12,889 research outputs found
Indicative Conditionals are Material - Expanding the Survey
Adam Rieger (2013) has carried out a survey of arguments in favour of the material account of indicative conditionals. These arguments involve simple and direct demonstrations of the material account. I extend the survey with new arguments and clarify the logical connections among them. I also show that the main counter-examples against these arguments are not successful either because their premises are just as counter-intuitive as the conclusions, or because they depend on contextual fallacies. The conclusion is that the unpopularity of the material account is unjustified and that a more systematic approach in the analysis of arguments is long overdue in our attempts to understand the nature of conditionals
Subjunctive Conditionals are Material
The material account claims that indicative conditionals are material. However, the conventional wisdom even among material account enthusiasts is that the material account cannot be extended to subjunctive conditionals. There are mainly three reasons that motivate this consensus: (1) the belief that if subjunctives were material, most subjunctive conditionals would be vacuously true, which is implausible; (2) its inconsistency with Adams pair, which suggest that indicative and subjunctive conditionals have different truth conditions; and (3) the belief that it is an inferior hypothesis compared to the possible world theories. I will argue against (1) that the counterintuitive aspects of vacuously true conditionals can be explained away in a uniform fashion, regardless of whether they are indicatives or subjunctives. I reinforce this assumption by showing that the positive arguments for the material account of indicatives are also intuitively valid for subjunctives. The point mentioned in (2) is resisted by explaining Adams pair as logically equivalent conditionals that can be appropriate at different times, depending of the speaker’s epistemic situation. Finally, (3) is criticised by making the case that the possible world account faces insurmountable problems and that a full-blown material account of indicatives and subjunctives is overall a more elegant solution
Coping with the Limitations of Rational Inference in the Framework of Possibility Theory
Possibility theory offers a framework where both Lehmann's "preferential
inference" and the more productive (but less cautious) "rational closure
inference" can be represented. However, there are situations where the second
inference does not provide expected results either because it cannot produce
them, or even provide counter-intuitive conclusions. This state of facts is not
due to the principle of selecting a unique ordering of interpretations (which
can be encoded by one possibility distribution), but rather to the absence of
constraints expressing pieces of knowledge we have implicitly in mind. It is
advocated in this paper that constraints induced by independence information
can help finding the right ordering of interpretations. In particular,
independence constraints can be systematically assumed with respect to formulas
composed of literals which do not appear in the conditional knowledge base, or
for default rules with respect to situations which are "normal" according to
the other default rules in the base. The notion of independence which is used
can be easily expressed in the qualitative setting of possibility theory.
Moreover, when a counter-intuitive plausible conclusion of a set of defaults,
is in its rational closure, but not in its preferential closure, it is always
possible to repair the set of defaults so as to produce the desired conclusion.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Twelfth Conference on Uncertainty in
Artificial Intelligence (UAI1996
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