Efficiency of scalar-parameterized mechanisms

We consider the problem of allocating a fixed amount of an infinitely divisible resource among multiple competing, fully rational users. We study the efficiency guarantees that are possible when we restrict to mechanisms that satisfy certain scalability constraints motivated by large scale communication networks; in particular, we restrict attention to mechanisms where users are restricted to one-dimensional strategy spaces. We first study the efficiency guarantees possible when the mechanism is not allowed to price differen- tiate. We study the worst-case efficiency loss (ratio of the utility associated with a Nash equilibrium to the maximum possible utility), and show that the proportional allocation mechanism of Kelly (1997) minimizes the efficiency loss when users are price anticipating. We then turn our attention to mechanisms where price differentiation is permitted; using an adaptation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves class of mechanisms, we con- struct a class of mechanisms with one-dimensional strategy spaces where Nash equilibria are fully efficient. These mechanisms are shown to be fully efficient even in general convex environments, under reasonable assumptions. Our results highlight a fundamental insight in mechanism design: when the pricing flexibility available to the mechanism designer is limited, restricting the strategic flexibility of bidders may actually improve the efficiency guarantee.National Science FoundationArmy Research OfficeDARPA - Next Generation Internet InitiativeNational Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowshi

Molecular mechanisms in haematological malignancies

Haematopoiesis requires the constant production of large numbers of peripheral blood cells. This process is under tight control of transcription factor networks as well as cytokines, growth factors and hormones. We will review the importance of transcription factors in programming the haematopoietic lineage commitment and the role of the microenvironment and the corresponding cellular sensitivity to ensure production of mature functional cells in response to the physiological demand. Understanding the molecular mechanism of this complex process gives the opportunity to identify the underlying molecular deregulation in haematopoietic malignancies. The different levels of deregulation include hyperproliferation, block in differentiation and sensitivity to growth factors. In this review, leukaemic transformation is selected to give evidence of cell signalling deregulation. The clinical implications will be reviewed in the context of the potential opportunities in the future to identify specific therapeutic patient groups that can be defined using prognostic and predictive biomarkers.peer-reviewe

Shelf Space Fees and Inter-Brand Competition

When in-store display influences consumer choices, shelf space allocation can be strategically used by retailers to extract payments from manufacturers. The paper finds that manufacturers with more popular brands have higher willingness-to-pay for the premium shelf spaces of supermarkets. Shelf space fees soften inter-brand competition and result in higher sale-weighted average retail price as well as inter-brand price differences. The fees increase the industry profit but lower the upstream profit. Both the aggregate consumer surplus and social welfare are negatively affected. This paper suggests that even when the fees do not drive small manufacturers out of retail stores, they might still be anti-competitive.Antitrust, In-store display, Shelf space fee, Retail market, Slotting allowance

Resource Allocation with Reverse Pricing for Communication Networks

Reverse pricing has been recognized as an effective tool to handle demand uncertainty in the travel industry (e.g., airlines and hotels). To investigate its viability for communication networks, we study the practical limitations of (operator-driven) time-dependent pricing that has been recently introduced, taking into account demand uncertainty. Compared to (operator-driven) time-dependent pricing, we show that the proposed pricing scheme can achieve "triple-win" solutions: an increase in the total average revenue of the operator; higher average resource utilization efficiency; and an increment in the total average payoff of the users. Our findings provide a new outlook on resource allocation, and design guidelines for adopting the reverse pricing scheme.Comment: to appear in IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) 2016, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (6 pages, 3 figures