Tenses, Dates and Times*

This paper presents a theory of utterance content that is neutral with respect to some of the key issues in the debate about the proper semantics of tense. Elaborating on some ideas from Korta & Perry (2011), we defend a proposal according to which utterances of both temporally specific and temporally unspecific sentences have a systematic variety of contents, from utterance-bound to incremental or referential. This analysis will shed some light on the contribution of tense to what is said by an utterance

(NON)-DETERMINING THE ORIGINAL SPEAKER: REPORTATIVE PARTICLES VERSUS VERBS

This work argues that the Basque reportative particle omen contributes to the propositional contents of the utterance, and it is not an illocutionary force indicator, contrary to what seems to be suggested by the standard view on omen. The results of the application of the assent/dissent test for the case of omen show that subjects not only accept a rejection of the reported content (p), but also a rejection of the evidential content (pomen) itself. The results are similar to those of the verb esan ‘to say’. It is, then, proposed that the difference between these two elements can be explained by distinguishing between the contents of the utterances (with Korta & Perry 2007, 2011), regarding the (non-)articulation of the original speaker

The roots of self-awareness

In this paper we provide an account of the structural underpinnings of self-awareness. We offer both an abstract, logical account-by way of suggestions for how to build a genuinely self-referring artificial agent-and a biological account, via a discussion of the role of somatoception in supporting and structuring self-awareness more generally. Central to the account is a discussion of the necessary motivational properties of self-representing mental tokens, in light of which we offer a novel definition of self-representation. We also discuss the role of such tokens in organizing self-specifying information, which leads to a naturalized restatement of the guarantee that introspective awareness is immune to error due to mis-identification of the subject

Two Problems of Overgeneration for the Reflexive-Referential Theory

One of the most promising aspects of Perry (2001)'s Reflexive-Referential Theory (henceforth RRT) is its capacity to generate a variety of contents that may be associated with a single utterance, contents that may be used for various explanatory purposes. My concern in this paper is that, as it stands, RRT generates too many contents. The problem is not just that most of those contents will be explanatorily idle, but rather, that nothing in the actual RRT explains why those contents cannot play the roles that their minimally different “neighbors” can play. In Section 1, I discuss two kinds of example that motivate RRT and its multiplicity of contents; the first comes close enough to some of Perry's own examples, but the second is original, and may be therefore viewed as an application of RRT to a problem that has not been discussed by Perry himself. In Section 2, I will show how these examples give rise, in turn, to problems of overgeneration. In other words, just as RRT is able to derive contents that may be used to account for the cases that need explanation, it ought to be able to derive analogous contents that, in turn, give counterintuitive, if not outright wrong predictions. In Section 3, I will tentatively outline a line of response that Perry could take. The overall direction of the paper is thus optimistic, since the problems raised may be viewed as pointing to ways of improving RRT, rather than undermining it

Not-at-issue Content in the Reflexive-Referential Theory

The Reflexive-Referential Theory is a multi-content approach to utterance interpretation. Its main proponent, John Perry, assumes that utterances of sentences with singular terms express several contents, depending on how their utterers and interpreters harness information from the situations in which they are produced. However, the theory says little to nothing about implied content, like presuppositions. Here, I discuss the possibility of including presuppositions, defined in terms of the concept of not-at-issue content, in this view. I begin with a brief characterization of the Reflexive-Referential theory in what regards its theoretical motivations and main thesis, followed by a study case of presuppositional not-at-issue content associated to a specific class of singular terms, proper names. To conclude, I ponder over a few consequences of this overall project of theoretical expansion.Fil: Calado Barbosa, Eduarda. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentin

Frege on Identity and Co-Reference

[EN] In "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung" (1892) Frege raises a problem concerning identity statements of the form a=b and he criticizes the view he holds in the Begriffsschrift (1879, & sect; 8). In building on a suggestion by Perry (2001/12, ch. 7) I will show how Frege's Begriffsschrift account can be rescued and how Frege's 1892 criticism of his Begriffsschrift's position somewhat miss the point. Furthermore, the Begriffsschrift's view can be developed to account in quite an elegant way to the so-called Frege's Puzzle without committing to the sense/reference (Sinn/Bedeutung) distinction Frege introduces in "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung". To do so we have, though, to give up the idea that all the relevant information conveyed by the utterance of a simple sentence is encapsulated into a single content. I will show of this can be done in adopting a Perry-style pluri-propositionalist model of communication.Research for this paper has been partly sponsored by the Spanish ministry of economyand competitivity (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) ) ; the Spanish ministry of science and innovation (PID2019-106078GB-I00 (MCI/AEI/FEDER, UE) ) and the Basque Government (IT1032-16

Regras reflexivas como conteúdo: o caso dos demonstrativos dêiticos

Determining what content is expressed by a demonstrative when its reference cannot be determined is a problem for those who assume that demonstrative reference is cognized by interpreters and demonstrative meaning has a mere indicative role. Here, I explore a concept of content that gives meaning a cognitively relevant role, namely, John Perry’s classificatory concept of content. With that purpose, I compare the interpretation of a deictic demonstrative in two cases: for an eavesdropper and a conversational participant, aiming to show that meaning, in the form of reflexive rules, can be recruited to play the role of content when information (in the speech situation) is scarce.Determinar que conteúdo é expresso por um demonstrativo quando sua referência não pode ser determinada é um problema para aqueles que supõem que seu significado tem um papel meramente indicativo. Aqui, eu exploro um conceito de conteúdo que dá ao significado um papel cognitivamente relevante, a saber, o conceito de conteúdo classificatório de John Perry. Com tal propósito, eu comparo a interpretação de um demonstrativo dêitico em dois casos: para um interceptador (eavesdropper) e um participante conversacional, objetivando mostrar que o significado, na forma de regras reflexivas, pode ser recrutado para desempenhar o papel de conteúdo sempre que a informação (na situação de fala) for escassa.Fil: Calado Barbosa, Eduarda. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentin

On Time chez Dummett

I discuss three connections between Dummett's writings about time and philosophical aspects of physics. The first connection (Section 2) arises from remarks of Dummett's about the different relations of observation to time and to space. The main point is uncontroversial and applies equally to classical and quantum physics. It concerns the fact that perceptual processing is so rapid, compared with the typical time-scale on which macroscopic objects change their observable properties, that it engenders the idea of a 'common now', spread across space. The other two connections are specific to quantum theory, as interpreted along the lines of Everett. So for these two connections, the physics side is controversial, just as the philosophical side is. In Section 3, I connect the subjective uncertainty before an Everettian 'splitting' of the multiverse to Dummett's suggestion, inspired by McTaggart, that a complete, i.e. indexical-free description of a temporal reality is impossible. And in Section 4, I connect Barbour's denial that time is real---a denial along the lines of Everett, rather than McTaggart---to Dummett's suggestion that statements about the past are not determinately true or false, because they are not effectively decidable.Comment: 25 pages; no figure

Conteúdo reflexivo e valor informacional

Orientador: Marco Antônio Caron RuffinoDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências HumanasResumo: Meu objetivo é analisar a proposta trabalhada por John Perry em Reference and Reflexivity para lidar com o valor informacional de sentenças contendo termos co-referenciais e termos vazios. O problema da informatividade é sobre explicar como sentenças contendo tais termos transmitem informação quando, à primeira vista, essa explicação é inviável se apelamos a seus conteúdos semânticos. Meu objetivo é usar o ferramental proposto por Perry para dar resposta aos problemas que apresento em cada capítulo e mostrar que é possível resolvê-los via semânticaAbstract: My aim is to analyze the proposal conceived by John Perry in his book Reference and Reflexivity so I can see how this proposal accounts for the informative value of sentences containing co-referential terms and empty terms. Informativeness problem is about how to explain the informative value of sentences containing those terms when semantics, at first glance, seems unable to do it. My aim is to use the toolbox that Perry's proposal provides to show how we can answer, via semantics, the problems I present in each chapter so that I can make a case for semanticsMestradoFilosofiaMestre em Filosofia2016/01596-2FAPES

Mental Files : Replies to My Critics

My responses to seven critical reviews of my book *Mental Files* (OUP 2012) published in a special issue of the journal Disputatio, edited by F. Salis. The reviewers are: Keith Hall, David Papineau, Annalisa Coliva and Delia Belleri, Peter Pagin, Thea Goodsell, Krista Lawlor and Manuel Garcia-Carpintero