32 research outputs found

    Unexpected precursors of Popper's World Three

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    Popper’s debt to psychology

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    Ontologia e architettura del mentale nella teoria della pratica di Pierre Bourdieu

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    Riassunto: Questo lavoro intende offrire una prospettiva sulla filosofia della mente implicita nell’opera di Pierre Bourdieu. Propongo di organizzare e analizzare le questioni psicologiche che si dipanano nella teoria della pratica di Bourdieu su due diversi piani descrittivi della sfera del mentale: quello ontologico e quello architettonico. Nella prima parte del lavoro chiarirò il concetto di habitus sulla base della sua costituzione schematica. Poi, definito l’habitus come “super-schema psicosociale”, esplorerò il suo funzionamento incarnato alla luce della teoria cognitiva della metafora. Nella seconda parte del lavoro, intendo chiarire l’architettura del mentale che emerge dalla relazione che Bourdieu teorizza tra conoscenza pratica e conoscenza riflessiva. Qui, vorrei prima sottolineare come Bourdieu faccia uso di un’architettura duale della mente, segnata da una particolare doppia-opacità riflessiva, per sostenere poi che le affermazioni metacognitive di Bourdieu ben si adattano agli approcci contemporanei della parità sé-altro della conoscenza di sé. Infine sosterrò come il funzionamento inconscio dell’habitus sia coerente con una visione cognitiva dell’inconscio.Parole chiave: La filosofia della mente di Bourdieu; Habitus; Schema; Dualità della mente; Parità Sé-Altro; Inconscio cognitivo The ontology and architecture of the mind in Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practiceAbstract: This article provides an outline of Bourdieu’s hidden philosophy of mind. I propose to organize and analyse the psychological themes that flow trough Bourdieu’s theory of practice using two different levels of description of the mental, the ontological and architectonic. In the first part of the article, I clarify the concept of habitus on the ground of its schematical constitution. Conceptualising habitus as a “psychosocial super-schema”, I explore its embodied functioning in the light of cognitive metaphor theory. In the second part, I clarify the architecture of the mental as it emerges from the relationship Bourdieu theorizes between practical and reflexive knowledge. Here, I first stress that Bourdieu employs a dual architecture of mind marked by a peculiar reflexive double-opacity, and then I argue that Bourdieu’s metacognitive claims fit the contemporary self-other parity accounts of self-knowledge. Finally, I claim that the unconscious functioning of habitus is consistent with a cognitivist theory of the unconscious.Keywords: Bourdieu’s Philosophy of Mind; Habitus; Schema; Duality of Mind; Self-Other Parity; Cognitive Unconsciou

    Karl Popper and the Social Sciences

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    The Impact of Karl Bühler on Hungarian Psychology and Linguistics

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    El antifundamentalismo radical del neodualismo postanalítico. A través de von Wright y Apel

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    Subsequently to the theory of the games of language by the latest Wittgenstein, post-analytic neo-dualism attributed a radically anti-fundamentalistic attitude to Russell, the first Wittgenstein and Popper, based on three reasons, at least according to von Wright and Apel: The inductive dogmatic foundation of the logical positivism of the two first cases; the permanent hypothetical re-foundation of the critical rationalism of Popper; and, finally, the explanatory-understanding foundation defended in a melioristic way by the semantic pragmatism of the latter. But not withstanding this basic agreement, von Wright and Apel disagreed about the merely pragmatic, or rather pragmatic transcendental sense that, in spite of everything, should be awarded to the notion of foundation in the followers of these new tendencies of post-analytic neo-dualism.El neodualismo postanalítico atribuyó a Russell, el primer Wittgenstein y Popper una actitud radicalmente anti-fundamentalista, con posterioridad a la teoría de los juegos del lenguaje del segundo Wittgenstein, debido a tres motivos, al menos según Von Wright y Apel, a saber: la fundamentación dogmática inductivista del positivismo lógico en los dos primeros casos; las sucesivas refundaciones meramente hipotéticas del racionalismo crítico en Popper; y, finalmente, la fundamentación explicativo-comprensiva preconizada de un modo meliorista por el pragmatismo semántico en aquel último caso. Pero a pesar de este acuerdo básico, von Wright y Apel discreparon acerca del sentido meramente pragmático, o más bien pragmático-transcendental que, a pesar de todo, se debería seguir otorgando a la noción de fundamentación en los seguidores de estas nuevas tendencias del neodualismo postanalítico. 

    Shaftesbury as Popperian: critical rationalism before its time? Part I

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    La doble génesis semiótica y heurística del neodualismo postanalítico. (A través de Wittgenstein y Popper, según Wright y Apel)

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    RESUMENSe reconstruye la doble génesis semiótica y a la vez heurística de los proyectos programáticos del primer Wittgenstein y Popper, como ellos mismos se reprocharon mutuamente por razones éticas contrapuestas en el así llamado “incidente del atizador” de 1946. Por su parte Wright y Apel también prolongaron este tipo de análisis acerca de las mutuas relaciones de subalternación y autodiferenciación o, por el contrario, de fundamentación y complementariedad recíproca, que se deberían establecer entre las correspondientes críticas del sentido y las subsiguientes éticas de la ciencia, analizándolas desde un enfoque neodualista postanalítico o estrictamente pragmáticotrascendental muy contrapuestos, dejando sin resolver numerosos problemas abiertos.PALABRAS CLAVESEMIÓTICA, HEURíSTICA, FALSACIONISMO, ANÁLISIS, NUEVO DUALISMOABSTRACTThis paper presents a reconstruction of the semiotic and heuristic double genesis of the programmatic projects by the early Wittgenstein and Popper, the way they both argued with each other due to conflicting ethical reasons in the so called “Wittgenstein’s Poker” incident in 1946. Wright and Apel also prolonged this type of analysis about mutual relationships of sub-alternation and auto-differentiation or, on the other hand, of foundation and reciprocal complementary, that should be established between the corresponding critics of meaning and the subsequent ethics of science, analysing them from a post analytical neo dualistic approach or a strictly pragmatic-transcendental approach –both radically opposed– leaving numerous rising problems unsolved.KEYWORDSEMIOTIC, HEURISTIC, FALSACIONISM, ANALySIS, NEW DUALIS

    Frameworks, models, and case studies

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    This thesis focuses on models of conceptual change in science and philosophy. In particular, I developed a new bootstrapping methodology for studying conceptual change, centered around the formalization of several popular models of conceptual change and the collective assessment of their improved formal versions via nine evaluative dimensions. Among the models of conceptual change treated in the thesis are Carnap’s explication, Lakatos’ concept-stretching, Toulmin’s conceptual populations, Waismann’s open texture, Mark Wilson’s patches and facades, Sneed’s structuralism, and Paul Thagard’s conceptual revolutions. In order to analyze and compare the conception of conceptual change provided by these different models, I rely on several historical reconstructions of episodes of scientific conceptual change. The historical episodes of scientific change that figure in this work include the emergence of the morphological concept of fish in biological taxonomies, the development of scientific conceptions of temperature, the Church-Turing thesis and related axiomatizations of effective calculability, the history of the concept of polyhedron in 17th and 18th century mathematics, Hamilton’s invention of the quaternions, the history of the pre-abstract group concepts in 18th and 19th century mathematics, the expansion of Newtonian mechanics to viscous fluids forces phenomena, and the chemical revolution. I will also present five different formal and informal improvements of four specific models of conceptual change. I will first present two different improvements of Carnapian explication, a formal and an informal one. My informal improvement of Carnapian explication will consist of a more fine-grained version of the procedure that adds an intermediate, third step to the two steps of Carnapian explication. I will show how this novel three-step version of explication is more suitable than its traditional two-step relative to handle complex cases of explications. My second, formal improvement of Carnapian explication will be a full explication of the concept of explication itself within the theory of conceptual spaces. By virtue of this formal improvement, the whole procedure of explication together with its application procedures and its pragmatic desiderata will be reconceptualized as a precise procedure involving topological and geometrical constraints inside the theory of conceptual spaces. My third improved model of conceptual change will consist of a formal explication of Darwinian models of conceptual change that will make vast use of Godfrey-Smith’s population-based Darwinism for targeting explicitly mathematical conceptual change. My fourth improvement will be dedicated instead to Wilson’s indeterminate model of conceptual change. I will show how Wilson’s very informal framework can be explicated within a modified version of the structuralist model-theoretic reconstructions of scientific theories. Finally, the fifth improved model of conceptual change will be a belief-revision-like logical framework that reconstructs Thagard’s model of conceptual revolution as specific revision and contraction operations that work on conceptual structures. At the end of this work, a general conception of conceptual change in science and philosophy emerges, thanks to the combined action of the three layers of my methodology. This conception takes conceptual change to be a multi-faceted phenomenon centered around the dynamics of groups of concepts. According to this conception, concepts are best reconstructed as plastic and inter-subjective entities equipped with a non-trivial internal structure and subject to a certain degree of localized holism. Furthermore, conceptual dynamics can be judged from a weakly normative perspective, bound to be dependent on shared values and goals. Conceptual change is then best understood, according to this conception, as a ubiquitous phenomenon underlying all of our intellectual activities, from science to ordinary linguistic practices. As such, conceptual change does not pose any particular problem to value-laden notions of scientific progress, objectivity, and realism. At the same time, this conception prompts all our concept-driven intellectual activities, including philosophical and metaphilosophical reflections, to take into serious consideration the phenomenon of conceptual change. An important consequence of this conception, and of the analysis that generated it, is in fact that an adequate understanding of the dynamics of philosophical concepts is a prerequisite for analytic philosophy to develop a realistic and non-idealized depiction of itself and its activities
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