Bounded Modality

What does 'might' mean? One hypothesis is that 'It might be raining' is essentially an avowal of ignorance like 'For all I know, it's raining'. But it turns out these two constructions embed in different ways, in particular as parts of larger constructions like Wittgenstein's 'It might be raining and it's not' and Moore's 'It's raining and I don't know it', respectively. A variety of approaches have been developed to account for those differences. All approaches agree that both Moore sentences and Wittgenstein sentences are classically consistent. In this paper I argue against this consensus. I adduce a variety of new data which I argue can best be accounted for if we treat Wittgenstein sentences as being classically inconsistent. This creates a puzzle, since there is decisive reason to think that 'Might p' is classically consistent with 'Not p'. How can it also be that 'Might p and not p' and 'Not p and might p' are classically inconsistent? To make sense of this situation, I propose a new theory of epistemic modals and their interaction with embedding operators. This account makes sense of the subtle embedding behavior of epistemic modals, shedding new light on their meaning and, more broadly, the dynamics of information in natural language

Theory or philosophy of law?

The article discusses the theory of law in terms of the extent to which it is part of jurisprudence, on the one hand, and a philosophical pursuit, on the other. The question is explored considering the historical development of the legal sciences and the situation of Polish theory of law in the latter half of the twentieth century. Also, the author relies on the analysis of selected theoreticallegal concepts, notably the so-called multiplane theory of law and the views thought of Zygmunt Ziembiński. The conclusions suggest that philosophy is inevitable in jurisprudence.The article discusses the theory of law in terms of the extent to which it is part of jurisprudence, on the one hand, and a philosophical pursuit, on the other. The question is explored considering the historical development of the legal sciences and the situation of Polish theory of law in the latter half of the twentieth century. Also, the author relies on the analysis of selected theoreticallegal concepts, notably the so-called multiplane theory of law and the views thought of Zygmunt Ziembiński. The conclusions suggest that philosophy is inevitable in jurisprudence

Argument and the Moral Impact Theory of the Law

The innovative Moral Impact Theory (“MIT”) of law claims that the moral impacts of legal institutional actions, rather than the linguistic content of “rules” or judicial or legislative pronouncements, determine law’s content. MIT’s corollary is that legal interpretation consists in the inquiry into what is morally required as a consequence of the lawmaking actions. This paper challenges MIT by critiquing its attendant view of the nature of legal interpretation and argument. Points include the following: (1) it is not practicable to predicate law’s content on the ability of legal officials to resolve moral controversies; (2) it would be impermissibly uncharitable to claim that participants in the legal system commit widespread error in failing to regard moral argument as the focus of legal interpretation; (3) whereas the legal official may initially respond to a conflict at the intuitive moral level, she must resolve the controversy at the deliberative, critical level, at which moral and legal thinking diverge; (4) because no two cases are precisely alike, and owing to the open texture of natural language, reference to extra-jurisdictional “persuasive” and “secondary” authority permeates legal argument, yet, nearly by definition, such linguistic sources cannot have engendered significant moral impacts in the home jurisdiction; and (5) one way or another, we ultimately arrive at linguistic contents. The paper concludes by accepting, as undeniable, that legal institutional actions have moral impacts, and generate moral obligations. Officials are obligated to adhere to certain constraints in their treatment of one another, cases, litigants and citizens. Less explored, however, have been the ways in which legal pronouncements likely morally impact the community, beyond the issue of a duty to obey the law

CAN TAX JUSTICE REARRANGE AN UNFAIR SYSTEM? THE BRAZILIAN CASE

ABSTRACTThe present study had sought the concepts and meanings of Justice in the works of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics), Hans Kelsen (Das Problem der Gerechtigkeit – The Problem of Justice) and John Rawls (A Theory of Justice). After this, the study has analyzed the ideas presented by John Rawls in "Justice as Equity", which are the foundation for a more specific insight about tax justice. The Rawlsian concept, from which the study started, was that justice would be "an appropriate balance between conflicting demands". Then it has analyzed some situations of what tax injustices in the Brazilian Tax Legislation would be. Finally, it has concluded that an approximate idea of tax justice is in the fair balance between the concerns of the taxpayer and the State, which equitably establishes the size of the social minimum and the fair savings rate, as well as it avoids high inequality at the top of the income distribution through tax proportionality, which could limit equal opportunities and would inhibit economic growth.KEYWORDS: Tax justice; proportionality; conflicting interests; economic growth.  RESUMO O presente trabalho buscou conceitos e significados de Justiça nas obras de Aristóteles (Ética a Nicômaco), Hans Kelsen (O problema da Justiça) e John Rawls (Uma teoria da Justiça). Após isso analisou-se os institutos defendidos por John Rawls em “Justiça como Equidade” para, com base nestes, edificar uma noção mais específica de justiça fiscal. O conceito rawlsiano de que se partiu foi que o da justiça como “equilíbrio apropriado entre exigências conflitantes”. Em seguida analisou-se algumas situações de injustiça fiscal na legislação tributária brasileira. Ao fim, concluiu-se que uma ideia próxima de justiça fiscal passa pelo justo equilíbrio entre os interesses do contribuinte e do Estado, que estabeleça, de forma equitativa, o tamanho do mínimo social e da taxa de poupança justa, bem como, utilizando-se da proporcionalidade tributária, evite elevada desigualdade no topo da distribuição de renda, o que limitaria a igualdade de oportunidades e inibiria do crescimento econômico.PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Justiça fiscal; proporcionalidade; interesses conflitantes; crescimento econômico.

Getting Into Equity

For two centuries, common lawyers have frequently talked about a “cause of action.” But “cause of action” is not an organizing principle for equity. This Article shows how a plaintiff gets into equity, and it shows equity is shaped by the interplay of its remedial, procedural, and substantive law. Equity is adjectival, related to law rather than the other way around. Remedies, not rights, are what give it power. And for getting into equity, it is the grievance that is central. To insist on an equitable cause of action is to work a fundamental change in how a plaintiff gets into equity

Getting into Equity

For two centuries, common lawyers have talked about a “cause of action.” But “cause of action” is not an organizing principle for equity. This Article shows how a plaintiff gets into equity, and it explains that equity is shaped by the interplay of its remedial, procedural, and substantive law. Equity is adjectival, that is, it modifies law rather than the other way around. Its power comes from remedies, not rights. And for getting into equity, what is central is a grievance. To insist on an equitable cause of action is to work a fundamental change in how a plaintiff gets into equity

On how AI & law can help autonomous systems obey the law: a position paper

Abstract. In this position paper I discuss to what extent current and past AI & law research is relevant for research on autonomous intelligent systems that exhibit legally relevant behaviour. After a brief review of the history of AI & law, I will compare the problems faced by autonomous intelligent systems with the problems faced by lawyers in traditional legal settings. This should give insights into the extent to which AI & law models of legal problem solving and decision support can be applied in the design of legally well-behaving autonomous systems

On how AI & Law can help autonomous systems obey the law: a position paper

In this position paper I discuss to what extent current and past AI & law research is relevant for research on autonomous intelligent systems that exhibit legally relevant behaviour. After a brief review of the history of AI & law, I will compare the problems faced by autonomous intelligent systems with the problems faced by lawyers in traditional legal settings. This should give insights into the extent to which AI & law models of legal problem solving and decision support can be applied in the design of legally well-behaving autonomous systems