Getting the real-time precise round-trip time for stepping stone detection

Stepping stone attacks are often used by network intruders to hide their identities. The Round Trip Times (RTT) between the send packets and corresponding echo packets for the connection chains of stepping stones are critical for detecting such attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel real-time RTT getting algorithm for stepping stones which is based on the estimation of the current RTT value. Our experiments show that it is far more precise than the previous real-time RTT getting algorithms. We also present the probability analysis which shows that our algorithm has a high matching rate and a high accurate rate

A quick-response real-time stepping stone detection scheme

Stepping stone attacks are often used by network intruders to hide their identities. To detect and block stepping stone attacks, a stepping stone detection scheme should be able to correctly identify a stepping-stone in a very short time and in real-time. However, the majority of past research has failed to indicate how long or how many packets it takes for the monitor to detect a stepping stone. In this paper, we propose a novel quick-response real-time stepping stones detection scheme which is based on packet delay properties. Our experiments show that it can identify a stepping stone within 20 seconds which includes false positives and false negatives of less than 3%

Precise ICMP Traceback Based On Normal Flow Filtration in Denial of Services Attack

In past two decades, Internet has developed rapidly and has integrated in many aspects of human life. Any disruption of connectivity and the overuse of services cause for service unavailability to its intended users. The Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are becoming more serious in security of Internet. DoS is a harmful attempt in targeting to limit or deny availability of service to legitimate users. This kind of attack can be done by consuming important resources. The best action is to block the attack traffic at its source. There is no easy way to this approach because attacker can spoof the source IP address easily. Traceback models try to locate source of attack regardless of whether the source address field in each packet contains false information or not. Intention-driven model, a sampling traceback technique, provides information about the attack flow and able to reconstruct the attack path to the source of attack by the aid of Intrusion Detection system (IDS). This technique does not have any flow differentiate mechanism. In other words, it is unable to differentiate legitimate user and attacker, when both of them sending packet via same route to the victim. As a result, providing incorrect information and locate false point about the source of attack. To overcome this weakness, this research aims to increase the generation of more useful ICMP traceback packets, which includes attack path information. More useful information about the attack flow provided by the routers along the attack path to the IDS, can provide higher accuracy to locate the attacker. To achieve such a goal, this research improves the Intention-driven ICMP traceback model by filtering normal flow in the specific short time and two new algorithms in UDP-based and TCP-based attack are applied. As a consequence of filtering of normal flow, the percentage of packets belonging to the attack flow will be expanded and the chance of generating ICMP traceback messages which contain attack flow information will be increased. The results show the proposed model used in this research increases the percentage of useful ICMP traceback messages in UDP-based attack about 10% and 14% in the TCP-based attack when compared to the previous work. The proposed model also decreases percentage of ineffective generated iTrace packets in both UDP-based and TCP-based attack about 10%

Patterns and Interactions in Network Security

Networks play a central role in cyber-security: networks deliver security attacks, suffer from them, defend against them, and sometimes even cause them. This article is a concise tutorial on the large subject of networks and security, written for all those interested in networking, whether their specialty is security or not. To achieve this goal, we derive our focus and organization from two perspectives. The first perspective is that, although mechanisms for network security are extremely diverse, they are all instances of a few patterns. Consequently, after a pragmatic classification of security attacks, the main sections of the tutorial cover the four patterns for providing network security, of which the familiar three are cryptographic protocols, packet filtering, and dynamic resource allocation. Although cryptographic protocols hide the data contents of packets, they cannot hide packet headers. When users need to hide packet headers from adversaries, which may include the network from which they are receiving service, they must resort to the pattern of compound sessions and overlays. The second perspective comes from the observation that security mechanisms interact in important ways, with each other and with other aspects of networking, so each pattern includes a discussion of its interactions.Comment: 63 pages, 28 figures, 56 reference

Graph-based feature enrichment for online intrusion detection in virtual networks

The increasing number of connected devices to provide the required ubiquitousness of Internet of Things paves the way for distributed network attacks at an unprecedented scale. Graph theory, strengthened by machine learning techniques, improves an automatic discovery of group behavior patterns of network threats often omitted by traditional security systems. Furthermore, Network Function Virtualization is an emergent technology that accelerates the provisioning of on-demand security function chains tailored to an application. Therefore, repeatable compliance tests and performance comparison of such function chains are mandatory. The contributions of this dissertation are divided in two parts. First, we propose an intrusion detection system for online threat detection enriched by a graph-learning analysis. We develop a feature enrichment algorithm that infers metrics from a graph analysis. By using different machine learning techniques, we evaluated our algorithm for three network traffic datasets. We show that the proposed graph-based enrichment improves the threat detection accuracy up to 15.7% and significantly reduces the false positives rate. Second, we aim to evaluate intrusion detection systems deployed as virtual network functions. Therefore, we propose and develop SFCPerf, a framework for an automatic performance evaluation of service function chaining. To demonstrate SFCPerf functionality, we design and implement a prototype of a security service function chain, composed of our intrusion detection system and a firewall. We show the results of a SFCPerf experiment that evaluates the chain prototype on top of the open platform for network function virtualization (OPNFV).O crescente número de dispositivos IoT conectados contribui para a ocorrência de ataques distribuídos de negação de serviço a uma escala sem precedentes. A Teoria de Grafos, reforçada por técnicas de aprendizado de máquina, melhora a descoberta automática de padrões de comportamento de grupos de ameaças de rede, muitas vezes omitidas pelos sistemas tradicionais de segurança. Nesse sentido, a virtualização da função de rede é uma tecnologia emergente que pode acelerar o provisionamento de cadeias de funções de segurança sob demanda para uma aplicação. Portanto, a repetição de testes de conformidade e a comparação de desempenho de tais cadeias de funções são obrigatórios. As contribuições desta dissertação são separadas em duas partes. Primeiro, é proposto um sistema de detecção de intrusão que utiliza um enriquecimento baseado em grafos para aprimorar a detecção de ameaças online. Um algoritmo de enriquecimento de características é desenvolvido e avaliado através de diferentes técnicas de aprendizado de máquina. Os resultados mostram que o enriquecimento baseado em grafos melhora a acurácia da detecção de ameaças até 15,7 % e reduz significativamente o número de falsos positivos. Em seguida, para avaliar sistemas de detecção de intrusões implantados como funções virtuais de rede, este trabalho propõe e desenvolve o SFCPerf, um framework para avaliação automática de desempenho do encadeamento de funções de rede. Para demonstrar a funcionalidade do SFCPerf, ´e implementado e avaliado um protótipo de uma cadeia de funções de rede de segurança, composta por um sistema de detecção de intrusão (IDS) e um firewall sobre a plataforma aberta para virtualização de função de rede (OPNFV)

Adversarial Examples in Constrained Domains

Machine learning algorithms have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial manipulation through systematic modification of inputs (e.g., adversarial examples) in domains such as image recognition. Under the default threat model, the adversary exploits the unconstrained nature of images; each feature (pixel) is fully under control of the adversary. However, it is not clear how these attacks translate to constrained domains that limit which and how features can be modified by the adversary (e.g., network intrusion detection). In this paper, we explore whether constrained domains are less vulnerable than unconstrained domains to adversarial example generation algorithms. We create an algorithm for generating adversarial sketches: targeted universal perturbation vectors which encode feature saliency within the envelope of domain constraints. To assess how these algorithms perform, we evaluate them in constrained (e.g., network intrusion detection) and unconstrained (e.g., image recognition) domains. The results demonstrate that our approaches generate misclassification rates in constrained domains that were comparable to those of unconstrained domains (greater than 95%). Our investigation shows that the narrow attack surface exposed by constrained domains is still sufficiently large to craft successful adversarial examples; and thus, constraints do not appear to make a domain robust. Indeed, with as little as five randomly selected features, one can still generate adversarial examples.Comment: 17 pages, 5 figure