilistic logic as applies to an infinite lottery. This inductive logic does not preclude all predictions, but does affirm that predictions useful to deciding for or against eternal inflation are precluded

Eternal Inflation: When Probabilities Fail

In eternally inflating cosmology, infinitely many pocket universes are seeded. Attempts to show that universes like our observable universe are probable amongst them have failed, since no unique probability measure is recoverable. This lack of definite probabilities is taken to reveal a complete predictive failure. Inductive inference over the pocket universes, it would seem, is impossible. I argue that this conclusion of impossibility mistakes the nature of the problem. It confuses the case in which no inductive inference is possible, with another in which a weaker inductive logic applies. The alternative, applicable inductive logic is determined by background conditions and is the same, non-probabilistic logic as applies to an infinite lottery. This inductive logic does not preclude all predictions, but does affirm that predictions useful to deciding for or against eternal inflation are precluded

Stable Model Counting and Its Application in Probabilistic Logic Programming

Model counting is the problem of computing the number of models that satisfy a given propositional theory. It has recently been applied to solving inference tasks in probabilistic logic programming, where the goal is to compute the probability of given queries being true provided a set of mutually independent random variables, a model (a logic program) and some evidence. The core of solving this inference task involves translating the logic program to a propositional theory and using a model counter. In this paper, we show that for some problems that involve inductive definitions like reachability in a graph, the translation of logic programs to SAT can be expensive for the purpose of solving inference tasks. For such problems, direct implementation of stable model semantics allows for more efficient solving. We present two implementation techniques, based on unfounded set detection, that extend a propositional model counter to a stable model counter. Our experiments show that for particular problems, our approach can outperform a state-of-the-art probabilistic logic programming solver by several orders of magnitude in terms of running time and space requirements, and can solve instances of significantly larger sizes on which the current solver runs out of time or memory.Comment: Accepted in AAAI, 201

There are no universal rules for induction

In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are warranted by facts that prevail locally. This approach, it is urged, is preferable to formal theories of induction in which the good inductive inferences are delineated as those conforming to universal schemas. An inductive inference problem concerning indeterministic, nonprobabilistic systems in physics is posed, and it is argued that Bayesians cannot responsibly analyze it, thereby demonstrating that the probability calculus is not the universal logic of induction. Copyright 2010 by the Philosophy of Science Association.All right reserved