304 research outputs found
Manipulation Strategies for the Rank Maximal Matching Problem
We consider manipulation strategies for the rank-maximal matching problem. In
the rank-maximal matching problem we are given a bipartite graph such that denotes a set of applicants and a set of posts. Each
applicant has a preference list over the set of his neighbours in
, possibly involving ties. Preference lists are represented by ranks on the
edges - an edge has rank , denoted as , if post
belongs to one of 's -th choices. A rank-maximal matching is one in which
the maximum number of applicants is matched to their rank one posts and subject
to this condition, the maximum number of applicants is matched to their rank
two posts, and so on. A rank-maximal matching can be computed in time, where denotes the number of applicants, the
number of edges and the maximum rank of an edge in an optimal solution.
A central authority matches applicants to posts. It does so using one of the
rank-maximal matchings. Since there may be more than one rank- maximal matching
of , we assume that the central authority chooses any one of them randomly.
Let be a manipulative applicant, who knows the preference lists of all
the other applicants and wants to falsify his preference list so that he has a
chance of getting better posts than if he were truthful. In the first problem
addressed in this paper the manipulative applicant wants to ensure that
he is never matched to any post worse than the most preferred among those of
rank greater than one and obtainable when he is truthful. In the second problem
the manipulator wants to construct such a preference list that the worst post
he can become matched to by the central authority is best possible or in other
words, wants to minimize the maximal rank of a post he can become matched
to
Coalitions and Cliques in the School Choice Problem
The school choice mechanism design problem focuses on assignment mechanisms
matching students to public schools in a given school district. The well-known
Gale Shapley Student Optimal Stable Matching Mechanism (SOSM) is the most
efficient stable mechanism proposed so far as a solution to this problem.
However its inefficiency is well-documented, and recently the Efficiency
Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (EADAM) was proposed as a remedy for
this weakness. In this note we describe two related adjustments to SOSM with
the intention to address the same inefficiency issue. In one we create possibly
artificial coalitions among students where some students modify their
preference profiles in order to improve the outcome for some other students.
Our second approach involves trading cliques among students where those
involved improve their assignments by waiving some of their priorities. The
coalition method yields the EADAM outcome among other Pareto dominations of the
SOSM outcome, while the clique method yields all possible Pareto optimal Pareto
dominations of SOSM. The clique method furthermore incorporates a natural
solution to the problem of breaking possible ties within preference and
priority profiles. We discuss the practical implications and limitations of our
approach in the final section of the article
Counting Popular Matchings in House Allocation Problems
We study the problem of counting the number of popular matchings in a given
instance. A popular matching instance consists of agents A and houses H, where
each agent ranks a subset of houses according to their preferences. A matching
is an assignment of agents to houses. A matching M is more popular than
matching M' if the number of agents that prefer M to M' is more than the number
of people that prefer M' to M. A matching M is called popular if there exists
no matching more popular than M. McDermid and Irving gave a poly-time algorithm
for counting the number of popular matchings when the preference lists are
strictly ordered.
We first consider the case of ties in preference lists. Nasre proved that the
problem of counting the number of popular matching is #P-hard when there are
ties. We give an FPRAS for this problem.
We then consider the popular matching problem where preference lists are
strictly ordered but each house has a capacity associated with it. We give a
switching graph characterization of popular matchings in this case. Such
characterizations were studied earlier for the case of strictly ordered
preference lists (McDermid and Irving) and for preference lists with ties
(Nasre). We use our characterization to prove that counting popular matchings
in capacitated case is #P-hard
Rank Maximal Matchings -- Structure and Algorithms
Let G = (A U P, E) be a bipartite graph where A denotes a set of agents, P
denotes a set of posts and ranks on the edges denote preferences of the agents
over posts. A matching M in G is rank-maximal if it matches the maximum number
of applicants to their top-rank post, subject to this, the maximum number of
applicants to their second rank post and so on.
In this paper, we develop a switching graph characterization of rank-maximal
matchings, which is a useful tool that encodes all rank-maximal matchings in an
instance. The characterization leads to simple and efficient algorithms for
several interesting problems. In particular, we give an efficient algorithm to
compute the set of rank-maximal pairs in an instance. We show that the problem
of counting the number of rank-maximal matchings is #P-Complete and also give
an FPRAS for the problem. Finally, we consider the problem of deciding whether
a rank-maximal matching is popular among all the rank-maximal matchings in a
given instance, and give an efficient algorithm for the problem
Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability
The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel. Firms will be more willing to participate because otherwise, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion.Collusion, Partial cartels, Trigger strategies, Optimal punishment
Practical unconditionally secure signature schemes and related protocols
The security guarantees provided by digital signatures are vital to many modern applications such as online banking, software distribution, emails and many more. Their ubiquity across digital communications arguably makes digital signatures one of the most important inventions in cryptography. Worryingly, all commonly used schemes – RSA, DSA and ECDSA – provide only computational security, and are rendered completely insecure by quantum computers. Motivated by this threat, this thesis focuses on unconditionally secure signature (USS) schemes – an information theoretically secure analogue of digital signatures. We present and analyse two new USS schemes. The first is a quantum USS scheme that is both information-theoretically secure and realisable with current technology. The scheme represents an improvement over all previous quantum USS schemes, which were always either realisable or had a full security proof, but not both. The second is an entirely classical USS scheme that uses minimal resources and is vastly more efficient than all previous schemes, to such an extent that it could potentially find real-world application. With the discovery of such an efficient classical USS scheme using only minimal resources, it is difficult to see what advantage quantum USS schemes may provide. Lastly, we remain in the information-theoretic security setting and consider two quantum protocols closely related to USS schemes – oblivious transfer and quantum money. For oblivious transfer, we prove new lower bounds on the minimum achievable cheating probabilities in any 1-out-of-2 protocol. For quantum money, we present a scheme that is more efficient and error tolerant than all previous schemes. Additionally, we show that it can be implemented using a coherent source and lossy detectors, thereby allowing for the first experimental demonstration of quantum coin creation and verification
Social identity and implicit collusion in Cournot interactions
This research applies and extends the standard industrial organization models of repeated interaction between firms by incorporating group identity to evaluate the ability of group identity, thereby summarizing the theories of observed collusion. The model is used to outline circumstances under which collusion is easier to happen in a single market, and it will break down.
A general overview of literature based on laboratory experiments is presented to study the effects of social identity and study oligopoly markets. We construct lab experiments to test the effects of a single factor on collusion, i.e. whether the two players share the same group identity. University students were enrolled as research subjects in the laboratory experiments to test the validity of behaviour predictions. All experiments serve to answers two questions: a) How far is the market outcome away from the Standard Nash equilibrium? b) How good is the Nash prediction?
Study 1 investigates the effects of group identity on randomly rematches one-shot Cournot interactions. Study 2 describes the results of finitely repeated Cournot interactions that behaviour is more collusive when the players were from the same group than those from different groups or nogroup players. Study 3 concentrates on the indefinitely repeated interactions, finding that outgroup favouritism could be reflected in average quantity choices and collusion. Therefore, we determine that the effect of group identity on collusion is greater in repeated Cournot interactions than one-shot Cournot interactions, and that the repeated interaction devices enhance the difference between the players without group identity and players with primed group identity. The inspecting of individual behaviour indicated that the output adjustment is significantly correlated with the previous period’s two-sides profit changes comparisons. In the group matchings (ingroup matchings and outgroup matchings), group identity further strengthens the role of enhancement for collusion.
Group identity can influence significantly the player’s quantity choices. In this study we reassess the representation of group identity by applying group contingent other-regarding preferences. First, the influence of group identity varies unsympathetically across different devices of repeated Cournot interactions, so it cannot be explained through a well-behaved preference function. Second, this study suggests that group identity plays a key role in the preference over strategies of norms. Simulation results generated from a norm model estimated at the subject level provided insight into the repeated interactions and the group identity that motivate the collusion
- …