Study of fault-tolerant software technology

Presented is an overview of the current state of the art of fault-tolerant software and an analysis of quantitative techniques and models developed to assess its impact. It examines research efforts as well as experience gained from commercial application of these techniques. The paper also addresses the computer architecture and design implications on hardware, operating systems and programming languages (including Ada) of using fault-tolerant software in real-time aerospace applications. It concludes that fault-tolerant software has progressed beyond the pure research state. The paper also finds that, although not perfectly matched, newer architectural and language capabilities provide many of the notations and functions needed to effectively and efficiently implement software fault-tolerance

Salvador Dalí's Dream of Venus at the 1939 New York world's fair: capitalist funhouse or surrealist landmark?

For the 1939 World’s Fair in Flushing Meadows Corona Park, New York, Salvador Dalí created a surrealist funhouse called Dream of Venus. This installation, which included sound and performance, aimed at a controversial sensation, a truly surreal experience for its visitors. Labelled as “tacky, Oceanside amusement park attraction” and wrapped up by consumer commodity, however, Dalí’s surrealist funhouse is been said to have lost much of its provocative power. This contribution investigates to what extent the avant-garde aesthetics and politics became part and parcel of American consumer culture, commodity culture and capitalism. Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s poststructuralist analysis of the axiomatic regime of capitalism and their view on madness provides a toolbox for taking a closer look at surrealist (vain?) efforts to combat capitalist dominion

Reorganization and participation in decentralized platform ecosystems: evidence from blockchain forking

Like any organizational system, platform ecosystems reorganize to update its alignment with the internal and external environments. However, unlike reorganizations of centrally managed platforms performed by the owners, reorganizations of decentralized platforms ecosystems do not rely on formal authority. Instead, the network self-reorganizes to renew the structure, rules, and information to evolve. Little is known about how self-reorganizations influence the participation of various types of networks. In this study, we investigate nine reorganization events on Ethereum, a blockchain-based decentralized smart contract platform, to unpack how self-reorganization related to hard forking influence participation in the development, validation, transaction, and complementor networks. We find that, while participation increases across all networks show a small increase after hard forking events, more complex dynamics are at play within each network that builds on delicate trade-offs between participation structure, configuration, and incentives. Our findings have implications for blockchain research as well as for start-ups building decentralized applications on top of decentralized smart contract platforms

Reorganization and Participation in Decentralized Platform Ecosystems: Evidence from Blockchain Forking

Like any organizational system, platform ecosystems reorganize to update its alignment with the internal and external environments. However, unlike reorganizations of centrally managed platforms performed by the owners, reorganizations of decentralized platforms ecosystems do not rely on formal authority. Instead, the network self-reorganizes to renew the structure, rules, and information to evolve. Little is known about how self-reorganizations influence the participation of various types of networks. In this study, we investigate nine reorganization events on Ethereum, a blockchain-based decentralized smart contract platform, to unpack how self-reorganization related to hard forking influence participation in the development, validation, transaction, and complementor networks. We find that, while participation increases across all networks show a small increase after hard forking events, more complex dynamics are at play within each network that builds on delicate trade-offs between participation structure, configuration, and incentives. Our findings have implications for blockchain research as well as for start-ups building decentralized applications on top of decentralized smart contract platforms