Preference fusion and Condorcet's Paradox under uncertainty

Facing an unknown situation, a person may not be able to firmly elicit his/her preferences over different alternatives, so he/she tends to express uncertain preferences. Given a community of different persons expressing their preferences over certain alternatives under uncertainty, to get a collective representative opinion of the whole community, a preference fusion process is required. The aim of this work is to propose a preference fusion method that copes with uncertainty and escape from the Condorcet paradox. To model preferences under uncertainty, we propose to develop a model of preferences based on belief function theory that accurately describes and captures the uncertainty associated with individual or collective preferences. This work improves and extends the previous results. This work improves and extends the contribution presented in a previous work. The benefits of our contribution are twofold. On the one hand, we propose a qualitative and expressive preference modeling strategy based on belief-function theory which scales better with the number of sources. On the other hand, we propose an incremental distance-based algorithm (using Jousselme distance) for the construction of the collective preference order to avoid the Condorcet Paradox.Comment: International Conference on Information Fusion, Jul 2017, Xi'an, Chin

Postmodernism as the sociocultural deconstruction of modernity

This work seeks to provide a description of the theoretical positions and cultural expressions of postmodernism and to provide a sociological critique of its conclusions. The work uses the writings of the Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Lacan, and Baudrillard, as well as arguments in neo-pop art and postmodern architecture, as representatives of the postmodern position on the issues of referentiality, subjectivity, and rationality. Postmodernism is treated as a skeptical theoretical and cultural system which levels all ideational distinctions between belief and knowledge and truth and rhetoric. This work argues that a social or constructivist epistemology can provide a different way of approaching the issues of knowledge and truth, which avoids postmodernism\u27s skeptical and nihilistic conclusions. Postmodernism is seen as making sociological arguments against traditional philosophical distinctions, but drawing idealistic conclusions about the end of all meaning. Using the Neo-Durkheimians orientation towards cognitive style and the constructivist position in the sociology of scientific knowledge as starting points, it is argued that while pure philosophical distinctions between true and false and knowledge and belief cannot be made, these distinctions remain strong and powerful social distinctions. These distinctions serve to foster group cohesion and identity. Finally, this work examines how postmodernism can be seen as the outcome of the social organization of specific culture-producing and culture-consuming groups in contemporary society

A Liberal Theory of Federalism

From the European Wars of Religion to post-colonial independence struggles, and on to calls for minority rights and freedoms in Tibet, Kurdistan and beyond, liberals have always been moved by the desires of different individuals to live by different mores and systems of government. By offering a liberal theory of federalism that can equip us with both an account of legitimacy and an institutional structure capable of effectively navigating the diversity endemic to human society, this thesis seeks to carry forward the liberal project of doing justice to what John Rawls famously called “the fact of pluralism.” The liberal theory of federalism rests on a minimalist conception of liberalism, which holds that individuals should be free to live as they see fit, provided they do not stop others from living as they see fit. This in turn yields an account of legitimacy according to which any institutional structure whatsoever is legitimate, with the sole proviso that it not stop individuals from living as they see fit. This thesis fashions minimalist liberalism into a direct justification of the defining strengths of federal systems. By constitutionally enshrining constituent unit autonomy, federal systems are able to both protect negative liberty and promote democratic accountability. The liberal theory of federalism does not shy away from acknowledging that there is no guarantee that any given federal system will realise the liberal goal of doing justice to the fact of pluralism. Nonetheless, federalism offers the hope of a more perfect union between institutional structures and how individuals would like to live: As a means of limiting centralised power and giving more political autonomy to sub-state groups, federalism is another constitutional tool for ensuring that, as Benjamin Constant might have put it, the interests of individuals are “united when they are the same, balanced when they are different, but known and felt in all cases.

Reason, scepticism and politics: theory and practice in the enlightenment's politics

This thesis is concerned to discuss two related questions in political theory. First, the relationship of 'theory' and 'practice', concentrating specifically on the relationship between 'philosophy' and 'polities'; and, secondly, how the political theory of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment is helpful in revealing an answer to the first problem. In order to encompass this dual task, the thesis is divided into three parts. Part One, 'Philosophy in its Place', delineates two trends in modern political thought that most explicitly bracket off the theoretical and the practical. It goes on to discuss the thesis of Alisdair Maclntyre in AFTER VIRTUE, that it was the Enlightenment that was, in fact, the intellectual origin of these two trends. Chapter Two of Part One, continues this discussion by considering recent adaptations of the central claims (such as that offered by Bernard Williams), and challenges to them from thinkers who emphasise the methodological importance of the history of thought (such as Maclntyre himself, and Richard Rorty). It concludes with an analysis of an issue central to the discussions of all three thinkers: incommensurability. Part Two, 'Theory and Practice in the Enlightenment’s Politics ', consists of three chapters which together offer an interpretation of the Enlightenment's reflections on the relation between theory and practice and, specifically, of the two thinkers most important for this question, Hume and Kant. The analysis also discusses rival interpretations and concentrates specifically on refuting Maclntyre's arguments in AFTER VIRTUE on the nature, character and implications of Enlightenment thought. Part Three, 'Bringing Philosophy Back In', ties these various threads together by first discussing the methodological questions set out in Part One in more detail, and then by showing how the Enlightenment's thought on this topic is still of the utmost importance for modern political theorists and why this should be so

An exploration of transformation theory and the western tradition: a critical evaluation of a graduate studies class

This qualitative study is an exploration of transformation theory, the Western tradition, and a critical evaluation of a graduate studies class at a university. It is an exploration of assumptions that are embedded in experience, that influence the experience and provide meaning about the experience. An attempt has been made to identify assumptions that are embedded in Western experience and connect them with assumptions that shape the graduate class experience. The focus is on assumptions that facilitate and impede large group discussions. Jungian psychology of personality type and archetype and developmental psychology is used to analyze the group experience. The pragmatic problem solving model, developed by Knoop, is used to guide thinking about the Western tradition. It is used to guide the analysis, synthesis and writing of the experience of the graduate studies class members. A search through Western history, philosophy. and science revealed assumptions about the nature of truth, reality, and the self. Assumptions embedded in Western thinking about the subject-object relationship, unity and diversity are made explicit. An attempt is made to identify Western tradition assumptions underlying transformation theory. The critical evaluation of the graduate studies class experience focuses upon issues associated with group process, self-directed learning, the educator-learner transaction and the definition of adult education. The advantages of making implicit assumptions explicit is explored

Civilization and Progress

Historical and systematic in its treatment, this work reviews the idea of progress in Western thought as it relates to civilization, in a more comprehensive survey than is to be found in previous writings on the subject. In the author’s view, the history of civilization reveals an increasing range of human capacity, both for good and for evil, depending upon men’s choice between contending values. From this standpoint, the work proceeds to the exploration of such fields of social activity as the evolution of the family, the emancipation of women, economic conditions and technology, intellectual and aesthetic values, moral and religious experience. Civilization and Progress is marked by balanced and judicious treatment, very broad learning, and a lucid and forceful style. The author asks us to consider the alternatives we face and to reflect on the choices which men have made in the past, which confront us in the present world crisis, and on which our destiny hangs in the future. Seminal in scholarship and creativity, this work will interest those concerned with the Western intellectual tradition and with the condition of mankind. Radoslav A. Tsanoff is the author of numerous books on philosophy. He is McManis Professor of Philosophy at Rice University.https://uknowledge.uky.edu/upk_philosophy/1003/thumbnail.jp

PRELUDE TO DEMOCRACY: A Study of Proportional Representation and the Heritage of Weimar Germany, 1871-1920

Surprisingly little has been written in critical analysis of German election systems. Herman Finer, Sigmund Neumann, and Carl Friedrich, among others, have dealt for the most part with political parties. James Pollock has written descriptions of election machinery and procedures. Ferdinand Hermens has produced the standard work on proportional representation, one confined in the section on Germany to its alleged role in the disintegration and collapse of the Weimar Republic. With the recent exception of Eugene Anderson\u27s excellent analysis of Prussian politics, however, treatments of election systems have been for the most part unrelated to the context of German society and politics. The following study deals with an election system undoubtedly the most controversial in German political history. It presents an analysis of proportional representation, or as commonly abbreviated, P. R., from the founding of the Second Reich through the first elections under the Weimar electoral law. Its purpose is to relate the development of P. R. to prevailing social and political conditions and attitudes, and in this manner to shed light on the nature of the Weimar heritage. Simply stated, P. R. is a technique designed to mirror in the parliament the opinions and wishes of the voters (Chapter 1). Its theoreticians call for representation of voter preferences exactly in accordance with respective numerical strengths; and insofar as all voters theoretically have equal opportunities to achieve representation of their particular points of view, the system or technique is alleged to be the most democratic in existence. The idea of P. R. was first expounded in developed form by French Utopians and later incorporated in the programs of Marxian Revisionists throughout Europe. It became attractive to political liberals like John Stuart Mill concerned with the problem of the individual and his survival from the pressures of modern civilization toward collective mediocrity. It assumed increasing significance to politicians of all persuasions in the conflicts arising out of industrialization between power elites and mass movements, between those who wished to preserve and those who wished to alter or abolish the existing order

PRELUDE TO DEMOCRACY: A Study of Proportional Representation and the Heritage of Weimar Germany, 1871-1920

Surprisingly little has been written in critical analysis of German election systems. Herman Finer, Sigmund Neumann, and Carl Friedrich, among others, have dealt for the most part with political parties. James Pollock has written descriptions of election machinery and procedures. Ferdinand Hermens has produced the standard work on proportional representation, one confined in the section on Germany to its alleged role in the disintegration and collapse of the Weimar Republic. With the recent exception of Eugene Anderson\u27s excellent analysis of Prussian politics, however, treatments of election systems have been for the most part unrelated to the context of German society and politics. The following study deals with an election system undoubtedly the most controversial in German political history. It presents an analysis of proportional representation, or as commonly abbreviated, P. R., from the founding of the Second Reich through the first elections under the Weimar electoral law. Its purpose is to relate the development of P. R. to prevailing social and political conditions and attitudes, and in this manner to shed light on the nature of the Weimar heritage. Simply stated, P. R. is a technique designed to mirror in the parliament the opinions and wishes of the voters (Chapter 1). Its theoreticians call for representation of voter preferences exactly in accordance with respective numerical strengths; and insofar as all voters theoretically have equal opportunities to achieve representation of their particular points of view, the system or technique is alleged to be the most democratic in existence. The idea of P. R. was first expounded in developed form by French Utopians and later incorporated in the programs of Marxian Revisionists throughout Europe. It became attractive to political liberals like John Stuart Mill concerned with the problem of the individual and his survival from the pressures of modern civilization toward collective mediocrity. It assumed increasing significance to politicians of all persuasions in the conflicts arising out of industrialization between power elites and mass movements, between those who wished to preserve and those who wished to alter or abolish the existing order

Democracy after Deliberation: Bridging the Constitutional Economics/Deliberative Democracy Divide

This dissertation addresses a debate about the proper relationship between democratic theory and institutions. The debate has been waged between two rival approaches: on the one side is an aggregative and economic theory of democracy, known as constitutional economics, and on the other side is deliberative democracy. The two sides endorse starkly different positions on the issue of what makes a democracy legitimate and stable within an institutional setting. Constitutional economists model political agents in the same way that neoclassical economists model economic agents, that is, as self-regarding, rational maximizers; so that evaluations of democratic legitimacy and stability depend on the extent to which the design of institutional rules and practices maximize individual utility by promoting efficient schemes of collective choice. Deliberative democrats, on the other hand, understand political agents as communicative reason-giving subjects who justify their preferences and positions on issues that jointly affect them in a process of consensus-directed discourse, or deliberation; so that evaluations of democratic legitimacy and order depend on the degree to which institutional norms and practices promote deliberation and draw upon deliberated public judgment. I argue that despite the numerous incompatibilities between constitutional economics and deliberative democracy—which amount to a 'deep divide'—an opportunity to produce a genuine synthesis of the two approaches arises inasmuch as it is possible to overcome several points of opposition in their separate research programmes. The central thesis of the dissertation is that it is possible to construct a bridge spanning the divide between constitutional economists and deliberative democrats, and that Dewey and Bentley's transactional view can facilitate this bridge-building project. Pursuant to this end, the points of opposition between the v research programmes are mediated by way of five concepts which, on balance, favor deliberative democracy and its feasible institutionalization

Democracy after Deliberation: Bridging the Constitutional Economics/Deliberative Democracy Divide

This dissertation addresses a debate about the proper relationship between democratic theory and institutions. The debate has been waged between two rival approaches: on the one side is an aggregative and economic theory of democracy, known as constitutional economics, and on the other side is deliberative democracy. The two sides endorse starkly different positions on the issue of what makes a democracy legitimate and stable within an institutional setting. Constitutional economists model political agents in the same way that neoclassical economists model economic agents, that is, as self-regarding, rational maximizers; so that evaluations of democratic legitimacy and stability depend on the extent to which the design of institutional rules and practices maximize individual utility by promoting efficient schemes of collective choice. Deliberative democrats, on the other hand, understand political agents as communicative reason-giving subjects who justify their preferences and positions on issues that jointly affect them in a process of consensus-directed discourse, or deliberation; so that evaluations of democratic legitimacy and order depend on the degree to which institutional norms and practices promote deliberation and draw upon deliberated public judgment. I argue that despite the numerous incompatibilities between constitutional economics and deliberative democracy—which amount to a 'deep divide'—an opportunity to produce a genuine synthesis of the two approaches arises inasmuch as it is possible to overcome several points of opposition in their separate research programmes. The central thesis of the dissertation is that it is possible to construct a bridge spanning the divide between constitutional economists and deliberative democrats, and that Dewey and Bentley's transactional view can facilitate this bridge-building project. Pursuant to this end, the points of opposition between the v research programmes are mediated by way of five concepts which, on balance, favor deliberative democracy and its feasible institutionalization