78,431 research outputs found
Model-Checking an Alternating-time Temporal Logic with Knowledge, Imperfect Information, Perfect Recall and Communicating Coalitions
We present a variant of ATL with distributed knowledge operators based on a
synchronous and perfect recall semantics. The coalition modalities in this
logic are based on partial observation of the full history, and incorporate a
form of cooperation between members of the coalition in which agents issue
their actions based on the distributed knowledge, for that coalition, of the
system history. We show that model-checking is decidable for this logic. The
technique utilizes two variants of games with imperfect information and
partially observable objectives, as well as a subset construction for
identifying states whose histories are indistinguishable to the considered
coalition
No-Regret Learning in Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Recall
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is an efficient no-regret learning
algorithm for decision problems modeled as extensive games. CFR's regret bounds
depend on the requirement of perfect recall: players always remember
information that was revealed to them and the order in which it was revealed.
In games without perfect recall, however, CFR's guarantees do not apply. In
this paper, we present the first regret bound for CFR when applied to a general
class of games with imperfect recall. In addition, we show that CFR applied to
any abstraction belonging to our general class results in a regret bound not
just for the abstract game, but for the full game as well. We verify our theory
and show how imperfect recall can be used to trade a small increase in regret
for a significant reduction in memory in three domains: die-roll poker, phantom
tic-tac-toe, and Bluff.Comment: 21 pages, 4 figures, expanded version of article to appear in
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Conference on Machine Learnin
Perfect Prediction in Minkowski Spacetime: Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium for Dynamic Games with Imperfect Information
The assumptions of necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of
strategies, also known as perfect prediction, lead to at most one surviving
outcome, immune to the knowledge that the players have of them. Solutions
concepts implementing this approach have been defined on both dynamic games
with perfect information and no ties, the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium, and
strategic games with no ties, the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium.
In this paper, we generalize the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium to games
in extensive form with imperfect information and no ties. Both the Perfect
Prediction Equilibrium and the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium for strategic
games become special cases of this generalized equilibrium concept. The
generalized equilibrium, if there are no ties in the payoffs, is at most
unique, and is Pareto-optimal.
We also contribute a special-relativistic interpretation of a subclass of the
games in extensive form with imperfect information as a directed acyclic graph
of decisions made by any number of agents, each decision being located at a
specific position in Minkowski spacetime, and the information sets and game
structure being derived from the causal structure. Strategic games correspond
to a setup with only spacelike-separated decisions, and dynamic games to one
with only timelike-separated decisions.
The generalized Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium thus characterizes the
outcome and payoffs reached in a general setup where decisions can be located
in any generic positions in Minkowski spacetime, under necessary rationality
and necessary knowledge of strategies. We also argue that this provides a
directly usable mathematical framework for the design of extension theories of
quantum physics with a weakened free choice assumption.Comment: 25 pages, updated technical repor
Reasoning about Knowledge and Strategies under Hierarchical Information
Two distinct semantics have been considered for knowledge in the context of
strategic reasoning, depending on whether players know each other's strategy or
not. The problem of distributed synthesis for epistemic temporal specifications
is known to be undecidable for the latter semantics, already on systems with
hierarchical information. However, for the other, uninformed semantics, the
problem is decidable on such systems. In this work we generalise this result by
introducing an epistemic extension of Strategy Logic with imperfect
information. The semantics of knowledge operators is uninformed, and captures
agents that can change observation power when they change strategies. We solve
the model-checking problem on a class of "hierarchical instances", which
provides a solution to a vast class of strategic problems with epistemic
temporal specifications on hierarchical systems, such as distributed synthesis
or rational synthesis
Sleeping Beauty Reconsidered: Conditioning and Reflection in Asynchronous Systems
A careful analysis of conditioning in the Sleeping Beauty problem is done,
using the formal model for reasoning about knowledge and probability developed
by Halpern and Tuttle. While the Sleeping Beauty problem has been viewed as
revealing problems with conditioning in the presence of imperfect recall, the
analysis done here reveals that the problems are not so much due to imperfect
recall as to asynchrony. The implications of this analysis for van Fraassen's
Reflection Principle and Savage's Sure-Thing Principle are considered.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper appears in Principles of
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Ninth
International Conference (KR 2004). This version will appear in Oxford
Studies in Epistemolog
- …