33,032 research outputs found
Dovetail: Stronger Anonymity in Next-Generation Internet Routing
Current low-latency anonymity systems use complex overlay networks to conceal
a user's IP address, introducing significant latency and network efficiency
penalties compared to normal Internet usage. Rather than obfuscating network
identity through higher level protocols, we propose a more direct solution: a
routing protocol that allows communication without exposing network identity,
providing a strong foundation for Internet privacy, while allowing identity to
be defined in those higher level protocols where it adds value.
Given current research initiatives advocating "clean slate" Internet designs,
an opportunity exists to design an internetwork layer routing protocol that
decouples identity from network location and thereby simplifies the anonymity
problem. Recently, Hsiao et al. proposed such a protocol (LAP), but it does not
protect the user against a local eavesdropper or an untrusted ISP, which will
not be acceptable for many users. Thus, we propose Dovetail, a next-generation
Internet routing protocol that provides anonymity against an active attacker
located at any single point within the network, including the user's ISP. A
major design challenge is to provide this protection without including an
application-layer proxy in data transmission. We address this challenge in path
construction by using a matchmaker node (an end host) to overlap two path
segments at a dovetail node (a router). The dovetail then trims away part of
the path so that data transmission bypasses the matchmaker. Additional design
features include the choice of many different paths through the network and the
joining of path segments without requiring a trusted third party. We develop a
systematic mechanism to measure the topological anonymity of our designs, and
we demonstrate the privacy and efficiency of our proposal by simulation, using
a model of the complete Internet at the AS-level
Adaptive Traffic Fingerprinting for Darknet Threat Intelligence
Darknet technology such as Tor has been used by various threat actors for
organising illegal activities and data exfiltration. As such, there is a case
for organisations to block such traffic, or to try and identify when it is used
and for what purposes. However, anonymity in cyberspace has always been a
domain of conflicting interests. While it gives enough power to nefarious
actors to masquerade their illegal activities, it is also the cornerstone to
facilitate freedom of speech and privacy. We present a proof of concept for a
novel algorithm that could form the fundamental pillar of a darknet-capable
Cyber Threat Intelligence platform. The solution can reduce anonymity of users
of Tor, and considers the existing visibility of network traffic before
optionally initiating targeted or widespread BGP interception. In combination
with server HTTP response manipulation, the algorithm attempts to reduce the
candidate data set to eliminate client-side traffic that is most unlikely to be
responsible for server-side connections of interest. Our test results show that
MITM manipulated server responses lead to expected changes received by the Tor
client. Using simulation data generated by shadow, we show that the detection
scheme is effective with false positive rate of 0.001, while sensitivity
detecting non-targets was 0.016+-0.127. Our algorithm could assist
collaborating organisations willing to share their threat intelligence or
cooperate during investigations.Comment: 26 page
Seeking Anonymity in an Internet Panopticon
Obtaining and maintaining anonymity on the Internet is challenging. The state
of the art in deployed tools, such as Tor, uses onion routing (OR) to relay
encrypted connections on a detour passing through randomly chosen relays
scattered around the Internet. Unfortunately, OR is known to be vulnerable at
least in principle to several classes of attacks for which no solution is known
or believed to be forthcoming soon. Current approaches to anonymity also appear
unable to offer accurate, principled measurement of the level or quality of
anonymity a user might obtain.
Toward this end, we offer a high-level view of the Dissent project, the first
systematic effort to build a practical anonymity system based purely on
foundations that offer measurable and formally provable anonymity properties.
Dissent builds on two key pre-existing primitives - verifiable shuffles and
dining cryptographers - but for the first time shows how to scale such
techniques to offer measurable anonymity guarantees to thousands of
participants. Further, Dissent represents the first anonymity system designed
from the ground up to incorporate some systematic countermeasure for each of
the major classes of known vulnerabilities in existing approaches, including
global traffic analysis, active attacks, and intersection attacks. Finally,
because no anonymity protocol alone can address risks such as software exploits
or accidental self-identification, we introduce WiNon, an experimental
operating system architecture to harden the uses of anonymity tools such as Tor
and Dissent against such attacks.Comment: 8 pages, 10 figure
Octopus: A Secure and Anonymous DHT Lookup
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) lookup is a core technique in structured
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. Its decentralized nature introduces security and
privacy vulnerabilities for applications built on top of them; we thus set out
to design a lookup mechanism achieving both security and anonymity, heretofore
an open problem. We present Octopus, a novel DHT lookup which provides strong
guarantees for both security and anonymity. Octopus uses attacker
identification mechanisms to discover and remove malicious nodes, severely
limiting an adversary's ability to carry out active attacks, and splits lookup
queries over separate anonymous paths and introduces dummy queries to achieve
high levels of anonymity. We analyze the security of Octopus by developing an
event-based simulator to show that the attacker discovery mechanisms can
rapidly identify malicious nodes with low error rate. We calculate the
anonymity of Octopus using probabilistic modeling and show that Octopus can
achieve near-optimal anonymity. We evaluate Octopus's efficiency on Planetlab
with 207 nodes and show that Octopus has reasonable lookup latency and
manageable communication overhead
Hang With Your Buddies to Resist Intersection Attacks
Some anonymity schemes might in principle protect users from pervasive
network surveillance - but only if all messages are independent and unlinkable.
Users in practice often need pseudonymity - sending messages intentionally
linkable to each other but not to the sender - but pseudonymity in dynamic
networks exposes users to intersection attacks. We present Buddies, the first
systematic design for intersection attack resistance in practical anonymity
systems. Buddies groups users dynamically into buddy sets, controlling message
transmission to make buddies within a set behaviorally indistinguishable under
traffic analysis. To manage the inevitable tradeoffs between anonymity
guarantees and communication responsiveness, Buddies enables users to select
independent attack mitigation policies for each pseudonym. Using trace-based
simulations and a working prototype, we find that Buddies can guarantee
non-trivial anonymity set sizes in realistic chat/microblogging scenarios, for
both short-lived and long-lived pseudonyms.Comment: 15 pages, 8 figure
Evaluation of Anonymized ONS Queries
Electronic Product Code (EPC) is the basis of a pervasive infrastructure for
the automatic identification of objects on supply chain applications (e.g.,
pharmaceutical or military applications). This infrastructure relies on the use
of the (1) Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology to tag objects in
motion and (2) distributed services providing information about objects via the
Internet. A lookup service, called the Object Name Service (ONS) and based on
the use of the Domain Name System (DNS), can be publicly accessed by EPC
applications looking for information associated with tagged objects. Privacy
issues may affect corporate infrastructures based on EPC technologies if their
lookup service is not properly protected. A possible solution to mitigate these
issues is the use of online anonymity. We present an evaluation experiment that
compares the of use of Tor (The second generation Onion Router) on a global
ONS/DNS setup, with respect to benefits, limitations, and latency.Comment: 14 page
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