Census politics in deeply divided societies

Population censuses in societies that are deeply divided along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines can be sensitive affairs – particularly where political settlements seek to maintain peace through the proportional sharing of power between groups. This brief sets out some key findings from a research project investigating the relationship between census politics and the design of political institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kenya, Lebanon and Northern Ireland

„The old men who hold us back‟: Clan Elders, elite bargaining and exclusionary politics

© 2020 Adonis and Abbey Publishers Ltd. All rights reserved. In 1962, Hawa Jibril, a poetess and a long-time activist for Somali women‟s rights and political participation, called on fellow women activists to oppose male elders who sought to exclude women from the governance of their country by engaging in activism. In her powerful poem, „the old men who hold us back‟ Hawa exhorted her fellow activists to not let the old men “prevail over us” (Jibril 2008:151). Sixty years later, Somali women continue their resistance against clan-based politics and elders who attempt to hold them back. This paper examines the effects of the political institutionalization of the clans and the ways that it challenges women‟s aspirations to participate in politics. This article is based on research carried out in Puntland (Garowe), Somaliland (Hargeisa and Bur‟o) and Mogadishu; Nairobi, Kenya; and Minneapolis, MN from 2016 - 2018. It asks the following questions: How has the 4.5 power-sharing agreement and the presence of clan elders as gatekeepers in the political system affected Somali women? And in what way have women responded to these obstacles? This research finds that despite the adoption of gender quota, the presence of clan elders and the 4.5 power-sharing agreement both pose significant barriers to women‟s inclusion in politics

Can power-sharing foster peace? Evidence from Northern Ireland*

In the absence of power-sharing, minority groups in opposition have powerful incentives to substitute the ballot with the bullet. In contrast, when power is shared among all major groups in society, the relative gains of sticking to electoral politics are larger for minority groups. After making the theoretical argument, we provide in the current paper an empirical analysis of the impact of power-sharing at the local level, making use of fine-grained data from Northern Ireland’s 26 local district councils over the 1973–2001 period. We find that power-sharing has a sizable and robust conflict-reducing impact