The future of Internet governance: should the U.S. relinquish Its authority over ICANN?

How ICANN and the Internet domain name system are ultimately governed may set an important precedent in future policy debates over how the Internet should be governed, and what role governments and intergovernmental organizations should play. Overview Currently, the U.S. government retains limited authority over the Internet’s domain name system, primarily through the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions contract between the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). By virtue of the IANA functions contract, the NTIA exerts a legacy authority and stewardship over ICANN, and arguably has more influence over ICANN and the domain name system (DNS) than other national governments. On March 14, 2014, NTIA announced the intention to transition its stewardship role and procedural authority over key Internet domain name functions to the global Internet multistakeholder community. To accomplish this transition, NTIA has asked ICANN to convene interested global Internet stakeholders to develop a transition proposal. NTIA has stated that it will not accept any transition proposal that would replace the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution. Currently, Internet stakeholders are engaged in a series of working groups to develop a transition proposal. Their goal is to submit a final proposal to NTIA by summer 2015. NTIA must approve the proposal in order for it to relinquish its authority over the IANA functions contract. While the IANA functions contract expires on September 30, 2015, NTIA has the flexibility to extend the contract for any period through September 2019. Concerns have risen in Congress over the proposed transition. Critics worry that relinquishing U.S. authority over Internet domain names may offer opportunities for either hostile foreign governments or intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations, to gain undue influence over the Internet. On the other hand, supporters argue that this transition completes the necessary evolution of Internet domain name governance towards the private sector, and will ultimately support and strengthen the multistakeholder model of Internet governance. Legislation has been introduced in the 113th and 114th Congresses which would prevent, delay, or impose conditions or additional scrutiny on the transition. In the 113th Congress, a provision in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) provides that during FY2015, NTIA may not use any appropriated funds to relinquish its responsibility with respect to Internet domain name system functions. In the 114th Congress, H.R. 805 (the DOTCOM Act of 2015) would prohibit NTIA from relinquishing its authority over the Internet domain name system until the Government Accountability Office (GAO) submits a report to Congress examining the implications of the proposed transfer. The proposed transition could have a significant impact on the future of Internet governance. National governments are recognizing an increasing stake in ICANN and DNS policy decisions, especially in cases where Internet DNS policy intersects with national laws and interests related to issues such as intellectual property, cybersecurity, privacy, and Internet freedom. How ICANN and the Internet domain name system are ultimately governed may set an important precedent in future policy debates—both domestically and internationally—over how the Internet should be governed, and what role governments and intergovernmental organizations should play

SOVEREIGN DOMAINS: A Declaration of Independence of ccTLDs from Foreign Control

In the year 2000, the Government Advisory Committee (“GAC”) of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) passed a set of principles that essentially claimed national sovereignty over country code top-level domains (“ccTLD”s) such as .us, .ca, .uk and .au. Shortly thereafter, ICANN redelegated several ccTLDs in accordance with new GAC principles. Despite the outcry accompanying the passage of these principles and ICANN’s self-professed adherence thereto, the entire exercise could easily be criticized as merely symbolic because of the overriding power of ICANN in the operation of the Domain Name System (“DNS”). Indeed, Stuart Lynn, ICANN’s current president, summed up the lack of power that ccTLDs have within the governance structure of the Internet when he opined that “ICANN could, in theory, recommend that a particular ccTLD be redelegated to a cooperating administrator. If the United States government accepted that recommendation, non-cooperating ccTLD administrators would be replaced.

Decentralized trust in the inter-domain routing infrastructure

Inter-domain routing security is of critical importance to the Internet since it prevents unwanted traffic redirections. The current system is based on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), a centralized repository of digital certificates. However, the inherent centralization of such design creates tensions between its participants and hinders its deployment. In addition, some technical drawbacks of PKIs delay widespread adoption. In this paper we present IPchain, a blockchain to store the allocations and delegations of IP addresses. IPchain leverages blockchains' properties to decentralize trust among its participants, with the final goal of providing flexible trust models that adapt better to the ever-changing geopolitical landscape. Moreover, we argue that Proof of Stake is a suitable consensus algorithm for IPchain due to the unique incentive structure of this use-case, and that blockchains offer relevant technical advantages when compared to existing systems, such as simplified management. In order to show its feasibility and suitability, we have implemented and evaluated IPchain's performance and scalability storing around 350k IP prefixes in a 2.5 GB chain.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

ICANN : guilty as charged

Discusses the role of ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), a private not-for-profit California corporation created to manage the Internet domain name system and take the regulatory action that the US Department of Commerce (DoC) was unable or unwilling to handle directly. Considers ICANN's legal status and policy-making activities. Explores the criticisms that have been levelled at ICANN, relating to: (1) the DoC's relationship with ICANN; (2) the violation of competition laws; and (3) the effect of ICANN's actions in Europe

Restraining ICANN: an analysis of OFAC sanctions and their impact on the Internet Corporation for assigned names and numbers

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has long played a crucial role in coordinating some aspects of the domain name system (DNS) and managing domain names and Internet Protocol Addresses. In 2016, ICANN underwent a significant transformation when completing the IANA Transition, aimed at securing the corporation’s independence from U.S. government oversight. However, while the transition marked a pivotal moment in ICANN’s history, the corporation still operates within U.S. jurisdiction. This situation makes ICANN subject to compliance with the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions programs, impeding the corporation from contracting and accrediting gTLD registries and registrars from countries currently targeted by OFAC, as well as individuals or entities included in OFAC’s «Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons» (SDN) list. This article explores the implications of the IANA Transition, the constraints that OFAC exerts on ICANN operations, and the complexities surrounding potential solutions to the OFAC sanctions quandar

The role of non-state actors in regime formation: Case study on Internet governance.

Many scholars argue that the Internet is a symbol of globalization and avoidance of state control. The Internet governance negotiations, which aims to establish an international regime for the Internet, is conducted through a multi-stakeholder setting associated with extensive involvement of non-state actors. This has been viewed as an indicator for a \u27diminishing state role\u27 in international relations; particularly, formation of international regimes. This study indicates that the role of states does not diminish in regime formation. States, especially great powers, are the main actors that set international principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. They create regimes in order to regulate international behavior as to global sectors, including the Internet. States deliberately enable certain non-state actors to participate in regime formation and governance of some global sectors, based on conscious perception of the utility and usefulness of such participation

The Internet Name Game and the Nonprofit Solution

This paper is a case study of the campaign to create a new internet names authority to handle the assignment of internet domain names. Almost everyone knows by now that the Internet was originally a defense research project, which morphed into a research network for scientists and then into a tool of higher education and eventually into the commercial and general household utility we know today. In terms familiar to nonprofit research community what began in the state sector, expanded into the third sector and then into the market and household sectors and the consumer economy. There is a second and more recent story of the development of the internet, however, which is equally relevant to third sector theory: It is an almost perfect case of a cooperative and workable third-sector solution implemented on a voluntary basis by the members of the Internet Society which was eventually replaced by a government-imposed but unstable market solution. Faced with the need to expand beyond the original limits of the .com domain, the search for new solutions led to a subsequent round of market failures followed by government failure and eventually a return to a non-profit solution, which is currently being implemented (and proved durable for at least the next two decades). This case study explores the familiar dynamics of market failure, government failure and a number of other related issues raised by the case

The Patriation of .ca

Country code top level domains (‘‘ccTLD’’s), such as .ca, are distinct from generic top-level domains (‘‘gTLD’’s), such as .com, in that they are generally conceived to be associated with a specific country. In Canada, the authority to operate the technical functions of the .ca domain name registry has been delegated to the Canadian Internet Registration Authority (‘‘CIRA’’) by a United States non-profit corporation, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (‘‘ICANN’’). The authority to make policy regarding the .ca has purportedly been delegated to CIRA by the Government of Canada. There is an issue, however, as to whether ICANN’s delegation of authority to CIRA to manage the technical functions of the .ca reflects a diminished ability of Canada to decide the identity of the .ca registry and, by implication, to control the registry’s operational policies, thereby diminishing Canada’s sovereignty over the .ca domain. While ICANN has been criticized as illegitimate, unfair, anticompetitive and its dispute settlement procedure systematically biased, this paper steps back from those issues and asks whether acknowledging the technical authority of a private foreign entity over the .ca domain is consistent with Canada’s commitment to political sovereignty. For, as Lessig has pointed out, in cyberspace, code (computer hardware and software) is like law in that code regulates how cyberspace behaves. Applying this observation to the DNS, we argue that the structure of the DNS, which enables the U.S. Department of Commerce (‘‘DoC’’) to decide who manages the technical aspects of the .ca, implies that Canada lacks sovereign control over the .ca domain space and related policies and laws

An expansionary approach for the allocation of next generation ipv6 internet addresses.

Tesis ini menunjukkan bahawa ‘penyahpusatan lanjut bagi peruntukan Pengalamat Internet IPv6 Generasi Akan Datang adalah mungkin tanpa memberi kesan terhadap kebolehskalaan (scalability) dan kestabilan sistem laluan Internet.’ Ia menjelaskan suatu ‘Pendekatan Ekspansionari’ dan ‘Model Implementasi’ yang memungkinkan penyahpusatan yang sedemikian. This thesis shows that ‘further decentralization for the allocation of Next Generation IPv6 Internet Addresses is possible without affecting the scalability and stability of the Internet routing system.’ It describes an ‘Expansionary Approach’ and an ‘Implementation model’ that allows for such decentralization