A framework for comparing the security of voting schemes

We present a new framework to evaluate the security of voting schemes. We utilize the framework to compare a wide range of voting schemes, including practical schemes in realworld use and academic schemes with interesting theoretical properties. In the end we present our results in a neat comparison table. We strive to be unambiguous: we specify our threat model, assumptions and scope, we give definitions to the terms that we use, we explain every conclusion that we draw, and we make an effort to describe complex ideas in as simple terms as possible. We attempt to consolidate all important security properties from literature into a coherent framework. These properties are intended to curtail vote-buying and coercion, promote verifiability and dispute resolution, and prevent denial-of-service attacks. Our framework may be considered novel in that trust assumptions are an output of the framework, not an input. This means that our framework answers questions such as ”how many authorities have to collude in order to violate ballot secrecy in the Finnish paper voting scheme?

Social Capital and Political Accountability

In this paper, we empirically investigate a channel through which social capital may improve economic wellbeing and the functioning of institutions: political accountability. The main idea is that voters who share norms of generalized morality demand higher standards of behavior on their elected representavtives, are more willing to bear the cost of acquiring information, and are more likely to base their vote on criteria of social welfare rather than (narrow) personal interest. We take this conjecture to the data using information on the Italian members of Parliament in the postwar period (1948–2001). The empirical evidence shows that the electoral punishment of political misbehavior is considerably larger in electoral districts with high social capital, where social capital is measured by blood donation, and political misbehavior refers to receiving a request of criminal prosecution or shirking in parliamentary activity. Accordingly, episodes of political misbehavior are less frequent in electoral districts with high social capital.Social Capital, Culture, Political Agency

Federalism and Accountability with Distorted Election Choices

Random factors such as bad weather or exogenous economic shocks affect the re-election of politicians and can reduce accountability. Such distorted election choices interact with the architecture of government. Contrasting centralized with decentralized political systems, this study shows that centralization is likely to result in higher accountability if election choices are subject to small random distortions. Furthermore, equity and efficiency arguments for uniform policies in centralized systems are derived as these are likely to result in the better overall performance of politicians and in more equal performance across regions.accountability, federalism, decentralization, retrospective voting, Condorcet Jury Theorem

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

We present a tractable stochastic endogenous growth model that explains how social capital influences economic development. In our model, social capital increases citizens' awareness of government activity. Hence, it alleviates the electoral incentives to under- invest in education, whose returns are delayed and less visible to voters. In equilibrium, higher social capital raises the average output growth rate and reduces its volatility by increasing public investment in education while making its returns higher and less variable. Our theory also predicts that a more unequal distribution of social capital reduces public education expenditures. We provide suggestive cross-country evidence consistent with these predictions.Social Capital, Education Expenditures, Economic Growth, Elections, Government Expenditures, Imperfect Information

“Irrational choices” that shape history . A Behavioural Economic Approach for the Brexit-Trump Syndrome

Màster Oficial d'Internacionalització, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona. Curs: 2021-2022. Tutor: Patricia García-Durán HuetBehavioural economics has emerged as a new field in economics allowing to rethink rational expectations. This research’s hypothesis, however, is that advancements in understanding human behaviour come also with its dangers. To test the hypothesis, the cases of 2016 Brexit Referendum and 2016 US Presidential Election are analysed. The results show proof of the existence of behavioural economics tools that were intentionally targeted to undermine rational decision-making . By so doing, this thesis raises awareness of the need to regulate such practices, as well as helps open the debate on the ethics to be followed by such regulation

Parliamentary Libraries, Institutes and Offices: The Sources of Parliamentary Information

World Bank Institute Working Paper Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary, Washington D

SecMon: End-to-End Quality and Security Monitoring System

The Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is becoming a more available and popular way of communicating for Internet users. This also applies to Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems and merging these two have already proven to be successful (e.g. Skype). Even the existing standards of VoIP provide an assurance of security and Quality of Service (QoS), however, these features are usually optional and supported by limited number of implementations. As a result, the lack of mandatory and widely applicable QoS and security guaranties makes the contemporary VoIP systems vulnerable to attacks and network disturbances. In this paper we are facing these issues and propose the SecMon system, which simultaneously provides a lightweight security mechanism and improves quality parameters of the call. SecMon is intended specially for VoIP service over P2P networks and its main advantage is that it provides authentication, data integrity services, adaptive QoS and (D)DoS attack detection. Moreover, the SecMon approach represents a low-bandwidth consumption solution that is transparent to the users and possesses a self-organizing capability. The above-mentioned features are accomplished mainly by utilizing two information hiding techniques: digital audio watermarking and network steganography. These techniques are used to create covert channels that serve as transport channels for lightweight QoS measurement's results. Furthermore, these metrics are aggregated in a reputation system that enables best route path selection in the P2P network. The reputation system helps also to mitigate (D)DoS attacks, maximize performance and increase transmission efficiency in the network.Comment: Paper was presented at 7th international conference IBIZA 2008: On Computer Science - Research And Applications, Poland, Kazimierz Dolny 31.01-2.02 2008; 14 pages, 5 figure

The paradoxical success of corrupt politicians: evidence from a field experiment

This paper contributes to the literature on the explanations for the often observed phenomenon of the electoral success of corrupt politicians. It focuses on the particular case of the Portuguese municipality of Oeiras, where Isaltino Morais was elected as mayor after being convicted for corruption-related crimes. We collected data on 557 residents of the municipality. Data were collected four weeks after the October 2017 election. We find no evidence for the ignorant voter explanation but strong support for the implicit trading theory

Collusion in Peer-to-Peer Systems

Peer-to-peer systems have reached a widespread use, ranging from academic and industrial applications to home entertainment. The key advantage of this paradigm lies in its scalability and flexibility, consequences of the participants sharing their resources for the common welfare. Security in such systems is a desirable goal. For example, when mission-critical operations or bank transactions are involved, their effectiveness strongly depends on the perception that users have about the system dependability and trustworthiness. A major threat to the security of these systems is the phenomenon of collusion. Peers can be selfish colluders, when they try to fool the system to gain unfair advantages over other peers, or malicious, when their purpose is to subvert the system or disturb other users. The problem, however, has received so far only a marginal attention by the research community. While several solutions exist to counter attacks in peer-to-peer systems, very few of them are meant to directly counter colluders and their attacks. Reputation, micro-payments, and concepts of game theory are currently used as the main means to obtain fairness in the usage of the resources. Our goal is to provide an overview of the topic by examining the key issues involved. We measure the relevance of the problem in the current literature and the effectiveness of existing philosophies against it, to suggest fruitful directions in the further development of the field