1,271 research outputs found
On imitation dynamics in potential population games
Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic
properties analyzed. In the considered class of imitation dynamics - that
encompass the replicator equation as well as other models previously considered
in evolutionary biology - players have no global information about the game
structure, and all they know is their own current utility and the one of fellow
players contacted through pairwise interactions. For potential population
games, global asymptotic stability of the set of Nash equilibria of the
sub-game restricted to the support of the initial population configuration is
proved. These results strengthen (from local to global asymptotic stability)
existing ones and generalize them to a broader class of dynamics. The developed
techniques highlight a certain structure of the problem and suggest possible
generalizations from the fully mixed population case to imitation dynamics
whereby agents interact on complex communication networks.Comment: 7 pages, 3 figures. Accepted at CDC 201
Lowest Unique Bid Auctions
We consider a class of auctions (Lowest Unique Bid Auctions) that have
achieved a considerable success on the Internet. Bids are made in cents (of
euro) and every bidder can bid as many numbers as she wants. The lowest unique
bid wins the auction. Every bid has a fixed cost, and once a participant makes
a bid, she gets to know whether her bid was unique and whether it was the
lowest unique. Information is updated in real time, but every bidder sees only
what's relevant to the bids she made. We show that the observed behavior in
these auctions differs considerably from what theory would prescribe if all
bidders were fully rational. We show that the seller makes money, which would
not be the case with rational bidders, and some bidders win the auctions quite
often. We describe a possible strategy for these bidders
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