Robust and efficient password authenticated key agreement with user anonymity for session initiation protocol-based communications

A suitable key agreement protocol plays an essential role in protecting the communications over open channels among users using Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). This paper presents a robust and flexible password authenticated key agreement protocol with user anonymity for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) used by VoIP communications. Security analysis demonstrates that our protocol enjoys many unique properties, such as user anonymity, no password table, session key agreement, mutual authentication, password updating freely and conveniently revoking lost smartcards etc. Furthermore, our protocol can resist the replay attack, the impersonation attack, the stolen-verifier attack, the man-in-middle attack, the Denning-Sacco attack, and the offline dictionary attack with or without smartcards. Finally, performance analysis shows that our protocol is more suitable for practical application in comparison with other related protocols

Keys in the Clouds: Auditable Multi-device Access to Cryptographic Credentials

Personal cryptographic keys are the foundation of many secure services, but storing these keys securely is a challenge, especially if they are used from multiple devices. Storing keys in a centralized location, like an Internet-accessible server, raises serious security concerns (e.g. server compromise). Hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are a well-known solution for protecting sensitive data in untrusted environments, and are now becoming available on commodity server platforms. Although the idea of protecting keys using a server-side TEE is straight-forward, in this paper we validate this approach and show that it enables new desirable functionality. We describe the design, implementation, and evaluation of a TEE-based Cloud Key Store (CKS), an online service for securely generating, storing, and using personal cryptographic keys. Using remote attestation, users receive strong assurance about the behaviour of the CKS, and can authenticate themselves using passwords while avoiding typical risks of password-based authentication like password theft or phishing. In addition, this design allows users to i) define policy-based access controls for keys; ii) delegate keys to other CKS users for a specified time and/or a limited number of uses; and iii) audit all key usages via a secure audit log. We have implemented a proof of concept CKS using Intel SGX and integrated this into GnuPG on Linux and OpenKeychain on Android. Our CKS implementation performs approximately 6,000 signature operations per second on a single desktop PC. The latency is in the same order of magnitude as using locally-stored keys, and 20x faster than smart cards.Comment: Extended version of a paper to appear in the 3rd Workshop on Security, Privacy, and Identity Management in the Cloud (SECPID) 201

Efficient and flexible password authenticated key agreement for Voice over Internet Protocol session initiation protocol using smart card

Providing a suitable key agreement protocol for session initiation protocol is crucial to protecting the communication among the users over the open channel. This paper presents an efficient and flexible password authenticated key agreement protocol for session initiation protocol associated with Voice over Internet Protocol. The proposed protocol has many unique properties, such as session key agreement, mutual authentication, password updating function and the server not needing to maintain a password or verification table, and so on. In addition, our protocol is secure against the replay attack, the impersonation attack, the stolen-verifier attack, the man-in-the-middle attack, the Denning–Sacco attack, and the offline dictionary attack with or without the smart card

Cryptanalysis of an e_cient three-party password-based key exchange scheme

AbstractIn order to secure communications between two clients with a trusted server's help in public network environments, a three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) scheme is used to provide the transaction confidentiality and e_ciency. In 2010, Lou-Huang proposed a new simple three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (LH-3PAKE) scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). By analysis, Lou-Huang claimed that the proposed LH- 3PAKE scheme is not only secure against various attacks, but also more e_cient than previously proposed 3PAKE schemes. However, this paper demonstrates LH-3PAKE scheme is vulnerable to o_-line password guessing attacks by an attacker