Understanding Focus: Pitch, Placement and Coherence

This paper presents a novel account of focal stress and pitch contour in English dialogue. We argue that one should analyse and treat focus and pitch contour jointly, since (i) some pragmatic interpretations vary with contour (e.g., whether an utterance accepts or rejects; or whether it implicates a positive or negative answer); and (ii) there are utterances with identical prosodic focus that in the same context are infelicitous with one contour, but felicitous with another. We offer an account of two distinct pitch contours that predicts the correct felicity judgements and implicatures, outclassing other models in empirical coverage or formality. Prosodic focus triggers a presupposition, where what is presupposed and how the presupposition is resolved depends on prosodic contour. If resolving the presupposition entails the proffered content, then the proffered content is uninteresting and hence the utterance is in-felicitous. Otherwise, resolving the presupposition may lead to an implicature. We regiment this account in SDRT

Projection in discourse:A data-driven formal semantic analysis

A sentence like "Bertrand, a famous linguist, wrote a book" contains different contributions: there is a person named "Bertrand", he is a famous linguist, and he wrote a book. These contributions convey different types of information; while the existence of Bertrand is presented as given information---it is presupposed---the other contributions signal new information. Moreover, the contributions are affected differently by linguistic constructions. The inference that Bertrand wrote a book disappears when the sentence is negated or turned into interrogative form, while the other contributions survive; this is called 'projection'. In this thesis, I investigate the relation between different types of contributions in a sentence from a theoretical and empirical perspective. I focus on projection phenomena, which include presuppositions ('Bertrand exists' in the aforementioned example) and conventional implicatures ('Bertrand is a famous linguist'). I argue that the differences between the contributions can be explained in terms of information status, which describes how content relates to the unfolding discourse context. Based on this analysis, I extend the widely used formal representational system Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) with an explicit representation of the different contributions made by projection phenomena; this extension is called 'Projective Discourse Representation Theory' (PDRT). I present a data-driven computational analysis based on data from the Groningen Meaning Bank, a corpus of semantically annotated texts. This analysis shows how PDRT can be used to learn more about different kinds of projection behaviour. These results can be used to improve linguistically oriented computational applications such as automatic translation systems

Grammar Is a System That Characterizes Talk in Interaction

Much of contemporary mainstream formal grammar theory is unable to provide analyses for language as it occurs in actual spoken interaction. Its analyses are developed for a cleaned up version of language which omits the disfluencies, non-sentential utterances, gestures, and many other phenomena that are ubiquitous in spoken language. Using evidence from linguistics, conversation analysis, multimodal communication, psychology, language acquisition, and neuroscience, we show these aspects of language use are rule governed in much the same way as phenomena captured by conventional grammars. Furthermore, we argue that over the past few years some of the tools required to provide a precise characterizations of such phenomena have begun to emerge in theoretical and computational linguistics; hence, there is no reason for treating them as "second class citizens" other than pre-theoretical assumptions about what should fall under the purview of grammar. Finally, we suggest that grammar formalisms covering such phenomena would provide a better foundation not just for linguistic analysis of face-to-face interaction, but also for sister disciplines, such as research on spoken dialogue systems and/or psychological work on language acquisition

Speech Acts: The Contemporary Theoretical Landscape

What makes it the case that an utterance constitutes an illocutionary act of a given kind? This is the central question of speech-act theory. Answers to it—i.e., theories of speech acts—have proliferated. Our main goal in this chapter is to clarify the logical space into which these different theories fit. We begin, in Section 1, by dividing theories of speech acts into five families, each distinguished from the others by its account of the key ingredients in illocutionary acts. Are speech acts fundamentally a matter of convention or intention? Or should we instead think of them in terms of the psychological states they express, in terms of the effects that it is their function to produce, or in terms of the norms that govern them? In Section 2, we take up the highly influential idea that speech acts can be understood in terms of their effects on a conversation’s context or “score”. Part of why this idea has been so useful is that it allows speech-act theorists from the five families to engage at a level of abstraction that elides their foundational disagreements. In Section 3, we investigate some of the motivations for the traditional distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force, and some of the ways in which this distinction has been undermined by recent work. In Section 4, we survey some of the ways in which speech-act theory has been applied to issues outside semantics and pragmatics, narrowly construed