5,398 research outputs found
Recommended from our members
Pico without public keys
This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following paper: Frank Stajano, Bruce Christianson, Mark Lomas, Graeme Jenkinson, Jeunese Payne, Max Spencer, and Quentin Stafford Fraser, 'Pico without Public Keys', Security Protocols XXIII, 23rd International Workshop Cambridge, March 31- April 2, 2015, Revised Selected Papers, pp. 195-211, part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, Vol. 9379), first online 25 November 2015, ISBN: 978-3-319-26095-2. The final publication is available at Springer via: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-26096-9_21v.Pico is a user authentication system that does not require remembering secrets. It is based on a personal handheld token that holds the user’s credentials and that is unlocked by a “personal aura” generated by digital accessories worn by the owner. The token, acting as prover, engages in a public-key-based authentication protocol with the verifier. What would happen to Pico if success of the mythical quantum computer meant secure public key primitives were no longer available, or if for other reasons such as energy consumption we preferred not to deploy them? More generally, what would happen under those circumstances to user authentication on the web, which relies heavily on public key cryptography through HTTPS/TLS? Although the symmetric-key-vs-public-key debate dates back to the 1990s, we note that the problematic aspects of public key deployment that were identified back then are still ubiquitous today. In particular, although public key cryptography is widely deployed on the web, revocation still doesn’t work. We discuss ways of providing desirable properties of public-key-based user authentication systems using symmetric-key primitives and tamperevident tokens. In particular, we present a protocol through which a compromise of the user credentials file at one website does not require users to change their credentials at that website or any other. We also note that the current prototype of Pico, when working in compatibility mode through the Pico Lens (i.e. with websites that are unaware of the Pico protocols), doesn’t actually use public key cryptography, other than that implicit in TLS. With minor tweaks we adopt this as the native mode for Pico, dropping public key cryptography and achieving much greater deployability without any noteworthy loss in security
The Value of User-Visible Internet Cryptography
Cryptographic mechanisms are used in a wide range of applications, including
email clients, web browsers, document and asset management systems, where
typical users are not cryptography experts. A number of empirical studies have
demonstrated that explicit, user-visible cryptographic mechanisms are not
widely used by non-expert users, and as a result arguments have been made that
cryptographic mechanisms need to be better hidden or embedded in end-user
processes and tools. Other mechanisms, such as HTTPS, have cryptography
built-in and only become visible to the user when a dialogue appears due to a
(potential) problem. This paper surveys deployed and potential technologies in
use, examines the social and legal context of broad classes of users, and from
there, assesses the value and issues for those users
Recommended from our members
Low-cost mitigation against cold boot attacks for an authentication token
Pico: No More Passwords!
Abstract. From a usability viewpoint, passwords and PINs have reached the end of their useful life. Even though they are convenient for implementers, for users they are increasingly unmanageable. The demands placed on users (passwords that are unguessable, all different, regularly changed and never written down) are no longer reasonable now that each person has to manage dozens of passwords. Yet we can’t abandon passwords until we come up with an alternative method of user authentication that is both usable and secure. We present an alternative design based on a hardware token called Pico that relieves the user from having to remember passwords and PINs. Unlike most alternatives, Pico doesn’t merely address the case of web passwords: it also applies to all the other contexts in which users must at present remember passwords, passphrases and PINs. Besides relieving the user from memorization efforts, the Pico solution scales to thousands of credentials, provides “continuous authentication ” and is resistant to brute force guessing, dictionary attacks, phishing and keylogging. 1 Why users are right to be fed up Remembering an unguessable and un-brute-force-able password was a manageable task twenty or thirty years ago, when each of us had to use only one or two. Since then, though, two trends in computing have made this endeavour much harder. First, computing power has grown by several orders of magnitude: once upon a time, eight characters were considered safe from brute force 1; nowadays, passwords that are truly safe from brute force and from advanced guessing attacks 2 typically exceed the ability of ordinary users to remember them 3 4. Second, and most important, the number of computer-based services with which It’s OK to skip all these gazillions of footnotes
Recommended from our members
Am I in good company? A privacy-protecting protocol for cooperating ubiquitous computing devices
A portable device carries important secrets in encrypted form; to unlock it, a threshold secret sharing scheme is used, requiring the presence of several other devices. We explore the design space for the protocol through which these devices communicate wirelessly, under the additional constraint that eavesdroppers should not be able to recognize and track the user carrying these devices
- …