Gödel's Mathematical Intuition and Platonism

This paper has two objectives. The first is to present an interpretation of Gödel's concept of mathematical intuition and defend it against other interpretations like Charles Parsons'. The second objective is to show the necessity of realism for Gödel's mathematical intuition. The first section seeks to show what mathematical intuition is and how it works, focusing on Gödel's works and unpublished texts. Consequently, from this section, I will show that, for Gödel, the concept of mathematical intuition emerges and develops parallel to his platonistic ontological commitment. Gödel's Platonism and mathematical intuition involve not only an ontological dimension but also an epistemological dimension. In the second section, I will discuss Parsons' 1995 paper "Platonism and mathematical intuition in Kurt Gödel's thought", in which he argues for a separation between mathematical intuition and Gödel's Platonism. What I will show is that this separation is not possible in Gödel since according to the recent publications of his philosophical notebooks and works prior to 1964, mathematical intuition was already implicit and, contrary to what Parsons argues, it is not something that arises before and independently of Gödel's realism

Philosophy of Mathematics: Theories and Defense

In this paper I discuss six philosophical theories of mathematics including logicism, intuitionism, formalism, platonism, structuralism, and moderate realism. I also discuss problems that arise within these theories and attempts to solve them. Finally, I attempt to harmonize the best features of moderate realism and structuralism, presenting a theory that I take to best describe current mathematical practice

Linguistic Knowledge of Reality: A Metaphysical Impossibility?

Reality contains information (significant) that becomes significances in the mind of the observer. Language is the human instrument to understand reality. But is it possible to attain this reality? Is there an absolute reality, as certain philosophical schools tell us? The reality that we perceive, is it just a fragmented reality of which we are part? The work that the authors present is an attempt to address this question from an epistemological, linguistic and logical-mathematical point of view

The Implications of Gödel's Theorem

After a brief and informal explanation of the Gödel’s theorem as a version of the Epimenides’ paradox applied to Elementary Number Theory formulated in first-order logic, Lucas shows some of the most relevant consequences of this theorem, such as the impossibility to define truth in terms of provability and so the failure of Verificationist and Intuitionist arguments. He shows moreover how Gödel’s theorem proves that first-order arithmetic admits non-standard models, that Hilbert’s programme is untenable and that second-order logic is not mechanical. There are furthermore some more general consequences: the difference between being reasonable and following a rule and the possibility that one man’s insight differs from another’s without being wrong. Finally some consequences concerning moral and political philosophy can arise from Gödel’s theorem, because it suggests that – instead of some fundamental principle from which all else follows deductively – we can seek for different arguments in different situations

Gödel Mathematics Versus Hilbert Mathematics. II Logicism and Hilbert Mathematics, the Identification of Logic and Set Theory, and Gödel’s 'Completeness Paper' (1930)

The previous Part I of the paper discusses the option of the Gödel incompleteness statement (1931: whether “Satz VI” or “Satz X”) to be an axiom due to the pair of the axiom of induction in arithmetic and the axiom of infinity in set theory after interpreting them as logical negations to each other. The present Part II considers the previous Gödel’s paper (1930) (and more precisely, the negation of “Satz VII”, or “the completeness theorem”) as a necessary condition for granting the Gödel incompleteness statement to be a theorem just as the statement itself, to be an axiom. Then, the “completeness paper” can be interpreted as relevant to Hilbert mathematics, according to which mathematics and reality as well as arithmetic and set theory are rather entangled or complementary rather than mathematics to obey reality able only to create models of the latter. According to that, both papers (1930; 1931) can be seen as advocating Russell’s logicism or the intensional propositional logic versus both extensional arithmetic and set theory. Reconstructing history of philosophy, Aristotle’s logic and doctrine can be opposed to those of Plato or the pre-Socratic schools as establishing ontology or intensionality versus extensionality. Husserl’s phenomenology can be analogically realized including and particularly as philosophy of mathematics. One can identify propositional logic and set theory by virtue of Gödel’s completeness theorem (1930: “Satz VII”) and even both and arithmetic in the sense of the “compactness theorem” (1930: “Satz X”) therefore opposing the latter to the “incompleteness paper” (1931). An approach identifying homomorphically propositional logic and set theory as the same structure of Boolean algebra, and arithmetic as the “half” of it in a rigorous construction involving information and its unit of a bit. Propositional logic and set theory are correspondingly identified as the shared zero-order logic of the class of all first-order logics and the class at issue correspondingly. Then, quantum mechanics does not need any quantum logics, but only the relation of propositional logic, set theory, arithmetic, and information: rather a change of the attitude into more mathematical, philosophical, and speculative than physical, empirical and experimental. Hilbert’s epsilon calculus can be situated in the same framework of the relation of propositional logic and the class of all mathematical theories. The horizon of Part III investigating Hilbert mathematics (i.e. according to the Pythagorean viewpoint about the world as mathematical) versus Gödel mathematics (i.e. the usual understanding of mathematics as all mathematical models of the world external to it) is outlined