Model checking quantum Markov chains

Although the security of quantum cryptography is provable based on the principles of quantum mechanics, it can be compromised by the flaws in the design of quantum protocols and the noise in their physical implementations. So, it is indispensable to develop techniques of verifying and debugging quantum cryptographic systems. Model-checking has proved to be effective in the verification of classical cryptographic protocols, but an essential difficulty arises when it is applied to quantum systems: the state space of a quantum system is always a continuum even when its dimension is finite. To overcome this difficulty, we introduce a novel notion of quantum Markov chain, specially suited to model quantum cryptographic protocols, in which quantum effects are entirely encoded into super-operators labelling transitions, leaving the location information (nodes) being classical. Then we define a quantum extension of probabilistic computation tree logic (PCTL) and develop a model-checking algorithm for quantum Markov chains.Comment: Journal versio

Analysis of the Security of BB84 by Model Checking

Quantum Cryptography or Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique that allows the secure distribution of a bit string, used as key in cryptographic protocols. When it was noted that quantum computers could break public key cryptosystems based on number theory extensive studies have been undertaken on QKD. Based on quantum mechanics, QKD offers unconditionally secure communication. Now, the progress of research in this field allows the anticipation of QKD to be available outside of laboratories within the next few years. Efforts are made to improve the performance and reliability of the implemented technologies. But several challenges remain despite this big progress. The task of how to test the apparatuses of QKD For example did not yet receive enough attention. These devises become complex and demand a big verification effort. In this paper we are interested in an approach based on the technique of probabilistic model checking for studying quantum information. Precisely, we use the PRISM tool to analyze the security of BB84 protocol and we are focused on the specific security property of eavesdropping detection. We show that this property is affected by the parameters of quantum channel and the power of eavesdropper.Comment: 12 Pages, IJNS

Automated Verification of Quantum Protocols using MCMAS

We present a methodology for the automated verification of quantum protocols using MCMAS, a symbolic model checker for multi-agent systems The method is based on the logical framework developed by D'Hondt and Panangaden for investigating epistemic and temporal properties, built on the model for Distributed Measurement-based Quantum Computation (DMC), an extension of the Measurement Calculus to distributed quantum systems. We describe the translation map from DMC to interpreted systems, the typical formalism for reasoning about time and knowledge in multi-agent systems. Then, we introduce dmc2ispl, a compiler into the input language of the MCMAS model checker. We demonstrate the technique by verifying the Quantum Teleportation Protocol, and discuss the performance of the tool.Comment: In Proceedings QAPL 2012, arXiv:1207.055

Symbolic Abstractions for Quantum Protocol Verification

Quantum protocols such as the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution protocol exchange qubits to achieve information-theoretic security guarantees. Many variants thereof were proposed, some of them being already deployed. Existing security proofs in that field are mostly tedious, error-prone pen-and-paper proofs of the core protocol only that rarely account for other crucial components such as authentication. This calls for formal and automated verification techniques that exhaustively explore all possible intruder behaviors and that scale well. The symbolic approach offers rigorous, mathematical frameworks and automated tools to analyze security protocols. Based on well-designed abstractions, it has allowed for large-scale formal analyses of real-life protocols such as TLS 1.3 and mobile telephony protocols. Hence a natural question is: Can we use this successful line of work to analyze quantum protocols? This paper proposes a first positive answer and motivates further research on this unexplored path

Quantum Weakly Nondeterministic Communication Complexity

We study the weakest model of quantum nondeterminism in which a classical proof has to be checked with probability one by a quantum protocol. We show the first separation between classical nondeterministic communication complexity and this model of quantum nondeterministic communication complexity for a total function. This separation is quadratic.Comment: 12 pages. v3: minor correction

Symbolic bisimulation for quantum processes

With the previous notions of bisimulation presented in literature, to check if two quantum processes are bisimilar, we have to instantiate the free quantum variables of them with arbitrary quantum states, and verify the bisimilarity of resultant configurations. This makes checking bisimilarity infeasible from an algorithmic point of view because quantum states constitute a continuum. In this paper, we introduce a symbolic operational semantics for quantum processes directly at the quantum operation level, which allows us to describe the bisimulation between quantum processes without resorting to quantum states. We show that the symbolic bisimulation defined here is equivalent to the open bisimulation for quantum processes in the previous work, when strong bisimulations are considered. An algorithm for checking symbolic ground bisimilarity is presented. We also give a modal logical characterisation for quantum bisimilarity based on an extension of Hennessy-Milner logic to quantum processes.Comment: 30 pages, 7 figures, comments are welcom

Quantitative Verification: Formal Guarantees for Timeliness, Reliability and Performance

Computerised systems appear in almost all aspects of our daily lives, often in safety-critical scenarios such as embedded control systems in cars and aircraft or medical devices such as pacemakers and sensors. We are thus increasingly reliant on these systems working correctly, despite often operating in unpredictable or unreliable environments. Designers of such devices need ways to guarantee that they will operate in a reliable and efficient manner. Quantitative verification is a technique for analysing quantitative aspects of a system's design, such as timeliness, reliability or performance. It applies formal methods, based on a rigorous analysis of a mathematical model of the system, to automatically prove certain precisely specified properties, e.g. ``the airbag will always deploy within 20 milliseconds after a crash'' or ``the probability of both sensors failing simultaneously is less than 0.001''. The ability to formally guarantee quantitative properties of this kind is beneficial across a wide range of application domains. For example, in safety-critical systems, it may be essential to establish credible bounds on the probability with which certain failures or combinations of failures can occur. In embedded control systems, it is often important to comply with strict constraints on timing or resources. More generally, being able to derive guarantees on precisely specified levels of performance or efficiency is a valuable tool in the design of, for example, wireless networking protocols, robotic systems or power management algorithms, to name but a few. This report gives a short introduction to quantitative verification, focusing in particular on a widely used technique called model checking, and its generalisation to the analysis of quantitative aspects of a system such as timing, probabilistic behaviour or resource usage. The intended audience is industrial designers and developers of systems such as those highlighted above who could benefit from the application of quantitative verification,but lack expertise in formal verification or modelling