The impact of freight transport capacity limitations on supply chain dynamics

We investigate how capacity limitations in the transportation system affect the dynamic behaviour of supply chains. We are interested in the more recently defined, 'backlash' effect. Using a system dynamics simulation approach, we replicate the well-known Beer Game supply chain for different transport capacity management scenarios. The results indicate that transport capacity limitations negatively impact on inventory and backlog costs, although there is a positive impact on the 'backlash' effect. We show that it is possible for both backlog and inventory to simultaneous occur, a situation which does not arise with the uncapacitated scenario. A vertical collaborative approach to transport provision is able to overcome such a trade-off. © 2013 Taylor & Francis

Multimodal schedule design for synchromodal freight transport systems

Intermodal freight transport has been discussed for decades as an alternative to unimodal road transport. However, it still does not represent a significant portion of the total freight market. A new and promising possibility to improve the performance of freight systems is the synchromodal design of hinterland transport systems. A cornerstone for synchromodality is an integrated view in the design and operation of intermodal transport. A main benefit of this integrated view is an improved flexibility in mode choice in hinterland transport. This paper gives a detailed description of this integrated view for synchromodal freight transport. Based on this description, a mathematical model for designing service schedules for synchromodal freight transport systems is also presented. The benefits of providing integrated transport services compared to separately planned transport services are also discussed for a case in the hinterland network of the Port of Rotterdam

Vertical and horizontal tax competition in the transport sector

The purpose of this paper is to review the literature dealing with horizontal and vertical tax competition in the transport sector, taking into account the role of transport externalities. Our emphasis throughout is on tax competition between governments, not between private suppliers. For the various different settings (horizontal and vertical competition, parallel and serial networks), we discuss the relevance of tax competition and describe the type of results typically obtained. We further point out the relevance of different types of tax competition for transport policy in a European setting. Finally, we discuss the losses of non-cooperative behaviour of governments.

Evolution of a supply chain management game for the trading agent competition

TAC SCM is a supply chain management game for the Trading Agent Competition (TAC). The purpose of TAC is to spur high quality research into realistic trading agent problems. We discuss TAC and TAC SCM: game and competition design, scientific impact, and lessons learnt

Dynamic joint investments in supply chains under information asymmetry

Supply chain management involves the selection, coordination and motivation of independently operated suppliers. However the central planner's perspective in operations management translates poorly to vertically separated chains, where suppliers may have rational myopic reasons to object to full in- formation sharing and centralized decision rights. Particular problems occur when a downstream coordinator demands relation-specific investments (equipment, cost improvements in processes, adaptation of components to downstream processes, allocation of future capacity etc) from upstream suppliers without being able to commit to long-term contracts. In practice and theory, this leads of- ten to a phenomenon of either underinvestment in the chain or costly vertical integration to solve the commitment problem. A two-stage supply chain under stochastic demand and information asymmetry is modelled. A repeated investment-production game with coordinator commitment in supplier's investment addresses the information sharing and asset- specific investment problem. We provide a mitigation of the hold-up problem on the investment cost observed by the supplier and an instrument for truthful revelation of private information by using an investment sharing device. We show that there is an interior solution for the investment sharing parameter and discuss some extensions to the work.supply chain management, investment, information

Coordinating a Supply Chain With a Manufacturer-Owned Online Channel: A Dual Channel Model Under Price Competition

We consider a dual channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells a single product to end-users through both a traditional retail channel and a manufacturer-owned direct online channel. We adopt a commonly used linear demand substitution model in which the mean demand in each channel is a function of the prices in each channel.We model each channel as a news vendor problem, with price and order quantity as decision variables. In addition, the manufacturer must choose the wholesale price to charge to the independent retailer. We analyze the optimal decisions for each channel and prove the existence of a unique equilibrium for the system. We compare this equilibrium solution to the solution for an integrated system, in which the manufacturer owns both the online store and the retailer. To enable supply chain coordination, we propose two contract schemes: a modified revenue-sharing contract and gain/loss sharing contract. We show that, in cases where the retail channel has a larger market than the online channel, such contracts enable the manufacturer to maintain price discrimination, selling the products in different channels at different prices. Finally, we perform a comprehensive numerical study to consider the impact of the model parameters on the equilibrium and to demonstrate the performance of the proposed coordination contracts. We conclude that coordination is most critical for products which are highly price sensitive and for systems in which the online and traditional retail channels are not viewed as close substitutes

The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines: A Suggested Revision (March 26, 2020)

The FTC and DOJ requested comments on their draft Vertical Merger Guidelines in January 2020. This article is a complete alternative set of suggested Vertical Merger Guidelines that reflects and supplements the approach explained in the comments submitted by the author along with Jonathan. Baker, Nancy Rose and Fiona Scott Morton, as well as their other comments, and might be read in conjunction with those comments. This suggested revision of the Agencies’ draft expands the list of potential competition harms and provides illustrative examples. It expands and unifies the discussion and treatment of potential competitive benefits. It deletes the quasi-safe harbor and suggests the circumstances under which competitive harms raise lessened concerns on the one hand and heightened concerns on the other

Value chain competitiveness analysis: entrepreneurial behavioural practices determining business success in Uganda's commercial sugar and forestry industries

Global value chain (GVC) participation has been placed on a high level policy agenda by Development Partners as a prescription template for agri-business growth and competitiveness of developing countries, especially sub-Saharan Africa. Despite, the GVC participation popularity in application, there is an intense debate questioning why some countries are advancing in the global marketplace, while others are failing to do so. Actors' (entrepreneur's) behavior has been highlighted by the value chain fraternity researchers as an area of interest to investigate this phenomenon. The purpose of this research was to contribute to the understanding of the link between the entrepreneur behavior and better enhanced competitiveness in GVC, and as such offer some key insights into the emerging GVC theory. Case Study Approach was the major research strategy complemented by the Survey. Polar types of Ugandan commercial sugarcane and forestry farmers were selected, namely high and low performing entrepreneurs. Principal unit of analysis was the entire value chain, analyzed at three levels: Micro (Farm Enterprises), Meso (Farmer/Miller) and Macro (National Policies & Regulatory Environment). Principal component analysis was run for purposes of grouping items. Empirical data was analyzed using within case analysis, and cross-case pattern analysis. Theoretically and policy practice this study has brought into insight new research frontiers: (1) The finding of internality behavior demonstrates that entrepreneur's traits, characteristics and actions are basically behaviors that can be learnt, nurtured, and developed into a business culture, competencies and capabilities for enterprise growth, productivity and competitiveness. Therefore, policy program designs should focus on igniting these behaviors which are already embedded in the minds of the entrepreneurs, and then supporting the strengthening of such behavioral changes for entrepreneurs to effectively participate in GVC in developing economies. (2) Institutional quality defined by the set of rules of the game with the associated governance power matters with respect to equitable wealth distribution and ultimately competitiveness. Findings of this study are being used to inform both the drafting of the National Sugar Bill 'Draft Uganda Sugar Act 2015' and improvement of the regulatory environment of Uganda's Forestry Industry Sector