Phenomenal regression to the real object in physical and virtual worlds

© 2014, Springer-Verlag London. In this paper, we investigate a new approach to comparing physical and virtual size and depth percepts that captures the involuntary responses of participants to different stimuli in their field of view, rather than relying on their skill at judging size, reaching or directed walking. We show, via an effect first observed in the 1930s, that participants asked to equate the perspective projections of disc objects at different distances make a systematic error that is both individual in its extent and comparable in the particular physical and virtual setting we have tested. Prior work has shown that this systematic error is difficult to correct, even when participants are knowledgeable of its likelihood of occurring. In fact, in the real world, the error only reduces as the available cues to depth are artificially reduced. This makes the effect we describe a potentially powerful, intrinsic measure of VE quality that ultimately may contribute to our understanding of VE depth compression phenomena

Reflexive Monism

Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and to how the “phenomenal world” relates to the “physical world”, the “world itself”, and processing in the brain. In order to place the theory within the context of current thought and debate, I address questions that have been raised about reflexive monism in recent commentaries and also evaluate competing accounts of the same issues offered by “transparency theory” and by “biological naturalism”. I argue that, of the competing views on offer, reflexive monism most closely follows the contours of ordinary experience, the findings of science, and common sense

From perception to the Digital World: phenomenological observations

This article is based on Gibson’s “experimental phenomenology” and ecological perspec- tive. It aims to develop Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “incarnate” by relating it to the more general concept of “illusion” in order to apply it to digital environments and immersive virtual realities. First of all, we should clarify, from a phenomenological point of view, the notion of “world.” Although the concept of “world” is closely linked to that of “reality,” it cannot be superimposed on it. We will analyze this distinction by focusing on specific cases of optical-geometric illusions and their ontological and epistemological implications. We will then extend them from the natural to the digital world

Can Science Explain Consciousness?

For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate this approach, a concept of agency is introduced along with a different understanding of intentionality. Following this approach reveals that the autopoietic cognitive system constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, which underlie perceptual completion effects and “filling in”—and, by implication, phenomenology in general. It creates phenomenality much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that it assigns meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history that is the source of valuation upon which meaning depends. Phenomenality is a virtual representation to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self) tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future action, and coordinating various sub- agencies. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal, but serves a function for higher organisms that is distinct from that of unconscious processing. While a strictly scientific solution to the hard problem is not possible for a science that excludes the subjectivity it seeks to explain, there is hope to at least psychologically bridge the explanatory gulf between mind and matter, and perhaps hope for a broader definition of science

Phenomenal regression as a potential metric of veridical perception in virtual environments

It is known that limitations of the visual presentation and sense of presence in a virtual environment (VE) can result in deficits of spatial perception such as the documented depth compression phenomena. Investigating size and distance percepts in a VE is an active area of research, where different groups have measured the deficit by employing skill-based tasks such as walking, throwing or simply judging sizes and distances. A psychological trait called phenomenal regression (PR), first identified in the 1930s by Thouless, offers a measure that does not rely on either judgement or skill. PR describes a systematic error made by subjects when asked to match the perspective projections of two stimuli displayed at different distances. Thouless’ work found that this error is not mediated by a subject’s prior knowledge of its existence, nor can it be consciously manipulated, since it measures an individual’s innate reaction to visual stimuli. Furthermore he demonstrated that, in the real world, PR is affected by the depth cues available for viewing a scene. When applied in a VE, PR therefore potentially offers a direct measure of perceptual veracity that is independent of participants’ skill in judging size or distance. Experimental work has been conducted and a statistically significant correlation of individuals’ measured PR values (their ‘Thouless ratio’, or TR) between virtual and physical stimuli was found. A further experiment manipulated focal depth to mitigate the mismatch that occurs between accommodation and vergence cues in a VE. The resulting statistically significant effect on TR demonstrates that it is sensitive to changes in viewing conditions in a VE. Both experiments demonstrate key properties of PR that contribute to establishing it as a robust indicator of VE quality. The first property is that TR exhibits temporal stability during the period of testing and the second is that it differs between individuals. This is advantageous as it yields empirical values that can be investigated using regression analysis. This work contributes to VE domains in which it is desirable to replicate an accurate perception of space, such as training and telepresence, where PR would be a useful tool for comparing subjective experience between a VE and the real world, or between different VEs

A dramaturgy of intermediality: composing with integrative design

The thesis investigates and develops a compositional system on intermediality in theatre and performance as a dramaturgical practice through integrative design. The position of the visual/sonic media in theatre and performance has been altered by the digitalisation and networking of media technologies, which enables enhanced dynamic variables in the intermedial processes. The emergent intermediality sites are made accessible by developments in media technologies and form part of broader changes towards a mediatised society: a simultaneous shift in cultural contexts, theatre practice and audience perception. The practice-led research is situated within a postdramatic context and develops a system of compositional perspectives and procedures to enhance the knowledge of a dramaturgy on intermediality. The intermediality forms seem to re-situate the actual/virtual relations in theatre and re-construct the processes of theatricalisation in the composition of the stage narrative. The integration of media and performers produces a compositional environment of semiosis, where the theatre becomes a site of narration, and the designed integration in-between medialities emerges as intermediality sites in the performance event. A selection of performances and theatre directors is identified, who each in distinct ways integrate mediating technologies as a core element in their compositional design. These directors and performances constitute a source of reflection on compositional strategies from the perspective of practice, and enable comparative discussions on dramaturgical design and the consistency of intermediality sites. The practice-led research realised a series of prototyping processes situated in performance laboratories in 2004-5. The laboratories staged investigations into the relation between integrative design procedures and parameters for composition of intermediality sites, particularly the relative presence in-between the actual and the virtual, and the relative duration and distance in-between timeness and placeness. The integration of performer activities and media operations into dramaturgical structures were developed as a design process of identifying the mapping and experiencing the landscape through iterative prototyping. The developed compositional concepts and strategies were realised in the prototype performance Still I Know Who I Am, performed October 2006. This final research performance was a full-scale professional production, which explored the developed dramaturgical designs through creative practice. The performance was realised as a public event, and composed of a series of scenes, each presenting a specific composite of the developed integrative design strategies, and generating a particular intermediality site. The research processes in the performance laboratories and the prototype performance developed on characteristics, parameters and procedures of compositional strategies, investigating the viability of a dramaturgy of intermediality through integrative design. The practice undertaken constitutes raw material from which the concepts are drawn and underpins the premises for the theoretical reflections

In-Between What Once Was and What is Yet to Come: On the Phenomena of Bereavement and Grieving

When a significant other dies, our lives can be shattered and our worlds upended. We may find that we no longer know how to make sense of our experiences or how to engage in our practical activities. Nothing can be as it was before because the world as we once knew it has ended, and we are no longer the same persons we once were. Nonetheless this ending opens up something new because the death of the other changes the possibilities of our lived world. A phenomenological analysis of the phenomena of grief and bereavement reveals that while bereavement undermines meaning as such, there is nonetheless something existentially meaningful about the experience in general. Insofar as bereavement is a disorienting, disruptive event, it opens us to our openness by asking us to respond differently, and responding differently can recuperate us from the event by transforming us and our worlds

Can Science Explain consciousness? Toward a solution to the 'hard problem'

For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate this approach, a concept of agency is introduced along with a different understanding of intentionality. Following this approach reveals that the autopoietic cognitive system constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, which underlie perceptual completion effects and “filling in”—and, by implication, phenomenology in general. It creates phenomenality much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that it assigns meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history that is the source of valuation upon which meaning depends. Phenomenality is a virtual representation to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self) tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future action, and coordinating various sub- agencies. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal, but serves a function for higher organisms that is distinct from that of unconscious processing. While a strictly scientific solution to the hard problem is not possible for a science that excludes the subjectivity it seeks to explain, there is hope to at least psychologically bridge the explanatory gulf between mind and matter, and perhaps hope for a broader definition of science