15,227 research outputs found
Learning backward induction: a neural network agent approach
This paper addresses the question of whether neural networks (NNs), a realistic cognitive model of human information processing, can learn to backward induce in a two-stage game with a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. The NNs were found to predict the Nash equilibrium approximately 70% of the time in new games. Similarly to humans, the neural network agents are also found to suffer from subgame and truncation inconsistency, supporting the contention that they are appropriate models of general learning in humans. The agents were found to behave in a bounded rational manner as a result of the endogenous emergence of decision heuristics. In particular a very simple heuristic socialmax, that chooses the cell with the highest social payoff explains their behavior approximately 60% of the time, whereas the ownmax heuristic that simply chooses the cell with the maximum payoff for that agent fares worse explaining behavior roughly 38%, albeit still significantly better than chance. These two heuristics were found to be ecologically valid for the backward induction problem as they predicted the Nash equilibrium in 67% and 50% of the games respectively. Compared to various standard classification algorithms, the NNs were found to be only slightly more accurate than standard discriminant analyses. However, the latter do not model the dynamic learning process and have an ad hoc postulated functional form. In contrast, a NN agent’s behavior evolves with experience and is capable of taking on any functional form according to the universal approximation theorem.
Choosing Products in Social Networks
We study the consequences of adopting products by agents who form a social
network. To this end we use the threshold model introduced in Apt and Markakis,
arXiv:1105.2434, in which the nodes influenced by their neighbours can adopt
one out of several alternatives, and associate with such each social network a
strategic game between the agents. The possibility of not choosing any product
results in two special types of (pure) Nash equilibria.
We show that such games may have no Nash equilibrium and that determining the
existence of a Nash equilibrium, also of a special type, is NP-complete. The
situation changes when the underlying graph of the social network is a DAG, a
simple cycle, or has no source nodes. For these three classes we determine the
complexity of establishing whether a (special type of) Nash equilibrium exists.
We also clarify for these categories of games the status and the complexity
of the finite improvement property (FIP). Further, we introduce a new property
of the uniform FIP which is satisfied when the underlying graph is a simple
cycle, but determining it is co-NP-hard in the general case and also when the
underlying graph has no source nodes. The latter complexity results also hold
for verifying the property of being a weakly acyclic game.Comment: 15 pages. Appeared in Proc. of the 8th International Workshop on
Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2012), Lecture Notes in Computer Science
7695, Springer, pp. 100-11
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