8,676 research outputs found
Intellectual Property Rights and Market Dynamics
Two opposite models are currently operating in the modern economy, the strong intellectual property rights (IPR) model, and the open source/open science model. They have traditionally been applied to alternative institutional contexts. The strong IPR model has been associated to the business environment, while the open science model has been associated to the academic or research system. More recently, a strengthening of the IPR system has occurred in the public research system, and open science models have been adopted in private sectors like the open source software. This paper discusses these different models and their implications on the innovative activity of firms and economies, and the market dynamics. One of the main benefits deriving from a strong IPR system is that it encourages the entry of new technology-based firms and the commercialisation of technologies in markets for technologies. At the same time, an increased patent protection is also associated to potential costs, such as those arising from a excessive fragmentation of property rights, an abuse of patent protection for strategic reasons (sleeping and blocking patents), and an increase in litigation costs.Intellectual Property Rights, Patents, Patent Policy, Open Science, Open Source Software, Technology Commercialisation and Diffusion
The evolution of patent functions: New trends, main challenges and implications for firm strategy
Recent publications in the field of Intellectual Property (IP) have shown that the previous literature did not grasp how complex patents are. The goal of this paper is to present an overview of all identified functions of patents and of the main strategic implications of such a complex picture. We first survey the main patent functions : innovation protection, functions related to trade and finance, defensive roles, and patent as an input in the innovation process. We then define each function and analyse their main evolution trends in relation with the current environment. We finally identify the strategic implications of each function. We focus on the implications of the newly identified functions and on the interaction between the different functions.Patent ; Intellectual Property ; Strategic Management ; Functions ; Motives to patent
The Market for Patents in Europe
By using the PatVal-EU dataset we find that the most important determinant of patent licensing is firm size. Patent breadth, value, protection, and other factors suggested by the literature also have an impact, but not as important. In addition, most of these factors affect the willingness to license, but not whether a license actually takes place. We discuss why this suggests that there are transaction costs in the markets for technology. The issue is important because many potential licenses are not licensed suggesting that the markets for technology can be larger, with implied economic benefits.Licensing, Patent scope, Complementary assets, Firm size, Markets for technology
The Relationship Between Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law: An Economic Approach
This paper presents an economic analysis of the relationship between Intellectual Property (IP) Law and Competition Law. Contrary to some of the recent debate, our analysis emphasises the separation of IP Law and Competition Law: IP law should concern itself with assigning and defending intellectual property rights, while Competition Law should concern itself with the use of those rights. This separation extends to the enforcement of the law as well, where we argue that once property rights have been assigned, no further distinction based on intellectual or non-intellectual property should be made. While the IP/Competition Law interface has some specificity due to the types of behaviours that tend to arise more frequently where IP is concerned, we argue for a set of principles for Competition Policy that include restraint, a commitment not to revisit ex post the rights granted by IP law, and a commitment to make large changes in property right regimes only when very large changes in ex post regulation occur.
Competition Policy and Innovation
L'article analyse les complémentarités et les tensions entre la concurrence et l'innovation tant du point de vue des instruments d'analyse que du point de vue des politiques économiques.competition for the market; patent thicket; pools
When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction?
This paper is motivated by the substantial differences in start-up commercialization strategies observed across different high-technology sectors. Specifically, we evaluate the conditions under which start-up innovators earn their returns on innovation through product market competition with more established firms (such as in many areas of the electronics industry) as opposed to cooperation with these incumbents (either through licensing, strategic alliances or outright acquisition as observed in the pharmaceutical industry). While the former strategy challenges incumbent market power, the latter strategy tends to reinforce current market structure. Though the benefits of cooperation include forestalling the costs of competition in the product market and avoiding duplicative investment in sunk assets, imperfections in the market for ideas' may lead to competitive behavior in the product market. Specifically, if the transaction costs of bargaining are high or incumbents are likely to expropriate ideas from start-up innovators, then product market competition is more likely. We test these ideas using a novel dataset of the commercialization strategies of over 100 start-up innovators. Our principal robust findings are that the probability of cooperation is increasing in the innovator's control over intellectual property rights, association with venture capitalists (which reduce their transactional bargaining costs), and in the relative cost of control of specialized complementary assets. Our conclusion is that the propensity for pro-competitive benefits from start-up innovators reflects an earlier market failure, in the market for ideas.'
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The effects of intellectual property protection on international knowledge contracting
Developing countries, and particularly, those with a growing technological capacity, expect foreign technology transfers to increase when strengthening their intellectual property protection (IPR) rights. This paper evaluates empirically the impact of IPR on disembodied knowledge trade. It presents an exploration on Bilateral French Technology Receipts at the industry level for the
period 1994-2000. Two main findings stem from our analysis. First, It is found that IPR affects positively international knowledge contracting. Nevertheless, our findings show that the impact of IPR protection differs according to countries' income level and technological capacity. Stronger IPR rights can deter technology contracting in developing economies. Second, the effects of IPR protection are found to differ across industries. Stronger protection is found to be irrelevant to attract knowledge contracting in R&D-intensive industries, contrarily to middle R&D-intensive industries. Lastly, our findings on industries' sensitivity to foreign IPR protection differ from the results reported by survey studies (Mansfield et alii, 1968; Levin et alii, 1987; Cohen et alii, 2000) concerning the relative importance of IPR protection across industries to appropriate innovation
Markets for technology (why do we see them, why don't we see more of them and why we should care)
This essay explores the nature, the functioning, and the economic and policy implications of markets for technology. Today, the outsourcing of research and development activities is more common than in the past, and specialized technology suppliers have emerged in many industries. In a sense, the Schumpeterian vision of integrating R&D with manufacturing and distribution is being confronted by the older Smithian vision of division of labor. The existence and efficacy of markets for technology can profoundly influence the creation and diffusion of new knowledge, and hence, economic growth of countries and the competitive position of companies. The economic and managerial literatures have touched upon some aspects of the nature of these markets. However, a thorough understanding of how markets for technology work is still lacking. In this essay we address two main questions. First, what are the factors that enable a market for technology to exist and function effectively? Specifically we look at the role of industry structure, the nature of knowledge, and intellectual property rights and related institutions. Second, we ask what the implications of such markets are for the boundaries of the firm, the specialization and division of labor in the economy, industry structure, and economic growth. We build on this discussion to develop the implications of our work for public policy and corporate strategy
Patent Systems for Encouraging Innovation: Lessons from Economic Analysis
Economic theory views patents as policy instruments aimed at fostering innovation and diffusion. Three major implications are drawn regarding current policy debates. First, patents may not be the most effective means of protection for inventors to recover R&D investments when imitation is costly and first mover advantages are important. Second, patentability requirements, such as novelty or non-obviousness, should be sufficiently stringent to avoid the grant of patents for inventions with low social value that increase the social cost of the patent system. Third, the trade-off between the patent policy instruments of length and breadth could be used to provide sufficient incentives to develop inventions with high social value. Beyond these three implications, economic theory also pleads for a mechanism design approach: an optimal patent system could be based on a menu of different degrees of patent protection where stronger protection would involve higher fees, allowing self-selection by inventors.Patent subject matter, patentability requirements, sequential innovation, incentive mechanism, license fee
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