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Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey
A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for
players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to
static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one
period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods;
and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their
future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless
networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors,
resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In
this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless
networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to
encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances
and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various
problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together
with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we
outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference
Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography
This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum
trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers
entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is
continually updated on the webpage
\url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers
suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail
(\textit{[email protected]})
The Question of Spectrum: Technology, Management, and Regime Change
There is general agreement that the traditional command-and-control regulation of radio spectrum by the FCC (and NTIA) has failed. There is no general agreement on which regime should succeed it. Property rights advocates take Ronald Coase's advice that spectrum licenses should be sold off and traded in secondary markets, like any other assets. Commons advocates argue that new technologies cannot be accommodated by a licensing regime (either traditional or property rights) and that a commons regime leads to the most efficient means to deliver useful spectrum to the American public. This article reviews the scholarly history of this controversy, outlines the revolution of FCC thinking, and parses the question of property rights vs. commons into four distinct parts: new technology, spectrum uses, spectrum management, and the overarching legal regime. Advocates on both sides find much to agree about on the first three factors; the disagreement is focused on the choice of overarching regime to most efficiently and effectively make spectrum and its applications available to the American public. There are two feasible regime choices: a property rights regime and a mixed licensed/commons regime subject to regulation. The regime choice depends upon four factors: dispute resolution, transactions costs, tragedies of the commons and anticommons, and flexibility to changing technologies and demands. Each regime is described and analyzed against these four factors. With regard to pure transactions costs, commons may hold an advantage but it appears quite small. For all other factors, the property rights regime holds very substantial advantages relative to the mixed regime. I conclude that the choice comes down to markets vs. regulation as mechanism for allocating resources.
Co-primary inter-operator spectrum sharing over a limited spectrum pool using repeated games
We consider two small cell operators deployed in the same geographical area,
sharing spectrum resources from a common pool. A method is investigated to
coordinate the utilization of the spectrum pool without monetary transactions
and without revealing operator-specific information to other parties. For this,
we construct a protocol based on asking and receiving spectrum usage favors by
the operators, and keeping a book of the favors. A spectrum usage favor is
exchanged between the operators if one is asking for a permission to use some
of the resources from the pool on an exclusive basis, and the other is willing
to accept that. As a result, the proposed method does not force an operator to
take action. An operator with a high load may take spectrum usage favors from
an operator that has few users to serve, and it is likely to return these
favors in the future to show a cooperative spirit and maintain reciprocity. We
formulate the interactions between the operators as a repeated game and
determine rules to decide whether to ask or grant a favor at each stage game.
We illustrate that under frequent network load variations, which are expected
to be prominent in small cell deployments, both operators can attain higher
user rates as compared to the case of no coordination of the resource
utilization.Comment: To be published in proceedings of IEEE International Conference on
Communications (ICC) at London, Jun. 201
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