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A Truthful Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment Problem
We propose a truthful-in-expectation, -approximation mechanism for a
strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP). In GAP, a set of
items has to be optimally assigned to a set of bins without exceeding the
capacity of any singular bin. In the strategic variant of the problem we study,
values for assigning items to bins are the private information of bidders and
the mechanism should provide bidders with incentives to truthfully report their
values. The approximation ratio of the mechanism is a significant improvement
over the approximation ratio of the existing truthful mechanism for GAP.
The proposed mechanism comprises a novel convex optimization program as the
allocation rule as well as an appropriate payment rule. To implement the convex
program in polynomial time, we propose a fractional local search algorithm
which approximates the optimal solution within an arbitrarily small error
leading to an approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism. The presented
algorithm improves upon the existing optimization algorithms for GAP in terms
of simplicity and runtime while the approximation ratio closely matches the
best approximation ratio given for GAP when all inputs are publicly known.Comment: 18 pages, Earlier version accepted at WINE 201
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