98,583 research outputs found

    Informational privacy: a precondition for democratic participation?

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    The value of informational privacy has long ceased to be seen merely in the protection or exercise of individual autonomy. Already in the early 1980s, the German Federal Court pointed out that the political autonomy of citizens in exercising their democratic rights and duties would be incompatible with a “social and legal order [
], in which citizens could no longer know who knows what about them, when and on what occasion” (BVerfGE 65, 1). In this blog post, I want to highlight four dangers to democratic rule that may arise out of a society, in which privacy rights are not adequately protected or are even disregarded

    GDPR: Governance implications for regimes outside the EU

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    It is estimated that as of 2017 around 120 nations around the globe had legislation to protect personal data with at least another 30 in train. Many of the early regimes (dating back to the 1980s and 90s) reflect the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980, updated 2013). However, there are also increasing concerns that these guidelines may no longer be fit for purpose with recent issues regarding breaches of data security and privacy. The EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (2016) implements a reformed data privacy regime. Tellingly, some of the new and pending privacy regulations elsewhere reflect the GDPR, a characteristic that suggests much about the impact of international trade. Two questions arise: first, how is the GDPR likely to affect and influence governance of organisations, not only those domiciled in the EU, but also those trading with the Union or having a presence there? Second, compared to the GDPR, what gaps are there in other existing privacy regimes and what are the implications for the governance of those organisations and their risk management strategies? This paper compares the GDPR with privacy regimes in place in New Zealand and Australia (the first of which has GDPR “approved country status” for receipt of data) and attempts to answer the questions above, thus providing a focus for empirical research. As such, the paper provides insight into the impact of the data privacy and security legislative reform, on corporate governance, strategy and risk management beyond the EU in its reach to far distant regions. © The Authors, 2018. All Rights Reserved.Proceedings of the 14th European Conference on Management, Leadership and Governance, ECMLG 201

    Reviving the Public Trustee Concept and Applying It to Information Privacy Policy

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    Porn Wars: Serious Value, Social Harm, and the Burdens of Modern Obscenity Doctrine

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    During the 1980s, anti-pornography ideologues—an unlikely alliance of feminist activists and right-wing evangelical Christians—waged an open war against pornography and the anti-censorship feminists who supported legal protection for pornographic works. Following a pivotal defeat of an anti-pornography ordinance in federal court, the ideologies constituted in the so-called “Porn Wars” continued to guide obscenity doctrine. These ideologies have informed lower courts’ understanding of the harms and values associated with sexually explicit content more than constitutional scholars recognize, at least explicitly. Although courts recognize core feminist values such as sexual autonomy and privacy in sexually explicit content, they have built doctrine that essentially forestalls the exchange of sexual content, even among consenting adults in private and quasi-private spaces. Anti-pornography presumptions of harmful effects predominate lower court decisions in ways that could produce disastrous consequences for artistic speech, privacy, and even public health

    Reinventing Media Activism: Public Interest Advocacy in the Making of U.S. Communication-Information Policy, 1960-2002

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    This report is a long-term analysis of citizens' collective action to influence public policy toward communication and information. The work discusses in greater detail what is meant by communication and information policy (CIP) and why we think it is worthwhile to study it as a distinctive domain of public policy and citizen action. The report concentrates on citizen action in the United States and looks backwards, tracing the long-term evolutionary trajectory of communications-information advocacy in the USA since the 1960s. We focus on the concept of citizen collective action and explain its relevance to CIP.Research supported by the Ford Foundation's Knowledge, Creativity and Freedom Program. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the School of Information Studies, Syracuse University, or the Ford Foundation

    Women in the Legal Academy: A Brief History of Feminist Legal Theory

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    Women’s entry into the legal academy in significant numbers—first as students, then as faculty—was a 1970s and 1980s phenomenon. During those decades, women in law schools struggled: first, for admission and inclusion as individual students on a formally equal footing with male students; then for parity in their numbers in classes and on faculties; and, eventually, for some measure of substantive equality across various parameters, including their performance and evaluation both in and in front of the classroom, as well as in the quality of their experiences as students and faculty members and in the benefits to be reaped from their tenure. This part of the story of women’s entry into the legal academy in the 1970s and 1980s—a story of attempted admission, then inclusion, then integration and assimilation, and then, finally, equality—is now a familiar one, at least in broad outline. It is not, in its entirety, an uplifting story. According to a raft of articles produced by women law students in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, women law students during those decades participated less in the classroom, were called on and responded to differently when they did participate, suffered from more law-school-induced anxiety disorders and other mental health issues, graduated with lower GPAs and less law review experience, published fewer notes and filled fewer editorial positions on those journals, held fewer leadership positions overall while in law school, and had far more difficulties connecting with mentors, teachers, and would-be recommenders among the faculty than male students. Women law professors during those decades were tenured at significantly lower rates than men and, particularly at high prestige schools and at schools with fewer female faculty among the tenured ranks, were hired at lower rates that did not reflect their number in the pool of qualified applicants, had trouble asserting or maintaining authority in the classroom or being perceived as having authority, taught lower-prestige courses and received low teaching evaluations, and, like their students, were published far less frequently in the major and most prestigious law reviews. Much of this, albeit not all, has not changed much for either students or faculty. As women in law schools enter the posttenure and midcareer phase, many of the old problems persist while new ones appear: women faculty are invited to participate on panels less often than men, and both women students and faculty are underrepresented as authors in law reviews. Although gender-neutral parental leave is now available to faculty at most law schools, many such policies are still ad hoc. There is considerable worry, although no hard evidence, over whether men disproportionately use the time off to write rather than care for children. Women are still disproportionately overrepresented in some fields and underrepresented or unrepresented in others, and those fields correlate in unsurprising ways with levels of prestige: the more women in a field, the less prestigious. As elsewhere in the workforce, women faculty in legal education suffer from sexual harassment, most of which is unremedied. Women still suffer a pay gap in law schools that remains unaddressed at most universities, as it does elsewhere in academia. There is a sizeable literature on these depressing phenomena that stubbornly do not seem to abate. In these comments, however, I want to focus on another, less appreciated, part of the story of women’s entry into the legal academy in the 1970s and 1980s: the emergence of a body of scholarship—sometimes called feminist legal theory—produced by some of these women legal scholars over the same time period. The story I want to focus on, in other words, is not that of second- or third-wave women’s struggles within the academy, either for admission, acceptance, assimilation, or equality in law schools. Rather, this Article focuses on the story of the scholarship some of those second-wave assimilated women produced once they got there. Feminist jurisprudence, understood largely as scholarship on issues pertaining to gender equality, was launched in the 1970s, endures today, and continues to shape debates. Feminist legal theory, however, was in effect a subfield within feminist jurisprudence and, as its name implies, was an attempt to fashion a broad- based theoretical account of the relationship of law in liberal legal regimes to women’s subordination, patriarchy, and gender and sexual inequality— particularly in a post–civil rights era, when women enjoyed broad access to rights of formal equality, reproductive liberty, and liberal antidiscrimination law. Feminist legal theory so understood—a body of scholarship in search of a theoretical understanding of the relation of law to women’s subordination or, more simply, of law and patriarchy—was birthed in the 1970s, nurtured in the 1980s, and matured in the 1990s. I suggest in this Article that it is now seemingly in decline, and may soon disappear altogether. The reasons for this trajectory, I believe, are to date unexplored. Some reasons are fairly self-evident. Feminist legal theory was a product of three time-specific factors peculiar to the 1970s and 1980s: it reflected the political and the legal struggles of second-wave feminism. The critical theory schools were, to varying degrees, present or thriving in the academy in the 1970s and 1980s, within which feminist legal theory was birthed, grew, and then coexisted with critical theory, albeit at times very uneasily; and this feminist theory reflected second-wave women faculty and students’ mixed experiences of assimilation, success, and alienation in law schools themselves, as briefly recited above. Those three factors—the background politics, the presence of critical theory in law schools, and the differences in women’s experience of those schools—are all themselves either disappearing or dissipating in felt urgency, albeit in different ways and at different speeds, and that dissipation clearly is a part of the story of feminist legal theory’s decline. There are other reasons for its decline as well, however. Some are internal to feminism and feminist theory, and some pertain to the changing nature of legal scholarship from the 1980s to the present. I explore these reasons in Part II below. The story of the development of a distinctively feminist legal theory during the 1970s through the 1990s, and the story of its decline in the 2000s, is of obvious relevance to the history of second- and third-wave feminism. It should also be of interest for what it reveals about the nature of legal scholarship as it was understood, received, and produced in those decades. Its decline likewise reveals something about the changing nature of legal scholarship and the legal academy today. Thus, one conclusion I draw is that the feminist legal theory of the 1970s through the 1990s—regardless of the truth or lasting power of its claims—stands as an example of a type of legal scholarship that was somewhat distinctive to those decades. That form of legal scholarship, furthermore, likely can only emanate from the legal academy. For a host of reasons, we are currently in danger of losing this entire genre of intellectual work, which would be the polity’s loss, not just feminism’s or the legal academy’s

    Feminist Legal Scholarship: A History Through the Lens of the California Law Review

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    This Essay describes the evolution of feminist legal scholarship, using six articles published by the California Law Review as exemplars. This short history provides a window on the most important contributions of feminist scholarship to understandings about gender and law. It explores alternative formulations of equality, and the competing assumptions, ideals, and implications of these formulations. It describes frameworks of thought intended to compensate for the limitations of equality doctrine, including critical legal feminism, different voice theory, and nonsubordination theory, and the relationships between these frameworks. Finally, it identifies feminist legal scholarship that has crossed the disciplinary bound-aries of law. Among its conclusions, the Essay points out that as feminist scholarship has become more mainstream, its assumptions and methods are less distinct. It observes that even as feminist legal scholarship has generated important, insightful critiques of equality doctrine, it remains committed to the concept of equality, as continually revised and refined. The Essay also highlights the importance of feminist activism and practice in sharpening and refining feminist legal scholarship

    Privacy self-regulation and the changing role of the state: from public law to social and technical mechanisms of governance

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    This paper provides a structured overview of different self-governance mechanisms for privacy and data protection in the corporate world, with a special focus on Internet privacy. It also looks at the role of the state, and how it has related to privacy self-governance over time. While early data protection started out as law-based regulation by nation-states, transnational self-governance mechanisms have become more important due to the rise of global telecommunications and the Internet. Reach, scope, precision and enforcement of these industry codes of conduct vary a lot. The more binding they are, the more limited is their reach, though they - like the state-based instruments for privacy protection - are becoming more harmonised and global in reach nowadays. These social codes of conduct are developed by the private sector with limited participation of official data protection commissioners, public interest groups, or international organisations. Software tools - technical codes - for online privacy protection can give back some control over their data to individual users and customers, but only have limited reach and applications. The privacy-enhancing design of network infrastructures and database architectures is still mainly developed autonomously by the computer and software industry. Here, we can recently find a stronger, but new role of the state. Instead of regulating data processors directly, governments and oversight agencies now focus more on the intermediaries - standards developers, large software companies, or industry associations. And instead of prescribing and penalising, they now rely more on incentive-structures like certifications or public funding for social and technical self-governance instruments of privacy protection. The use of technology as an instrument and object of regulation is thereby becoming more popular, but the success of this approach still depends on the social codes and the underlying norms which technology is supposed to embed. --

    40 Years of FOIA, 20 Years of Delay: Oldest Pending Freedom of Information Requests Date Back to the 1980s

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    Presents findings from the Knight Open Government Survey, which surveys government offices and agencies on the status of their public information requests, and finds that extensive backlogs persist

    The New Policy Agenda for Financial Services

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