11,981 research outputs found
Can NSEC5 be practical for DNSSEC deployments?
NSEC5 is proposed modification to DNSSEC that simultaneously guarantees two security properties: (1) privacy against offline zone enumeration, and (2) integrity of zone contents, even if an adversary compromises the authoritative nameserver responsible for responding to DNS queries for the zone. This paper redesigns NSEC5 to make it both practical and performant. Our NSEC5 redesign features a new fast verifiable random function (VRF) based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), along with a cryptographic proof of its security. This VRF is also of independent interest, as it is being standardized by the IETF and being used by several other projects. We show how to integrate NSEC5 using our ECC-based VRF into the DNSSEC protocol, leveraging precomputation to improve performance and DNS protocol-level optimizations to shorten responses. Next, we present the first full-fledged implementation of NSEC5—extending widely-used DNS software to present a nameserver and recursive resolver that support NSEC5—and evaluate their performance under aggressive DNS query loads. Our performance results
indicate that our redesigned NSEC5 can be viable even for high-throughput scenarioshttps://eprint.iacr.org/2017/099.pdfFirst author draf
Keeping Authorities "Honest or Bust" with Decentralized Witness Cosigning
The secret keys of critical network authorities - such as time, name,
certificate, and software update services - represent high-value targets for
hackers, criminals, and spy agencies wishing to use these keys secretly to
compromise other hosts. To protect authorities and their clients proactively
from undetected exploits and misuse, we introduce CoSi, a scalable witness
cosigning protocol ensuring that every authoritative statement is validated and
publicly logged by a diverse group of witnesses before any client will accept
it. A statement S collectively signed by W witnesses assures clients that S has
been seen, and not immediately found erroneous, by those W observers. Even if S
is compromised in a fashion not readily detectable by the witnesses, CoSi still
guarantees S's exposure to public scrutiny, forcing secrecy-minded attackers to
risk that the compromise will soon be detected by one of the W witnesses.
Because clients can verify collective signatures efficiently without
communication, CoSi protects clients' privacy, and offers the first
transparency mechanism effective against persistent man-in-the-middle attackers
who control a victim's Internet access, the authority's secret key, and several
witnesses' secret keys. CoSi builds on existing cryptographic multisignature
methods, scaling them to support thousands of witnesses via signature
aggregation over efficient communication trees. A working prototype
demonstrates CoSi in the context of timestamping and logging authorities,
enabling groups of over 8,000 distributed witnesses to cosign authoritative
statements in under two seconds.Comment: 20 pages, 7 figure
Wall-bounded turbulent flows at high Reynolds numbers: Recent advances and key issues
Wall-bounded turbulent flows at high Reynolds numbers have become an increasingly active area of
research in recent years. Many challenges remain in theory, scaling, physical understanding,
experimental techniques, and numerical simulations. In this paper we distill the salient advances of
recent origin, particularly those that challenge textbook orthodoxy. Some of the outstanding
questions, such as the extent of the logarithmic overlap layer, the universality or otherwise of the
principal model parameters such as the von Kármán “constant,” the parametrization of roughness
effects, and the scaling of mean flow and Reynolds stresses, are highlighted. Research avenues that
may provide answers to these questions, notably the improvement of measuring techniques and the
construction of new facilities, are identified. We also highlight aspects where differences of opinion
persist, with the expectation that this discussion might mark the beginning of their resolution
PROVIDE: hiding from automated network scans with proofs of identity
Network scanners are a valuable tool for researchers and administrators, however they are also used by malicious actors to identify vulnerable hosts on a network. Upon the disclosure of a security vulnerability, scans are launched within hours. These opportunistic attackers enumerate blocks of IP addresses in hope of discovering an exploitable host. Fortunately, defensive measures such as port knocking protocols (PKPs) allow a service to remain stealth to unauthorized IP addresses. The service is revealed only when a client includes a special authentication token (AT) in the IP/TCP header. However this AT is generated from a secret shared between the clients/servers and distributed manually to each endpoint. As a result, these defense measures have failed to be widely adopted by other protocols such as HTTP/S due to challenges in distributing the shared secrets. In this paper we propose a scalable solution to this problem for services accessed by domain name. We make the following observation: automated network scanners access servers by IP address, while legitimate clients access the server by name. Therefore a service should only reveal itself to clients who know its name. Based on this principal, we have created a proof of the verifier’s identity (a.k.a. PROVIDE) protocol that allows a prover (legitimate user) to convince a verifier (service) that it is knowledgeable of the verifier’s identity. We present a PROVIDE implementation using a PKP and DNS (PKP+DNS) that uses DNS TXT records to distribute identification tokens (IDT) while DNS PTR records for the service’s domain name are prohibited to prevent reverse DNS lookups. Clients are modified to make an additional DNS TXT query to obtain the IDT which is used by the PKP to generate an AT. The inclusion of an AT in the packet header, generated from the DNS TXT query, is proof the client knows the service’s identity. We analyze the effectiveness of this mechanism with respect to brute force attempts for various strength ATs and discuss practical considerations.This work has been supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) awards #1430145, #1414119, and #1012798
Detection of Early-Stage Enterprise Infection by Mining Large-Scale Log Data
Recent years have seen the rise of more sophisticated attacks including
advanced persistent threats (APTs) which pose severe risks to organizations and
governments by targeting confidential proprietary information. Additionally,
new malware strains are appearing at a higher rate than ever before. Since many
of these malware are designed to evade existing security products, traditional
defenses deployed by most enterprises today, e.g., anti-virus, firewalls,
intrusion detection systems, often fail at detecting infections at an early
stage.
We address the problem of detecting early-stage infection in an enterprise
setting by proposing a new framework based on belief propagation inspired from
graph theory. Belief propagation can be used either with "seeds" of compromised
hosts or malicious domains (provided by the enterprise security operation
center -- SOC) or without any seeds. In the latter case we develop a detector
of C&C communication particularly tailored to enterprises which can detect a
stealthy compromise of only a single host communicating with the C&C server.
We demonstrate that our techniques perform well on detecting enterprise
infections. We achieve high accuracy with low false detection and false
negative rates on two months of anonymized DNS logs released by Los Alamos
National Lab (LANL), which include APT infection attacks simulated by LANL
domain experts. We also apply our algorithms to 38TB of real-world web proxy
logs collected at the border of a large enterprise. Through careful manual
investigation in collaboration with the enterprise SOC, we show that our
techniques identified hundreds of malicious domains overlooked by
state-of-the-art security products
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