Principles of Physical Layer Security in Multiuser Wireless Networks: A Survey

This paper provides a comprehensive review of the domain of physical layer security in multiuser wireless networks. The essential premise of physical-layer security is to enable the exchange of confidential messages over a wireless medium in the presence of unauthorized eavesdroppers without relying on higher-layer encryption. This can be achieved primarily in two ways: without the need for a secret key by intelligently designing transmit coding strategies, or by exploiting the wireless communication medium to develop secret keys over public channels. The survey begins with an overview of the foundations dating back to the pioneering work of Shannon and Wyner on information-theoretic security. We then describe the evolution of secure transmission strategies from point-to-point channels to multiple-antenna systems, followed by generalizations to multiuser broadcast, multiple-access, interference, and relay networks. Secret-key generation and establishment protocols based on physical layer mechanisms are subsequently covered. Approaches for secrecy based on channel coding design are then examined, along with a description of inter-disciplinary approaches based on game theory and stochastic geometry. The associated problem of physical-layer message authentication is also introduced briefly. The survey concludes with observations on potential research directions in this area.Comment: 23 pages, 10 figures, 303 refs. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1303.1609 by other authors. IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, 201

On the Interference Alignment Designs for Secure Multiuser MIMO Systems

In this paper, we propose two secure multiuser multiple-input multiple-output transmission approaches based on interference alignment (IA) in the presence of an eavesdropper. To deal with the information leakage to the eavesdropper as well as the interference signals from undesired transmitters (Txs) at desired receivers (Rxs), our approaches aim to design the transmit precoding and receive subspace matrices to minimize both the total inter-main-link interference and the wiretapped signals (WSs). The first proposed IA scheme focuses on aligning the WSs into proper subspaces while the second one imposes a new structure on the precoding matrices to force the WSs to zero. When the channel state information is perfectly known at all Txs, in each proposed IA scheme, the precoding matrices at Txs and the receive subspaces at Rxs or the eavesdropper are alternatively selected to minimize the cost function of an convex optimization problem for every iteration. We provide the feasible conditions and the proofs of convergence for both IA approaches. The simulation results indicate that our two IA approaches outperform the conventional IA algorithm in terms of average secrecy sum rate.Comment: Updated version, updated author list, accepted to be appear in IEICE Transaction

Secure Degrees of Freedom of MIMO X-Channels with Output Feedback and Delayed CSIT

We investigate the problem of secure transmission over a two-user multi-input multi-output (MIMO) X-channel in which channel state information is provided with one-unit delay to both transmitters (CSIT), and each receiver feeds back its channel output to a different transmitter. We refer to this model as MIMO X-channel with asymmetric output feedback and delayed CSIT. The transmitters are equipped with M-antennas each, and the receivers are equipped with N-antennas each. For this model, accounting for both messages at each receiver, we characterize the optimal sum secure degrees of freedom (SDoF) region. We show that, in presence of asymmetric output feedback and delayed CSIT, the sum SDoF region of the MIMO X-channel is same as the SDoF region of a two-user MIMO BC with 2M-antennas at the transmitter, N-antennas at each receiver and delayed CSIT. This result shows that, upon availability of asymmetric output feedback and delayed CSIT, there is no performance loss in terms of sum SDoF due to the distributed nature of the transmitters. Next, we show that this result also holds if only output feedback is conveyed to the transmitters, but in a symmetric manner, i.e., each receiver feeds back its output to both transmitters and no CSIT. We also study the case in which only asymmetric output feedback is provided to the transmitters, i.e., without CSIT, and derive a lower bound on the sum SDoF for this model. Furthermore, we specialize our results to the case in which there are no security constraints. In particular, similar to the setting with security constraints, we show that the optimal sum DoF region of the (M,M,N,N)--MIMO X-channel with asymmetric output feedback and delayed CSIT is same as the DoF region of a two-user MIMO BC with 2M-antennas at the transmitter, N-antennas at each receiver, and delayed CSIT. We illustrate our results with some numerical examples.Comment: To Appear in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Securit

Multiuser Diversity for Secrecy Communications Using Opportunistic Jammer Selection -- Secure DoF and Jammer Scaling Law

In this paper, we propose opportunistic jammer selection in a wireless security system for increasing the secure degrees of freedom (DoF) between a transmitter and a legitimate receiver (say, Alice and Bob). There is a jammer group consisting of $S$ jammers among which Bob selects $K$ jammers. The selected jammers transmit independent and identically distributed Gaussian signals to hinder the eavesdropper (Eve). Since the channels of Bob and Eve are independent, we can select the jammers whose jamming channels are aligned at Bob, but not at Eve. As a result, Eve cannot obtain any DoF unless it has more than $KN_j$ receive antennas, where $N_j$ is the number of jammer's transmit antenna each, and hence $KN_j$ can be regarded as defensible dimensions against Eve. For the jamming signal alignment at Bob, we propose two opportunistic jammer selection schemes and find the scaling law of the required number of jammers for target secure DoF by a geometrical interpretation of the received signals.Comment: Accepted with minor revisions, IEEE Trans. on Signal Processin