Post-quantum WireGuard

In this paper we present PQ-WireGuard, a post-quantum variant of the handshake in the WireGuard VPN protocol (NDSS 2017). Unlike most previous work on post-quantum security for real-world protocols, this variant does not only consider post-quantum confidentiality (or forward secrecy) but also post-quantum authentication. To achieve this, we replace the Diffie-Hellman-based handshake by a more generic approach only using key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). We establish security of PQ-WireGuard, adapting the security proofs for WireGuard in the symbolic model and in the standard model to our construction. We then instantiate this generic construction with concrete post-quantum secure KEMs, which we carefully select to achieve high security and speed. We demonstrate competitiveness of PQ-WireGuard presenting extensive benchmarking results comparing to widely deployed VPN solutions

A WireGuard Exploration

Internet users require secure means of communication. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) often serve this purpose, for consumers and businesses. The research aims of this paper were an analysis and implementation of the new VPN protocol WireGuard. The authors explain the cryptographic primitives used, build server and client code implementations of WireGuard peers, and present the benefits and drawbacks of this new technology. The outcome was a functional WireGuard client and server implementation, capable of tunneling all Internet traffic through a cloud-based virtual private server (VPS), with minimal manual configuration necessary from the end user. The code is publicly available

Introduction to Post-Quantum Cryptography

Trabajo de Fin de Grado en Ingeniería Informática, Facultad de Informática UCM, Departamento de Ingeniería del Software e Inteligencia Artificial, Curso 2021/2022En este trabajo se trata la importancia de la computación cuántica en la informática, y más en concreto en la ciberseguridad. Para ello, en primer lugar, se realiza una introducción detallada de qué es la criptografía así como los principales algoritmos criptográficos. En segundo lugar, se expone la computación cuántica, comentando sus orígenes, explicando su funcionamiento y enfocándose en aspectos de ciberseguridad así como los principales algoritmos que usa o los ataques más conocidos. Una vez detallados estos conceptos, se centra en las VPNs, más en concreto en WireGuard, del cual se analizan detalladamente sus distintos algoritmos y se proponen cambios para adecuarlo al futuro post-cuántico. Por último también se explica y prueba la aplicación web de laboratorio de análisis de firma digitales, con la que se realizan pruebas entre distintos algoritmos de hash para ver sus distintas características y rendimientos.In this work we will deal with the importance of quantum computing in computing, and more specifically in cybersecurity. To do this, first, a detailed introduction of what cryptography is as well as the main cryptographic algorithms is made. Secondly, quantum computing is exposed, commenting on its origins, explaining its operation and focusing on cybersecurity aspects as well as the main algorithms it uses or the most well-known attacks. Once these concepts are detailed, it focuses on VPNs, more specifically on WireGuard, of which its different algorithms are analyzed in detail and changes are proposed to adapt it to the post-quantum future. Finally, the digital signature analysis laboratory web application is also explained and tested, with which tests are carried out between different hash algorithms to see their different characteristics and performance.Depto. de Ingeniería de Software e Inteligencia Artificial (ISIA)Fac. de InformáticaTRUEunpu

A control plane for WireGuard

WireGuard is a VPN protocol that has gained significant interest recently. Its main advantages are: (i) simple configuration (via pre-shared SSH-like public keys), (ii) mobility support, (iii) reduced codebase to ease auditing, and (iv) Linux kernel implementation that yields high performance. However, WireGuard (intentionally) lacks a control plane. This means that each peer in a WireGuard network has to be manually configured with the other peers’ public key and IP addresses, or by other means. In this paper we present an architecture based on a centralized server to automatically distribute this information. In a nutshell, first we manually establish a WireGuard tunnel to the centralized server, and ask all the peers to store their public keys and IP addresses in it. Then, WireGuard peers use this secure channel to retrieve on-demand the information for the peers they want to communicate to. Our design strives to: (i) offer a key distribution scheme simpler than PKI-based ones, (ii) limit the number of public keys sent to the peers, and (iii) reduce tunnel establishment latency by means of an UDP-based protocol. We argue that such automation can help the deployment in enterprise or ISP scenarios. We also describe in detail our implementation and analyze several performance metrics. Finally, we discuss possible improvements regarding several shortcomings we found during implementation.This work was partially supported by the Spanish MINECO under contract TEC2017-90034-C2-1-R (ALLIANCE) and the Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA).Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Modular Design of KEM-Based Authenticated Key Exchange

A key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) is a basic building block for key exchange which must be combined with long-term keys in order to achieve authenticated key exchange (AKE). Although several KEM-based AKE protocols have been proposed, KEM-based modular building blocks are not available. We provide a KEM-based authenticator and a KEM-based protocol in the Authenticated Links model (AM), in the terminology of Canetti and Krawczyk (2001). Using these building blocks we achieve a set of generic AKE protocols. By instantiating these with post-quantum secure primitives we are able to propose several new post-quantum secure AKE protocols

Preuves mécanisées de protocoles cryptographiques et leur lien avec des implémentations vérifiées

Cryptographic protocols are one of the foundations for the trust people put in computer systems nowadays, be it online banking, any web or cloud services, or secure messaging. One of the best theoretical assurances for cryptographic protocol security is reached through proofs in the computational model. Writing such proofs is prone to subtle errors that can lead to invalidation of the security guarantees and, thus, to undesired security breaches. Proof assistants strive to improve this situation, have got traction, and have increasingly been used to analyse important real-world protocols and to inform their development. Writing proofs using such assistants requires a substantial amount of work. It is an ongoing endeavour to extend their scope through, for example, more automation and detailed modelling of cryptographic building blocks. This thesis shows on the example of the CryptoVerif proof assistant and two case studies, that mechanized cryptographic proofs are practicable and useful in analysing and designing complex real-world protocols.The first case study is on the free and open source Virtual Private Network (VPN) protocol WireGuard that has recently found its way into the Linux kernel. We contribute proofs for several properties that are typical for secure channel protocols. Furthermore, we extend CryptoVerif with a model of unprecedented detail of the popular Diffie-Hellman group Curve25519 used in WireGuard.The second case study is on the new Internet standard Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE), that has already been picked up for use in a privacy-enhancing extension of the TLS protocol (ECH), and in the Messaging Layer Security secure group messaging protocol. We accompanied the development of this standard from its early stages with comprehensive formal cryptographic analysis. We provided constructive feedback that led to significant improvements in its cryptographic design. Eventually, we became an official co-author. We conduct a detailed cryptographic analysis of one of HPKE's modes, published at Eurocrypt 2021, an encouraging step forward to make mechanized cryptographic proofs more accessible to the broader cryptographic community.The third contribution of this thesis is of methodological nature. For practical purposes, security of implementations of cryptographic protocols is crucial. However, there is frequently a gap between a cryptographic security analysis and an implementation that have both been based on a protocol specification: no formal guarantee exists that the two interpretations of the specification match, and thus, it is unclear if the executable implementation has the guarantees proved by the cryptographic analysis. In this thesis, we close this gap for proofs written in CryptoVerif and implementations written in F*. We develop cv2fstar, a compiler from CryptoVerif models to executable F* specifications using the HACL* verified cryptographic library as backend. cv2fstar translates non-cryptographic assumptions about, e.g., message formats, from the CryptoVerif model to F* lemmas. This allows to prove these assumptions for the specific implementation, further deepening the formal link between the two analysis frameworks. We showcase cv2fstar on the example of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol. cv2fstar connects CryptoVerif to the large F* ecosystem, eventually allowing to formally guarantee cryptographic properties on verified, efficient low-level code.Les protocoles cryptographiques sont l'un des fondements de la confiance que la société accorde aujourd'hui aux systèmes informatiques, qu'il s'agisse de la banque en ligne, d'un service web, ou de la messagerie sécurisée. Une façon d'obtenir des garanties théoriques fortes sur la sécurité des protocoles cryptographiques est de les prouver dans le modèle calculatoire. L'écriture de ces preuves est délicate : des erreurs subtiles peuvent entraîner l'invalidation des garanties de sécurité et, par conséquent, des failles de sécurité. Les assistants de preuve visent à améliorer cette situation. Ils ont gagné en popularité et ont été de plus en plus utilisés pour analyser des protocoles importants du monde réel, et pour contribuer à leur développement. L'écriture de preuves à l'aide de tels assistants nécessite une quantité substantielle de travail. Un effort continu est nécessaire pour étendre leur champ d'application, par exemple, par une automatisation plus poussée et une modélisation plus détaillée des primitives cryptographiques. Cette thèse montre sur l'exemple de l'assistant de preuve CryptoVerif et deux études de cas, que les preuves cryptographiques mécanisées sont praticables et utiles pour analyser et concevoir des protocoles complexes du monde réel. La première étude de cas porte sur le protocole de réseau virtuel privé (VPN) libre et open source WireGuard qui a récemment été intégré au noyau Linux. Nous contribuons des preuves pour plusieurs propriétés typiques des protocoles de canaux sécurisés. En outre, nous étendons CryptoVerif avec un modèle d'un niveau de détail sans précédent du groupe Diffie-Hellman populaire Curve25519 utilisé dans WireGuard. La deuxième étude de cas porte sur la nouvelle norme Internet Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE), qui est déjà utilisée dans une extension du protocole TLS destinée à améliorer la protection de la vie privée (ECH), et dans Messaging Layer Security, un protocole de messagerie de groupe sécurisée. Nous avons accompagné le développement de cette norme dès les premiers stades avec une analyse cryptographique formelle. Nous avons fourni des commentaires constructifs ce qui a conduit à des améliorations significatives dans sa conception cryptographique. Finalement, nous sommes devenus un co-auteur officiel. Nous effectuons une analyse cryptographique détaillée de l'un des modes de HPKE, publiée à Eurocrypt 2021, un pas encourageant pour rendre les preuves cryptographiques mécanisées plus accessibles à la communauté des cryptographes. La troisième contribution de cette thèse est de nature méthodologique. Pour des utilisations pratiques, la sécurité des implémentations de protocoles cryptographiques est cruciale. Cependant, il y a souvent un écart entre l'analyse de la sécurité cryptographique et l'implémentation, tous les deux basées sur la même spécification d'un protocole : il n'existe pas de garantie formelle que les deux interprétations de la spécification correspondent, et donc, il n'est pas clair si l'implémentation exécutable a les garanties prouvées par l'analyse cryptographique. Dans cette thèse, nous comblons cet écart pour les preuves écrites en CryptoVerif et les implémentations écrites en F*. Nous développons cv2fstar, un compilateur de modèles CryptoVerif vers des spécifications exécutables F* en utilisant la bibliothèque cryptographique vérifiée HACL* comme fournisseur de primitives cryptographiques. cv2fstar traduit les hypothèses non cryptographiques concernant, par exemple, les formats de messages, du modèle CryptoVerif vers des lemmes F*. Cela permet de prouver ces hypothèses pour l'implémentation spécifique, ce qui approfondit le lien formel entre les deux cadres d'analyse. Nous présentons cv2fstar sur l'exemple du protocole Needham-Schroeder-Lowe. cv2fstar connecte CryptoVerif au grand écosystème F*, permettant finalement de garantir formellement des propriétés cryptographiques sur du code de bas niveau efficace vérifié

Securing future decentralised industrial IoT infrastructures: challenges and free open source solutions

peer-reviewedThe next industrial revolution is said to be paved by the use of novel Internet of Things (IoT) technology. One important aspect of the modern IoT infrastructures is decentralised communication, often called Peer-to-Peer (P2P). In the context of industrial communication, P2P contributes to resilience and improved stability for industrial components. Current industrial facilities, however, still rely on centralised networking schemes which are considered to be mandatory to comply with security standards. In order to succeed, introduced industrial P2P technology must maintain the current level of protection and also consider possible new threats. The presented work starts with a short analysis of well-established industrial communication infrastructures and how these could benefit from decentralised structures. Subsequently, previously undefined Information Technology (IT) security requirements are derived from the new cloud based decentralised industrial automation model architecture presented in this paper. To meet those requirements, state-of-the-art communication schemes and their open source implementations are presented and assessed for their usability in the context of industrial IoT. Finally, derived building blocks for industrial IoT P2P security are presented which are qualified to comply with the stated industrial IoT security requirements