Routing for Security in Networks with Adversarial Nodes

We consider the problem of secure unicast transmission between two nodes in a directed graph, where an adversary eavesdrops/jams a subset of nodes. This adversarial setting is in contrast to traditional ones where the adversary controls a subset of links. In particular, we study, in the main, the class of routing-only schemes (as opposed to those allowing coding inside the network). Routing-only schemes usually have low implementation complexity, yet a characterization of the rates achievable by such schemes was open prior to this work. We first propose an LP based solution for secure communication against eavesdropping, and show that it is information-theoretically rate-optimal among all routing-only schemes. The idea behind our design is to balance information flow in the network so that no subset of nodes observe "too much" information. Interestingly, we show that the rates achieved by our routing-only scheme are always at least as good as, and sometimes better, than those achieved by "na\"ive" network coding schemes (i.e. the rate-optimal scheme designed for the traditional scenario where the adversary controls links in a network rather than nodes.) We also demonstrate non-trivial network coding schemes that achieve rates at least as high as (and again sometimes better than) those achieved by our routing schemes, but leave open the question of characterizing the optimal rate-region of the problem under all possible coding schemes. We then extend these routing-only schemes to the adversarial node-jamming scenarios and show similar results. During the journey of our investigation, we also develop a new technique that has the potential to derive non-trivial bounds for general secure-communication schemes

Algebraic Techniques for Low Communication Secure Protocols

Internet communication is often encrypted with the aid of mathematical problems that are hard to solve. Another method to secure electronic communication is the use of a digital lock of which the digital key must be exchanged first. PhD student Robbert de Haan (CWI) researched models for a guaranteed safe communication between two people without the exchange of a digital key and without assumptions concerning the practical difficulty of solving certain mathematical problems. In ancient times Julius Caesar used secret codes to make his messages illegible for spies. He upped every letter of the alphabet with three positions: A became D, Z became C, and so on. Usually, cryptographers research secure communication between two people through one channel that can be monitored by malevolent people. De Haan studied the use of multiple channels. A minority of these channels may be in the hands of adversaries that can intercept, replace or block the message. He proved the most efficient way to securely communicate along these channels and thus solved a fundamental cryptography problem that was introduced almost 20 years ago by Dole, Dwork, Naor and Yung

Jamming Games in the MIMO Wiretap Channel With an Active Eavesdropper

This paper investigates reliable and covert transmission strategies in a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel with a transmitter, receiver and an adversarial wiretapper, each equipped with multiple antennas. In a departure from existing work, the wiretapper possesses a novel capability to act either as a passive eavesdropper or as an active jammer, under a half-duplex constraint. The transmitter therefore faces a choice between allocating all of its power for data, or broadcasting artificial interference along with the information signal in an attempt to jam the eavesdropper (assuming its instantaneous channel state is unknown). To examine the resulting trade-offs for the legitimate transmitter and the adversary, we model their interactions as a two-person zero-sum game with the ergodic MIMO secrecy rate as the payoff function. We first examine conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (NE) and the structure of mixed-strategy NE for the strategic form of the game.We then derive equilibrium strategies for the extensive form of the game where players move sequentially under scenarios of perfect and imperfect information. Finally, numerical simulations are presented to examine the equilibrium outcomes of the various scenarios considered.Comment: 27 pages, 8 figures. To appear, IEEE Transactions on Signal Processin