Facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks and rapid response learning: Two types of memory for priming in person recognition

Experience with a stimulus changes a person forever... if not forever, at least for 17 years (Mitchell, 2006). Any process engaged by the brain leaves a trace behind that affects similar future processing. This form of plasticity aims to optimize the brain toward more efficient interaction with stimuli that have been encountered before, adapting the individual to the environment. Similar adaptation manifests itself as faster and more accurate performance to repeated stimuli. Repetition priming is the term used in the literature to describe this kind of facilitation. A crucial open question on repetition priming is whether experience makes stimulus processing more efficient or facilitates the selection of an appropriate response to a stimulus. In the literature these two alternatives are theorised respectively by facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks and by rapid response learning (Chapter 1). In the work presented here, processing/response accounts are tested in person recognition. This thesis presents evidence that repetition priming in person recognition is mostly produced by facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks, but, when stimuli are repeated three or more times, additional facilitation due to rapid response learning occurs as well (Chapters 2 - 3 - 4). Orthogonal tasks were used to distinguish the contribution of perceptual/conceptual facilitation and rapid response learning in behavioural facilitation (Chapter 5). Furthermore, LRPs/ERPs shed light on the neural processes that generate rapid response learning in person recognition: the response accessed from rapid response learning interacts with the response obtained from stimulus re-processing and determines benefits when congruent and costs when incongruent (Chapter 6). These results show that rapid response learning and facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks refer to two complementary types of memory that can lead to repetition priming. This thesis proposes a framework in which facilitation in perceptual and conceptual networks is supplemented, under specific circumstances, by rapid response learning (Chapter 7)

Perception and Cognition Are Largely Independent, but Still Affect Each Other in Systematic Ways: Arguments from Evolution and the Consciousness-Attention Dissociation

The main thesis of this paper is that two prevailing theories about cognitive penetration are too extreme, namely, the view that cognitive penetration is pervasive and the view that there is a sharp and fundamental distinction between cognition and perception, which precludes any type of cognitive penetration. These opposite views have clear merits and empirical support. To eliminate this puzzling situation, we present an alternative theoretical approach that incorporates the merits of these views into a broader and more nuanced explanatory framework. A key argument we present in favor of this framework concerns the evolution of intentionality and perceptual capacities. An implication of this argument is that cases of cognitive penetration must have evolved more recently and that this is compatible with the cognitive impenetrability of early perceptual stages of processing information. A theoretical approach that explains why this should be the case is the consciousness and attention dissociation framework. The paper discusses why concepts, particularly issues concerning concept acquisition, play an important role in the interaction between perception and cognition

Implicit memory

The Encyclopedia of Human Behavior, Second Edition is a comprehensive three-volume reference source on human action and reaction, and the thoughts, feelings, and physiological functions behind those actions

Perceptual simulation in conceptual tasks

No abstract available

Abstract concepts, language and sociality. From acquisition to inner speech

The problem of representation of abstract concepts, such as “freedom” and “justice”, has become particularly crucial in recent years, due to the increased success of embodied and grounded views of cognition. We will present a novel view on abstract concepts and abstract words. Since abstract concepts do not have single objects as referents, children and adults might rely more on input from others in learning them; we therefore suggest that linguistic and social experience play an important role for abstract concepts. We will discuss evidence obtained in our and other labs showing that processing of abstract concepts evokes linguistic interaction and social experiences, leading to the activation of the mouth motor system. We will discuss the possible mechanisms that underlie this activation. Mouth activation can be due to re-enactment of the experience of conceptual acquisition, which occurred through the mediation of language. Alternatively, it could be due to the re-explanation of the word meaning, possibly through inner speech. Finally, it can be due to a metacognitive process revealing low confidence on the meaning of our concepts. This process induces in us the need to rely on others to ask/negotiate conceptual meaning. We conclude that with abstract concepts words work as social tools: they extend our thinking abilities and push us to rely on others to integrate our knowledge

Modularist explanations of experience and other illusions

Debates about modularity invariably involve a crucial premise about how visual illusions are experienced. This paper argues that these debates are wrongheaded, and that experience of illusions is orthogonal to the core issue of the modularity hypothesis: informational encapsulation

Discourse comprehension and simulation of positive emotions

Recent research has suggested that emotional sentences are understood by constructing an emotion simulation of the events being described. The present study aims to investigate whether emotion simulation is also involved in online and offline comprehension of larger language segments such as discourse. Participants read a target text describing positive events while their facial postures were manipulated to be either congruent (matching condition) or incongruent (mismatching condition) with emotional valence of the text. In addition, a control condition was included in which participants read the text naturally (without a manipulation of facial posture). The influence of emotion simulation on discourse understanding was assessed by online (self-paced reading times) and offline (verbatim and inference questions) measures of comprehension. The major result was that participants read faster the target text describing positive emotional events while their bodily systems were prepared for processing of positive emotions (matching condition) rather than unprepared (control condition) or prevented from positive emotional processing (mismatching condition). Simulation of positive emotions did not have a significant impact on offline explicit and implicit discourse comprehension. This pattern of results suggests that emotion simulation has an impact on online comprehension, but may not have any effect on offline discourse processing

A feedback model of perceptual learning and categorisation

Top-down, feedback, influences are known to have significant effects on visual information processing. Such influences are also likely to affect perceptual learning. This article employs a computational model of the cortical region interactions underlying visual perception to investigate possible influences of top-down information on learning. The results suggest that feedback could bias the way in which perceptual stimuli are categorised and could also facilitate the learning of sub-ordinate level representations suitable for object identification and perceptual expertise

Spontaneous eye movements during passive spoken language comprehension reflect grammatical processing

Language is tightly connected to sensory and motor systems. Recent research using eye- tracking typically relies on constrained visual contexts, viewing a small array of objects on a computer screen. Some critiques of embodiment ask if people simply match their simulations to the pictures being presented. This study compared the comprehension of verbs with two different grammatical forms: the past progressive form (e.g., was walking), which emphasizes the ongoing nature of actions, and the simple past (e.g., walked), which emphasizes the end-state of an action. The results showed that the distribution and timing of eye movements mirrors the underlying conceptual structure of this linguistic difference in the absence of any visual stimuli. Thus, eye movement data suggest that visual inputs are unnecessary to solicit perceptual simulations