7,204 research outputs found
Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity OF Ronald Coase.
In the Federal Communications Commission, Ronald Coase (1959) exposed deep foundations via normative argument buttressed by astute historical observation. The government controlled scarce frequencies, issuing sharply limited use rights. Spillovers were said to be otherwise endemic. Coase saw that Government limited conflicts by restricting uses; property owners perform an analogous function via the "price system." The government solution was inefficient unless the net benefits of the alternative property regime were lower. Coase augured that the price system would outperform the administrative allocation system. His spectrum auction proposal was mocked by communications policy experts, opposed by industry interests, and ridiculed by policy makers. Hence, it took until July 25, 1994 for FCC license sales to commence. Today, some 73 U.S. auctions have been held, 27,484 licenses sold, and 17 billion in U.S. welfare losses have been averted. Not bad for the first 50 years of this, or any, Article appearing in Volume II of the Journal of Law & Economics.
An Incentive Compatible, Efficient Market for Air Traffic Flow Management
We present a market-based approach to the Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM)
problem. The goods in our market are delays and buyers are airline companies;
the latter pay money to the FAA to buy away the desired amount of delay on a
per flight basis. We give a notion of equilibrium for this market and an LP
whose solution gives an equilibrium allocation of flights to landing slots as
well as equilibrium prices for the landing slots. Via a reduction to matching,
we show that this equilibrium can be computed combinatorially in strongly
polynomial time. Moreover, there is a special set of equilibrium prices, which
can be computed easily, that is identical to the VCG solution, and therefore
the market is incentive compatible in dominant strategy.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1109.521
The Case for Liberal Spectrum Licenses: A Technical and Economic Perspective
The traditional system of radio spectrum allocation has inefficiently restricted wireless services. Alternatively, liberal licenses ceding de facto spectrum ownership rights yield incentives for operators to maximize airwave value. These authorizations have been widely used for mobile services in the U.S. and internationally, leading to the development of highly productive services and waves of innovation in technology, applications and business models. Serious challenges to the efficacy of such a spectrum regime have arisen, however. Seeing the widespread adoption of such devices as cordless phones and wi-fi radios using bands set aside for unlicensed use, some scholars and policy makers posit that spectrum sharing technologies have become cheap and easy to deploy, mitigating airwave scarcity and, therefore, the utility of exclusive rights. This paper evaluates such claims technically and economically. We demonstrate that spectrum scarcity is alive and well. Costly conflicts over airwave use not only continue, but have intensified with scientific advances that dramatically improve the functionality of wireless devices and so increase demand for spectrum access. Exclusive ownership rights help direct spectrum inputs to where they deliver the highest social gains, making exclusive property rules relatively more socially valuable. Liberal licenses efficiently accommodate rival business models (including those commonly associated with unlicensed spectrum allocations) while mitigating the constraints levied on spectrum use by regulators imposing restrictions in traditional licenses or via use rules and technology standards in unlicensed spectrum allocations.
Privatization in the Russian Federation
The aim of this paper is providing an overview of the privatization process in the Russian Federation. The first section focuses on the experience with management and employee-buyouts in the Russian Federation, the second part explores two sides of the privatization process: the mass privatization and the voucher system.privatization, transition, Russian Federation, employee-buyouts, mass privatization, voucher system
Coordination in Service Value Networks - A Mechanism Design Approach
The fundamental paradigm shift from traditional value chains to agile service value networks (SVN) implies new economic and organizational challenges. This work provides an auction-based coordination mechanism that enables the allocation and pricing of service compositions in SVNs. The mechanism is multidimensional incentive compatible and implements an ex-post service level enforcement. Further extensions of the mechanism are evaluated following analytical and numerical research methods
Sustainability and Substitution of Exhaustible Natural Resources. How resource prices affect long-term R&D investments
Traditional resource economics has been criticised for assuming too high elasticities of substitution, not observing material balance principles and relying too much on planner solutions to obtain long-term growth. By analysing a multi-sector R&D-based endogenous growth model with exhaustible natural resources, labour, knowledge, and physical capital as inputs, the present paper addresses this critique. We study transitional dynamics and the long-term growth path and identify conditions under which firms keep spending on research and development. We demonstrate that long-run growth can be sustained under free market conditions even when elasticities of substitution between capital and resources are low and the supply of physical capital is limited, which seems to be crucial for today’s sustainability debate.Growth, Non-renewable resources, Substitution, Investment incentives, Endogenous technological change, Sustainability
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