On Properties of Update Sequences Based on Causal Rejection

We consider an approach to update nonmonotonic knowledge bases represented as extended logic programs under answer set semantics. New information is incorporated into the current knowledge base subject to a causal rejection principle enforcing that, in case of conflicts, more recent rules are preferred and older rules are overridden. Such a rejection principle is also exploited in other approaches to update logic programs, e.g., in dynamic logic programming by Alferes et al. We give a thorough analysis of properties of our approach, to get a better understanding of the causal rejection principle. We review postulates for update and revision operators from the area of theory change and nonmonotonic reasoning, and some new properties are considered as well. We then consider refinements of our semantics which incorporate a notion of minimality of change. As well, we investigate the relationship to other approaches, showing that our approach is semantically equivalent to inheritance programs by Buccafurri et al. and that it coincides with certain classes of dynamic logic programs, for which we provide characterizations in terms of graph conditions. Therefore, most of our results about properties of causal rejection principle apply to these approaches as well. Finally, we deal with computational complexity of our approach, and outline how the update semantics and its refinements can be implemented on top of existing logic programming engines.Comment: 59 pages, 2 figures, 3 tables, to be published in "Theory and Practice of Logic Programming

Modeling Belief in Dynamic Systems, Part II: Revision and Update

The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper (Friedman & Halpern, 1997), we introduce a new framework to model belief change. This framework combines temporal and epistemic modalities with a notion of plausibility, allowing us to examine the change of beliefs over time. In this paper, we show how belief revision and belief update can be captured in our framework. This allows us to compare the assumptions made by each method, and to better understand the principles underlying them. In particular, it shows that Katsuno and Mendelzon's notion of belief update (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991a) depends on several strong assumptions that may limit its applicability in artificial intelligence. Finally, our analysis allow us to identify a notion of minimal change that underlies a broad range of belief change operations including revision and update.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for other files accompanying this articl

A Brief History of Updates of Answer-Set Programs

Funding Information: The authors would like to thank José Alferes, Martin Baláz, Federico Banti, Antonio Brogi, Martin Homola, Luís Moniz Pereira, Halina Przymusinska, Teodor C. Przymusinski, and Theresa Swift, with whom they worked on the topic of this paper over the years, as well as Ricardo Gonçalves and Matthias Knorr for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The authors would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions, which greatly helped us improve this paper. The authors were partially supported by Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia through projects FORGET (PTDC/CCI-INF/32219/2017) and RIVER (PTDC/CCI-COM/30952/2017), and strategic project NOVA LINCS (UIDB/04516/2020). Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press.Over the last couple of decades, there has been a considerable effort devoted to the problem of updating logic programs under the stable model semantics (a.k.a. answer-set programs) or, in other words, the problem of characterising the result of bringing up-to-date a logic program when the world it describes changes. Whereas the state-of-the-art approaches are guided by the same basic intuitions and aspirations as belief updates in the context of classical logic, they build upon fundamentally different principles and methods, which have prevented a unifying framework that could embrace both belief and rule updates. In this paper, we will overview some of the main approaches and results related to answer-set programming updates, while pointing out some of the main challenges that research in this topic has faced.publishersversionpublishe