Dynamical patterns of human postural responses to emotional stimuli

Erotic scenes and images of mutilated bodies are emotional stimuli that have repeatedly shown to evoke specific neurophysiological responses associated with enhanced attention and perceptual processing. Remarkably however, only a handful of studies have investigated human motor reactions to emotional activation as a direct index of physical approximation or withdrawal. Given the inconclusive results of these studies, the approach-avoidance distinction, one of the most salient concepts in human motivational research, remains a broadly exploited hypothesis that has never been empirically demonstrated. Here, we investigate postural responses elicited by discrete emotional stimuli in healthy young adults. We discover that both positive and negative affective pictures induce a significant posterior deviation from postural baseline equilibrium. Further, we find that neutral pictures also evoke posterior deviation, although with a less pronounced amplitude. Exploring the dynamical evolution of postural responses to emotional pictures at high temporal resolution, we uncover a characteristic profile that remains stable for stimuli from all three affective categories. In contrast, the postural response amplitude is modulated by the emotional content of the stimulus. Our observations do not support the interpretation of postural responses to affective picture-viewing as approach-avoidance behavior. Instead, our findings indicate the involvement of a previously unrecognized motor component of the physiological mechanism underlying human orienting responses

A closer look at the perceptual source in copy raising constructions

Simple claims with the verb ‘seem’, as well as the specific sensory verbs, ‘look’, ‘sound’, etc., require the speaker to have some relevant kind of perceptual acquaintance (Pearson, 2013; Ninan, 2014). But different forms of these reports differ in their perceptual requirements. For example, the copy raising (CR) report, ‘Tom seems like he’s cooking’ requires the speaker to have seen Tom, while its expletive subject (ES) variant, ‘It seems like Tom is cooking’, does not (Rogers, 1972; Asudeh and Toivonen, 2012). This contrast has led some theorists to hold that the matrix subject in CR constructions is uniformly interpreted as the perceptual source (p-source) (Asudeh and Toivonen, 2012; Rett and Hyams, 2014). Others, based on examples of CR reports that seem not to require perception of the referent of the matrix subject, have taken the p-source interpretation instead to be non-uniform across CR reports (Landau, 2011; Doran, 2015). We reconsider these theoretical approaches to copy raising in light of new experimental work probing the sensitivity of these requirements to the matrix verb, the embedded ‘like’-clause, and the context. While we find some motivation for a non-uniform p-source analysis, it comes from importantly different cases than those others have relied on. Furthermore, our findings cast doubt on the prevalent assumption that the perceptual requirements of CR reports are to be captured solely by the presence or absence of the p-source interpretation. We suggest that the data motivating a non-uniform p-source view are better captured by an alternative approach, which makes use of a more minimal evidential source role, in place of the perceptual source role. We close by considering the relationship between English copy raising and evidential constructions cross-linguisticall

Modeling the perceptual component of conceptual learning—A coordination perspective

Although a picture may be worth a thousand words, modeling diagrams as propositions and modeling visual processing as search through a database of verbal descriptions obscures what is problematic for the learner. Cognitive modeling of language learning and geometry has obscured the learner's problem of knowing where to look—what spaces, markings, and orientations constitute the objects of interest? Today we are launching into widespread use of multimedia instructional technology, without an adequate theory to relate perceptual processes to conceptual learning. Does this matter? In this article, I review the symbolic approach to modeling perceptual processing and show its limitations for explaining difficulties children encounter in interpreting a graphic display. I present an alternative analysis by which perceptual categorization is coupled to behavior sequences, where gesturing and emotional changes are essential for resolving impasses and breaking out of loops. I conclude by asking what kind of cognitive theory we need to exploit communication technology. Have we been correct to assume that pedagogy must be grounded in an accurate psychological model of knowledge, memory, and learning

Situational awareness and safety

This paper considers the applicability of situation awareness concepts to safety in the control of complex systems. Much of the research to date has been conducted in aviation, which has obvious safety implications. It is argued that the concepts could be extended to other safety critical domains. The paper presents three theories of situational awareness: the three-level model, the interactive sub-systems approach, and the perceptual cycle. The difference between these theories is the extent to which they emphasise process or product as indicative of situational awareness. Some data from other studies are discussed to consider the negative effects of losing situational awareness, as this has serious safety implications. Finally, the application of situational awareness to system design, and training are presented

Perceptual Pluralism

Perceptual systems respond to proximal stimuli by forming mental representations of distal stimuli. A central goal for the philosophy of perception is to characterize the representations delivered by perceptual systems. It may be that all perceptual representations are in some way proprietarily perceptual and differ from the representational format of thought (Dretske 1981; Carey 2009; Burge 2010; Block ms.). Or it may instead be that perception and cognition always trade in the same code (Prinz 2002; Pylyshyn 2003). This paper rejects both approaches in favor of perceptual pluralism, the thesis that perception delivers a multiplicity of representational formats, some proprietary and some shared with cognition. The argument for perceptual pluralism marshals a wide array of empirical evidence in favor of iconic (i.e., image-like, analog) representations in perception as well as discursive (i.e., language-like, digital) perceptual object representations

A discriminative approach to grounded spoken language understanding in interactive robotics

Spoken Language Understanding in Interactive Robotics provides computational models of human-machine communication based on the vocal input. However, robots operate in specific environments and the correct interpretation of the spoken sentences depends on the physical, cognitive and linguistic aspects triggered by the operational environment. Grounded language processing should exploit both the physical constraints of the context as well as knowledge assumptions of the robot. These include the subjective perception of the environment that explicitly affects linguistic reasoning. In this work, a standard linguistic pipeline for semantic parsing is extended toward a form of perceptually informed natural language processing that combines discriminative learning and distributional semantics. Empirical results achieve up to a 40% of relative error reduction

Communication and rational responsiveness to the world

Donald Davidson has long maintained that in order to be credited with the concept of objectivity – and, so, with language and thought – it is necessary to communicate with at least one other speaker. I here examine Davidson’s central argument for this thesis and argue that it is unsuccessful. Subsequently, I turn to Robert Brandom’s defense of the thesis in Making It Explicit. I argue that, contrary to Brandom, in order to possess the concept of objectivity it is not necessary to engage in the practice of interpersonal reasoning because possession of the concept is independently integral to the practice of intrapersonal reasoning

Philosophy of perception as a guide to aesthetics

The aim of this paper is to argue that it is a promising avenue of research to consider philosophy of perception to be a guide to aesthetics. More precisely, my claim is that many, maybe even most, traditional problems in aesthetics are in fact about philosophy of perception that can, as a result, be fruitfully addressed with the help of the conceptual apparatus of philosophy of perception. This claim may sound provocative, but after qualifying what I mean by aesthetics (to be contrasted with philosophy of art) and by philosophy of perception, it may be easier to accept

Sellarsian Perspectives on Perception and Non-Conceptual Content

I argue that a Sellarsian approach to experience allows one to take seriously the thought that there is something given to us in perception without denying that we can only be conscious of conceptually structured content. I argue against the traditional empiricist reading of Sellars, according to which sensations are understood as epistemically graspable prior to concrete propositional representations, by showing that it is unclear on such a view why sensations are not just the given as Sellars so famously criticizes it. I suggest an alternative transcendental reading, according to which there are two sides to the subject matter of perceptual judgments: The matter given in perception, and its form. I present an account of sensations and intuitions on which it is unproblematic to see sensations as what is given in perception: They are not intelligible independently of their role as the matter of intuitions, the content of which is accessible to us only in the context of a judgment

The Structure of Episodic Memory: Ganeri's ‘Mental Time Travel and Attention’

We offer a framework for assessing what the structure of episodic memory might be, if one accepts the Buddhist denial of persisting selves. This paper is a response to Jonardon Ganeri's paper "Mental time travel and attention", which explores Buddhaghosa's ideas about memory. (It will eventually be published with a reply by Ganeri)