Dynamic Size Counting in Population Protocols

The population protocol model describes a network of anonymous agents that interact asynchronously in pairs chosen at random. Each agent starts in the same initial state $s$. We introduce the *dynamic size counting* problem: approximately counting the number of agents in the presence of an adversary who at any time can remove any number of agents or add any number of new agents in state $s$. A valid solution requires that after each addition/removal event, resulting in population size $n$, with high probability each agent "quickly" computes the same constant-factor estimate of the value $\log_2 n$ (how quickly is called the *convergence* time), which remains the output of every agent for as long as possible (the *holding* time). Since the adversary can remove agents, the holding time is necessarily finite: even after the adversary stops altering the population, it is impossible to *stabilize* to an output that never again changes. We first show that a protocol solves the dynamic size counting problem if and only if it solves the *loosely-stabilizing counting* problem: that of estimating $\log n$ in a *fixed-size* population, but where the adversary can initialize each agent in an arbitrary state, with the same convergence time and holding time. We then show a protocol solving the loosely-stabilizing counting problem with the following guarantees: if the population size is $n$, $M$ is the largest initial estimate of $\log n$, and s is the maximum integer initially stored in any field of the agents' memory, we have expected convergence time $O(\log n + \log M)$, expected polynomial holding time, and expected memory usage of $O(\log^2 (s) + (\log \log n)^2)$ bits. Interpreted as a dynamic size counting protocol, when changing from population size $n_{prev}$ to $n_{next}$, the convergence time is $O(\log n_{next} + \log \log n_{prev})$

Computer Aided Verification

This open access two-volume set LNCS 10980 and 10981 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 30th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, CAV 2018, held in Oxford, UK, in July 2018. The 52 full and 13 tool papers presented together with 3 invited papers and 2 tutorials were carefully reviewed and selected from 215 submissions. The papers cover a wide range of topics and techniques, from algorithmic and logical foundations of verification to practical applications in distributed, networked, cyber-physical, and autonomous systems. They are organized in topical sections on model checking, program analysis using polyhedra, synthesis, learning, runtime verification, hybrid and timed systems, tools, probabilistic systems, static analysis, theory and security, SAT, SMT and decisions procedures, concurrency, and CPS, hardware, industrial applications

Selecting a Leader in a Network of Finite State Machines

This paper studies a variant of the leader election problem under the stone age model (Emek and Wattenhofer, PODC 2013) that considers a network of n randomized finite automata with very weak communication capabilities (a multi-frequency asynchronous generalization of the beeping model\u27s communication scheme). Since solving the classic leader election problem is impossible even in more powerful models, we consider a relaxed variant, referred to as k-leader selection, in which a leader should be selected out of at most k initial candidates. Our main contribution is an algorithm that solves k-leader selection for bounded k in the aforementioned stone age model. On (general topology) graphs of diameter D, this algorithm runs in O~(D) time and succeeds with high probability. The assumption that k is bounded turns out to be unavoidable: we prove that if k = omega (1), then no algorithm in this model can solve k-leader selection with a (positive) constant probability

Reduce to the Max: A Simple Approach for Massive-Scale Privacy-Preserving Collaborative Network Measurements (Extended Version)

Privacy-preserving techniques for distributed computation have been proposed recently as a promising framework in collaborative inter-domain network monitoring. Several different approaches exist to solve such class of problems, e.g., Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) based on Shamir's Secret Sharing algorithm (SSS). Such techniques are complete from a computation-theoretic perspective: given a set of private inputs, it is possible to perform arbitrary computation tasks without revealing any of the intermediate results. In fact, HE and SSS can operate also on secret inputs and/or provide secret outputs. However, they are computationally expensive and do not scale well in the number of players and/or in the rate of computation tasks. In this paper we advocate the use of "elementary" (as opposite to "complete") Secure Multiparty Computation (E-SMC) procedures for traffic monitoring. E-SMC supports only simple computations with private input and public output, i.e., it can not handle secret input nor secret (intermediate) output. Such a simplification brings a dramatic reduction in complexity and enables massive-scale implementation with acceptable delay and overhead. Notwithstanding its simplicity, we claim that an E-SMC scheme is sufficient to perform a great variety of computation tasks of practical relevance to collaborative network monitoring, including, e.g., anonymous publishing and set operations. This is achieved by combining a E-SMC scheme with data structures like Bloom Filters and bitmap strings.Comment: This is an extended version of the paper presented at the Third International Workshop on Traffic Monitoring and Analysis (TMA'11), Vienna, 27 April 201