A jurisprudential study: proving witchcraft in Africa

Widespread incidents of mob violence that are associated with witchcraft pose significant risks towards African criminal process. The need to address the extent to which these incidents threaten the overall institutional legitimacy of African criminal process constitutes the principal motivation behind the project of this thesis. This thesis identifies three major sets of challenges that are complained about by African communities. These pertain to (1) the relevant institutional practices that are to be followed in witchcraft cases (institutional); (2) the legal meaning of witchcraft (material); and (3) the evidential heuristics or processes of proof that are required to prove the direct crime of witchcraft (probative). These institutional, material and probative challenges are then summarised into a single overall thesis question: how can the direct crime of witchcraft be proven in Africa? This thesis embarks upon an Afrocentric Jurisprudential (theoretical) study in order to develop heuristics for the evidential proof of witchcraft in criminal cases in Africa. The kind of Jurisprudence undertaken in this thesis constitutes a prescriptive, middle-order level of theorising in that the proof heuristics that are developed take the form of argumentation schemes that are to be applied in witchcraft trials in Africa. The overall answer given to the main thesis question takes the form of an argument, a defeasible modus ponens, that is underpinned by a broad conception of (evidential) proof. The argument is that: (1) Generally speaking, if the relevant African institutional, material and probative (IMP) practices can be shown to be adhered to, then the plausibility of the evidential proof of the direct crime of witchcraft (P(w)) would have been established; (2) this thesis shows how the relevant IMP practices can be adhered to; (3) therefore, the plausibility of P(w) has been established by this thesis

A jurisprudential study: proving witchcraft in Africa

Widespread incidents of mob violence that are associated with witchcraft pose significant risks towards African criminal process. The need to address the extent to which these incidents threaten the overall institutional legitimacy of African criminal process constitutes the principal motivation behind the project of this thesis. This thesis identifies three major sets of challenges that are complained about by African communities. These pertain to (1) the relevant institutional practices that are to be followed in witchcraft cases (institutional); (2) the legal meaning of witchcraft (material); and (3) the evidential heuristics or processes of proof that are required to prove the direct crime of witchcraft (probative). These institutional, material and probative challenges are then summarised into a single overall thesis question: how can the direct crime of witchcraft be proven in Africa? This thesis embarks upon an Afrocentric Jurisprudential (theoretical) study in order to develop heuristics for the evidential proof of witchcraft in criminal cases in Africa. The kind of Jurisprudence undertaken in this thesis constitutes a prescriptive, middle-order level of theorising in that the proof heuristics that are developed take the form of argumentation schemes that are to be applied in witchcraft trials in Africa. The overall answer given to the main thesis question takes the form of an argument, a defeasible modus ponens, that is underpinned by a broad conception of (evidential) proof. The argument is that: (1) Generally speaking, if the relevant African institutional, material and probative (IMP) practices can be shown to be adhered to, then the plausibility of the evidential proof of the direct crime of witchcraft (P(w)) would have been established; (2) this thesis shows how the relevant IMP practices can be adhered to; (3) therefore, the plausibility of P(w) has been established by this thesis

Conductive arguments and the ‘inference to the best explanation’

I will demonstrate that conductive arguments are found in the inference to the best explana-tion as it is used in science. Conductive arguments, I argue, operate on two levels: the first is in the con-struction of hypotheses; the second is through the competition of hypotheses. By constructing arguments based on observations of facts, all possible (conceivable) factors are taken into account and a judgment is made based on our weighing of considerations: conductive argumentation

Students\u27 Conceptions about Climate Change: Using Critical Evaluation to Influence Plausibility Reappraisals and Knowledge Reconstruction

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) reported a greater than 90% chance that human activities are responsible for global temperature increases over the last 50 years, as well as other climatic changes. The scientific report also states that alternative explanations (e.g., increasing energy received from the Sun) are less plausible than human-induced climate change. These climate scientists have made their plausibility judgment--which I define as the relative potential truthfulness of alternative explanations--based on the evaluation and coordination of multiple lines evidence with competing theoretical perspectives. Climate change is a highly relevant and gravely serious topic; in an educational setting, climate change also presents an opportunity for students to learn about fundamental scientific principles and how scientists construct knowledge. However, students may be neither naturally evaluative when learning about controversial topics, such as climate change, nor reflective while engaging in judgments about knowledge and knowing (King & Kitchener, 2004), such as plausibility judgments. The purpose of this study was to examine how plausibility judgments and knowledge about human-induced climate change transform during instruction that promotes critical evaluation abilities. An instructional scaffold--called a model evidence link (MEL) diagram-- was used in this study. The MEL allowed students to weigh the strength of connections between two alternative models of climate change (i.e., the scientifically accepted model of human-induced climate change and a popular skeptics\u27 model that climate change is caused by increases in the Sun\u27s energy). The results revealed that treatment group participants who used the MEL diagram experienced a significant shift in their plausibility judgments toward the scientifically accepted model. This shift was accompanied by significantly greater postinstructional knowledge of human-induced climate change, with treatment group participants demonstrating reconstruction of knowledge about the causes of climate change to be more consistent with scientific understanding. Moderate to large effect sizes characterized these changes in treatment group participants\u27 plausibility perceptions and understanding. A comparison group of students who experienced a climate change activity that is part of their normal curriculum did not experience statistically significant changes. The results from this dissertation study, along with previous studies that I and my colleagues have conducted (see, for example, Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012), helped to inform the development of a model on the role of the plausibility judgment in conceptual change. This model has the potential to guide further research that will help educators better understand the mechanisms in conceptual change and guide instructional practices to promote knowledge reconstruction on scientific topics of great societal importance, such as climate change

The concept of plausibility in a risk analysis context: Review and clarifications of defining ideas and interpretations

The plausibility concept has gained increasing attention in recent years in risk analysis settings. A number of definitions exist, most of which interpret plausibility as an expression of uncertainty. The concept is frequently referred to in scenario analysis and emerging risk contexts, which are characterized by large uncertainties. The difficulty of assigning probabilities in such cases has led some to claim that, by offering a purely qualitative approach, plausibility is a more suitable tool for measuring uncertainty. However, a proper clarification of what the plausibility concept means in a risk analysis context is missing; current definitions of the concept do not provide a clear understanding of how plausibility is linked to fundamental aspects of risk and uncertainty. The present paper aims to rectify these issues, by i) reviewing and discussing how the plausibility concept is interpreted and used in the literature, ii) providing a suggested interpretation of the concept in a risk analysis context, and iii) giving our recommendations on how the practical application of the plausibility concept can be enhanced by drawing on contemporary risk science, specifically with regard to highlighting the likelihood and knowledge dimensions of risk. Based on the review, it is shown that the concept of plausibility should be seen as a measure of uncertainty capturing a combination of likelihood and judgments on the supporting knowledge. We conclude that a prudent use of the concept requires that each of these dimensions are addressed explicitly, using imprecise probabilities and strength of knowledge judgments.publishedVersio