On embedded implicatures

The Gricean approach explains implicatures by assumptions about the pragmatics of entire utterances. The phenomenon of embedded implicatures remains a challenge for this approach since in such cases apparently implicatures contribute to the truth-conditional content of constituents smaller than utterances. In this paper, I investigate three areas where embedded implicatures seem to differ from implicatures at the utterance level: optionality, epistemic status, and implicated presuppositions. I conclude that the differences between the two kinds of implicatures justify an approach that maintains Gricean assumptions at the utterance level, and assumes a special operator for embedded implicatures

Rethinking being Gricean: New challenges for metapragmatics

Arguably, forty years on, post-Gricean pragmatics is still the most successful and methodologically most rigorous approach to utterance meaning. However, and perhaps as a corollary of its extensive development, it has become necessary to ask what ‘being Gricean’ means for its current advocates. In this paper I address this question with respect to the current Anglo-American, truth-conditional paradigm, asking specifically how much, and on what identifiable dimensions, one can depart from his program and still remain ‘Gricean’. The label has generated very different challenges on several dimensions. First, (i) the role of inferential meanings has been questioned in that communication has since often been envisaged as mostly direct and non-inferential. In a similar spirit, (ii) the layered, also sometimes called ‘pipeline’ or ‘imbricated’ picture of meaning has been questioned within situation and game-theoretic semantics, and recently in their offshoot Equilibrium Semantics. Next, (iii) the explanatory role of intentions has often been denied in an attempt to reinstate the idea of multiple semantic ambiguities in lieu of meaning underdetermination, with the aim of aiding computational, formalizable accounts of discourse meaning. This reopened the question as to (iv) what kind of content, and how much of it, is attributable to grammar, following up on earlier proposals of the grammatical origin of some pragmatic meanings that were standardly classified as implicatures. Along yet another dimension, (v) the focus on cooperative interaction and proposition-based theorizing have been replaced with a focus on non-cooperative, such as strategic, communication and dialogue as the associated object of analysis. Finally, Grice’s project was a project in philosophy of language and as such in philosophical pragmatics. Theoretical, introspection-based methods employed without recourse to experimental or other empirical inquires are nowadays shunned in many pragmatics circles. So, the question arises regarding (vi) the place of philosophical pragmatics on a map of current research into meaning in communication. In this context, a metapragmatic question arises as to what qualitative and associated quantitative criteria current pragmatic theory has to fulfil in order to count as Gricean pragmatics. In this paper I address this question by discussing the identified areas (i)-(vi). Further, in doing so, using these indicators, I attempt to address the question ‘Quo vadis, pragmatics?’ with respect to the post-Gricean tradition. My metatheoretic inquiry begins by critically discussing the dimensions on which the Gricean program has been challenged and proceeds to arguing that none of the challenges constitutes a real threat to it. I develop two strands of argumentation showing how the approaches either (a) can be incorporated as its extensions or (b) are in pursuit of different goals and as such are not in competition with it. Argument (a) applies to automatic meaning assignment, the rejection of the ‘pipeline’ picture of meaning, emphasis on conventions, strategic conversation and generalized cognition. Argument (b) applies to the revival of semantic ambiguity and the grammatical foundation of implicatures. It is therefore concluded that the Gricean program can be relaxed on the dimensions covered by (a) and co-exist with the approaches subscribing to (b)

Relevance and Conditionals: A Synopsis of Open Pragmatic and Semantic Issues

Recently several papers have reported relevance effects on the cognitive assessments of indicative conditionals, which pose an explanatory challenge to the Suppositional Theory of conditionals advanced by David Over, which is influential in the psychology of reasoning. Some of these results concern the “Equation” (P(if A, then C) = P(C|A)), others the de Finetti truth table, and yet others the uncertain and-to-inference task. The purpose of this chapter is to take a Birdseye view on the debate and investigate some of the open theoretical issues posed by the empirical results. Central among these is whether to count these effects as belonging to pragmatics or semantics

Negation 'presupposition' and metarepresentation: a response to Noel Burton-Roberts

Metalinguistic negation (MN) is interesting for at least the following two reasons: (a) it is one instance of the much broader, very widespread and various phenomenon of metarepresentational use in linguistic communication, whose semantic and pragmatic properties are currently being extensively explored by both linguists and philosophers of language; (b) it plays a central role in recent accounts of presupposition-denial cases, such as ‘The king of France is not bald; there is no king of France’. It is this latter employment that discussion of metalinguistic negation has focused on since Horn (1985)'s key article on the subject. While Burton-Roberts (1989a, 1989b) saw the MN account of presupposition-denials as providing strong support for his semantic theory of presupposition, I have offered a multi-layered pragmatic account of these cases, which also involves MN, but maintains the view that the phenomenon of presupposition is pragmatic (Carston 1994, 1996, 1998a)

The History and Prehistory of Natural-Language Semantics

Contemporary natural-language semantics began with the assumption that the meaning of a sentence could be modeled by a single truth condition, or by an entity with a truth-condition. But with the recent explosion of dynamic semantics and pragmatics and of work on non- truth-conditional dimensions of linguistic meaning, we are now in the midst of a shift away from a truth-condition-centric view and toward the idea that a sentence’s meaning must be spelled out in terms of its various roles in conversation. This communicative turn in semantics raises historical questions: Why was truth-conditional semantics dominant in the first place, and why were the phenomena now driving the communicative turn initially ignored or misunderstood by truth-conditional semanticists? I offer a historical answer to both questions. The history of natural-language semantics—springing from the work of Donald Davidson and Richard Montague—began with a methodological toolkit that Frege, Tarski, Carnap, and others had created to better understand artificial languages. For them, the study of linguistic meaning was subservient to other explanatory goals in logic, philosophy, and the foundations of mathematics, and this subservience was reflected in the fact that they idealized away from all aspects of meaning that get in the way of a one-to-one correspondence between sentences and truth-conditions. The truth-conditional beginnings of natural- language semantics are best explained by the fact that, upon turning their attention to the empirical study of natural language, Davidson and Montague adopted the methodological toolkit assembled by Frege, Tarski, and Carnap and, along with it, their idealization away from non-truth-conditional semantic phenomena. But this pivot in explana- tory priorities toward natural language itself rendered the adoption of the truth-conditional idealization inappropriate. Lifting the truth-conditional idealization has forced semanticists to upend the conception of linguistic meaning that was originally embodied in their methodology

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF BANYUMASAN CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES

To mean what you say is sometimes problematic in daily conversation, moreover in some indigenous dialects. It requires comprehensive context to achieve the core of communication. So does in Banyumasan. Banyumasan or Banyumas dialect is a variant which is found along the flow of Serayu river. The river flows from Sindoro-Sumbing Mountains (Koentjaraningrat, 1984:23). Banyumas dialect is one of some variants of Javanese language. Banyumasan has some differences compared to standard Javanese spoken in Jogjakarta, Surakarta and Semarang. Those differences are also reflected in the characteristics of conversational implicatures found in this dialect. Conversational implicaure is a proposition that is implied by the utterance of sentence in a context even though that proposition is not a part of nor an entailment of what was actually said (Grice, 1975; Gazdar, 1979). The characteristics of conversational implicatures are calculability, cancellability, non-detachability, non-conventionality, and indeterminacy. (Grice, 1975; Levinson, 1983; Thomas, 1996; dan Cruse, 2004). A dialect has different characteristics compared to other dialects of the same language and so does the characteristic o