4,687 research outputs found
Spanning connectivity games
The Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index and other voting power indices measure the importance of a player in a coalitional game. We consider a simple coalitional game called the spanning connectivity game (SCG) based on an undirected, unweighted multigraph, where edges are players. We examine the computational complexity of computing the voting power indices of edges in the SCG. It is shown that computing Banzhaf values and Shapley-Shubik indices is #P-complete for SCGs. Interestingly, Holler indices and Deegan-Packel indices can be computed in polynomial time. Among other results, it is proved that Banzhaf indices can be computed in polynomial time for graphs with bounded treewidth. It is also shown that for any reasonable representation of a simple game, a polynomial time algorithm to compute the Shapley-Shubik indices implies a polynomial time algorithm to compute the Banzhaf indices. As a corollary, computing the Shapley value is #P-complete for simple games represented by the set of minimal winning coalitions, Threshold Network Flow Games, Vertex Connectivity Games and Coalitional Skill Games
Complexity of coalition structure generation
We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to
partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize
the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time
algorithm to solve the problem for all coalitional games provided that player
types are known and the number of player types is bounded by a constant. As a
corollary, we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an optimal
partition for weighted voting games with a constant number of weight values and
for coalitional skill games with a constant number of skills. We also consider
well-studied and well-motivated coalitional games defined compactly on
combinatorial domains. For these games, we characterize the complexity of
computing an optimal coalition structure by presenting polynomial-time
algorithms, approximation algorithms, or NP-hardness and inapproximability
lower bounds.Comment: 17 page
Efficient computation of the Shapley value for game-theoretic network centrality
The Shapley valueāprobably the most important normative payoff division scheme in coalitional gamesāhas recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in networks. However, although this approach has a variety of real-world applications (including social and organisational networks, biological networks and communication networks), its computational properties have not been widely studied. To date, the only practicable approach to compute Shapley value-based centrality has been via Monte Carlo simulations which are computationally expensive and not guaranteed to give an exact answer. Against this background, this paper presents the first study of the computational aspects of the Shapley value for network centralities. Specifically, we develop exact analytical formulae for Shapley value-based centrality in both weighted and unweighted networks and develop efficient (polynomial time) and exact algorithms based on them. We empirically evaluate these algorithms on two real-life examples (an infrastructure network representing the topology of the Western States Power Grid and a collaboration network from the field of astrophysics) and demonstrate that they deliver significant speedups over the Monte Carlo approach. Fo
Generating random graphs in biased Maker-Breaker games
We present a general approach connecting biased Maker-Breaker games and
problems about local resilience in random graphs. We utilize this approach to
prove new results and also to derive some known results about biased
Maker-Breaker games. In particular, we show that for
, Maker can build a pancyclic graph (that is, a graph
that contains cycles of every possible length) while playing a game on
. As another application, we show that for , playing a game on , Maker can build a graph which
contains copies of all spanning trees having maximum degree with
a bare path of linear length (a bare path in a tree is a path with all
interior vertices of degree exactly two in )
Wiretapping a hidden network
We consider the problem of maximizing the probability of hitting a
strategically chosen hidden virtual network by placing a wiretap on a single
link of a communication network. This can be seen as a two-player win-lose
(zero-sum) game that we call the wiretap game. The value of this game is the
greatest probability that the wiretapper can secure for hitting the virtual
network. The value is shown to equal the reciprocal of the strength of the
underlying graph.
We efficiently compute a unique partition of the edges of the graph, called
the prime-partition, and find the set of pure strategies of the hider that are
best responses against every maxmin strategy of the wiretapper. Using these
special pure strategies of the hider, which we call
omni-connected-spanning-subgraphs, we define a partial order on the elements of
the prime-partition. From the partial order, we obtain a linear number of
simple two-variable inequalities that define the maxmin-polytope, and a
characterization of its extreme points.
Our definition of the partial order allows us to find all equilibrium
strategies of the wiretapper that minimize the number of pure best responses of
the hider. Among these strategies, we efficiently compute the unique strategy
that maximizes the least punishment that the hider incurs for playing a pure
strategy that is not a best response. Finally, we show that this unique
strategy is the nucleolus of the recently studied simple cooperative spanning
connectivity game
Algorithmic and complexity aspects of simple coalitional games
Simple coalitional games are a fundamental class of cooperative games and voting games which are used to model coalition formation, resource allocation and decision making in computer science, artificial intelligence and multiagent systems. Although simple coalitional games are well studied in the domain of game theory and social choice, their algorithmic and computational complexity aspects have received less attention till recently. The computational aspects of simple coalitional games are of increased importance as these games are used by computer scientists to model distributed settings. This thesis fits in the wider setting of the interplay between economics and computer science which has led to the development of algorithmic game theory and computational social choice. A unified view of the computational aspects of simple coalitional games is presented here for the first time. Certain complexity results also apply to other coalitional games such as skill games and matching games. The following issues are given special consideration: influence of players, limit and complexity of manipulations in the coalitional games and complexity of resource allocation on networks. The complexity of comparison of influence between players in simple games is characterized. The simple games considered are represented by winning coalitions, minimal winning coalitions, weighted voting games or multiple weighted voting games. A comprehensive classification of weighted voting games which can be solved in polynomial time is presented. An efficient algorithm which uses generating functions and interpolation to compute an integer weight vector for target power indices is proposed. Voting theory, especially the Penrose Square Root Law, is used to investigate the fairness of a real life voting model. Computational complexity of manipulation in social choice protocols can determine whether manipulation is computationally feasible or not. The computational complexity and bounds of manipulation are considered from various angles including control, false-name manipulation and bribery. Moreover, the computational complexity of computing various cooperative game solutions of simple games in dierent representations is studied. Certain structural results regarding least core payos extend to the general monotone cooperative game. The thesis also studies a coalitional game called the spanning connectivity game. It is proved that whereas computing the Banzhaf values and Shapley-Shubik indices of such games is #P-complete, there is a polynomial time combinatorial algorithm to compute the nucleolus. The results have interesting significance for optimal strategies for the wiretapping game which is a noncooperative game defined on a network
Streaming Verification of Graph Properties
Streaming interactive proofs (SIPs) are a framework for outsourced
computation. A computationally limited streaming client (the verifier) hands
over a large data set to an untrusted server (the prover) in the cloud and the
two parties run a protocol to confirm the correctness of result with high
probability. SIPs are particularly interesting for problems that are hard to
solve (or even approximate) well in a streaming setting. The most notable of
these problems is finding maximum matchings, which has received intense
interest in recent years but has strong lower bounds even for constant factor
approximations.
In this paper, we present efficient streaming interactive proofs that can
verify maximum matchings exactly. Our results cover all flavors of matchings
(bipartite/non-bipartite and weighted). In addition, we also present streaming
verifiers for approximate metric TSP. In particular, these are the first
efficient results for weighted matchings and for metric TSP in any streaming
verification model.Comment: 26 pages, 2 figure, 1 tabl
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