Were Bush Tax Cut Supporters "Simply Ignorant?" A Second Look at Conservatives and Liberals in "Homer Gets a Tax Cut"

In a recent edition of Perspectives on Politics, Larry Bartels examines the high levels of support for tax cuts signed into law by President Bush in 2001. In so doing, he characterizes the opinions of “ordinary people” as lacking “a moral basis” and as being based on “simple-minded and sometimes misguided considerations of self interest.” He concludes that “the strong plurality support for Bush’s tax cut...is entirely attributable to simple ignorance.” Our analysis of the same data reveals different results. We show that for a large and politically relevant class of respondents – people who describe themselves as “conservative” or “Republican” – rising information levels increase support for the tax cuts. Indeed, using Bartels’ measure of political information, we show that the Republican respondents rated “most informed” supported the tax cuts at extraordinarily high levels (over 96%). For these citizens, Bartels’ claim that “better-informed respondents were much more likely to express negative views about the 2001 tax cut” is simply untrue. We then show that Bartels’ results depend on a very strong assumption about how information affects public opinion. He restricts all respondents -- whether liberal or conservative, Republican or Democrat – to respond to increasing information levels in identical ways. In other words, he assumes that if more information about the tax cut makes liberals less likely to support it, then conservatives must follow suit. This assumption is very presumptive about the policy trade-offs that different people should make. Our analysis, by contrast, allows people of different partisan or ideological identities to react to higher information levels in varying ways. This flexibility has many benefits, one of which is a direct test of Bartels’ restrictive assumption. We demonstrate that the assumption is untrue. Examined several ways, our findings suggest that much of the support for the tax cut was attributable to something other than “simple ignorance.” Bartels’ approach is based on a very strong presumption about how citizens should think and what they should think about. We advocate a different approach, one that takes questions of public policy seriously while respecting ideological and partisan differences in opinion and interest. Indeed, citizens have reasons for the opinions and interests they have. We may or may not agree with them. However, we, as social scientists, can contribute more by offering reliable explanations of these reasons than we can by judging them prematurely. By turning our attention to explaining differences of opinion, we can help to forge a stronger and more credible foundation for progress in meeting critical social needs.tax cut; President Bush; Republicans; conservatives; information; competence; public policy

Were Bush Tax Cut Supporters “Simply Ignorant?” A Second Look at Conservatives and Liberals in “Homer Gets a Tax Cut”

In a recent edition of Perspectives on Politics, Larry Bartels examines the high levels of support for tax cuts signed into law by President Bush in 2001. In so doing, he characterizes the opinions of “ordinary people” as being based on “simple-minded and sometimes misguided considerations of self interest” and concludes that “the strong plurality support for Bush’s tax cut...is entirely attributable to simple ignorance.” Our analysis of the same data reveals different results. We show that for a large and politically relevant class of respondents – people who describe themselves as “conservative” or “Republican” – increasing information levels increase support for the tax cuts to the extent that they have any affect at all. Indeed, using Bartels’ measure of political information, we show that the Republican respondents rated most informed supported the tax cuts at extraordinarily high levels (over 96%). For these citizens, Bartels’ claim that “better-informed respondents were much more likely to express negative views about the 2001 tax cut” is simply untrue. We then show that Bartels’ results depend on a very strong assumption about how information affects public opinion. He restricts all respondents -- whether liberal or conservative, Republican or Democrat – to respond to increasing information levels in identical ways. In other words, he assumes that if more information about the tax cut makes liberals less likely to support it, then conservatives must follow suit. This assumption is very presumptive about the policy and value trade- offs that different people should make. Our analysis, by contrast, allows people of different partisan or ideological identities to react to higher information levels in varying ways. This flexibility has many benefits, one of which is a direct test of Bartels’ restrictive assumption. We demonstrate that the assumption is untrue. Examined several ways, our findings suggest that much of the support for the tax cut was attributable to something other than “simple ignorance.” Bartels’ approach is based on a very strong presumption about how citizens should think and what they should think about. We advocate a different approach, one that takes questions of public policy seriously while respecting ideological and partisan differences in opinion and interest. Indeed, citizens have reasons for the opinions and interests they have. We may or may not agree with them. However, we, as social scientists, can contribute more by offering reliable explanations of these reasons than we can by judging them prematurely. By turning our attention to explaining differences of opinion, we can help to forge a stronger and more credible foundation for progress in meeting critical social needs.public opinion, tax policy, incomplete information, welfare economics

Political Compromise in America: Why Are Americans So Politically Divided And What Can Be Done To Prevent A Fractured Nation

Ask anyone who is politically active what they believe to be the biggest problem in politics today. More often than not, Americans tend to blame the failing parts of society on the stubbornness of the opposing political party. This generally opens up the floor to asking questions about whether individuals are willing to listen to members of the opposing party discuss their points of view, and unfortunately, many will choose not to listen at all, having already decided that they are wrong and there is no possibility of coming to a middle ground between the two points of view. People adopt a “my way or the highway” approach to politics. Because society is becoming more obviously political, with politics finding a way to imbue itself into every aspect of society, there is a deepening divide between those who identify as Republicans and those who identify as Democrats. This division, should it continue to grow, could ultimately lead to the complete division of the nation and the possibility of a second American Civil War. So why do people tend to choose not to compromise? This research paper looks to analyze this issue of political compromise in America, and strives to understand what is keeping people from coming to a middle ground on American politics. In its essence, the question is being asked: Why do people choose not to compromise in politics, and how can the nation be brought back to a place where there is a common starting point, even if the end points are different? By analyzing research and literature on the deepening political divide in this nation, as well as looking at different voting demographics and the patterns and traditions that stick to the voting process, this author hopes to ultimately debunk the idea that America is beyond the point of saving, and answer the question of where people need to come together in order to solve the political polarization of all American society

Political Cycles in Active Labor Market Policies

This paper examines a framework in which politicians can decrease unemployment via active labor market policies (ALMP). We combine theoretical models on partisan and opportunistic cycles and assume that voters are ignorant of the necessary facts to make informed voting decisions. The model predicts that politicians have incentives for a strategic use of active labor market policies that leads to a political cycle in unemployment and budget deficit. We test the hypotheses predicted by the theoretical model using data from German states from 1985:1 to 2004:11. The results illustrate that opportunistic behavior of politicians can explain the development of ALMP approximated by job-creation schemes.active labor market policies, political cycles, labor market expenditures, opportunistic politicians, partisan politicians

Polarization and the Modern Media Landscape

Overview: This paper serves as an in-depth look into the partisan bias that exists in today’s mainstream and social media outlets and platforms, and concludes that this lack of objectivity further divides, polarizes and radicalizes the American populace. The evidence gathered supports the general claim that the mainstream media is indeed politically and ideologically biased to a certain extent, as are numerous influential social media blogs and news sites. Both loyal Democrats and Republicans enclose themselves within these ideological echo-chambers of their own making, based upon the news outlets they choose to use, as well as the way they choose to receive such news (for example, TV vs. mobile phone). This phenomenon is something that has been shown to further radicalize already sympathetic partisans to more extreme views, leading one to be more involved in political activism and debate, thus further spreading their extreme views to larger sections of the public. All of these findings and conclusions amount to a troubling prognosis for the future of stable democratic institutions, such as free speech, and for the future of an open, objective, and free press. Author\u27s Reflection: I am a sophomore with a dual major in history and political science. Professor Rosenberry\u27s Reflection: What I liked best about this paper is the writer\u27s strong, confident voice in staking out a claim and then showing extensive support for it. This support includes evidence drawn from both academic sources and news/trade sources. For a paper such as this on such a current topic, the combination of those two types of information is important to making an effective argument , and Mark manages the combination exceptionally well

Judicial Selection and the Search for Middle Ground

This Article seeks to transcend perennial election versus appointment debates-including debates over campaign finance and the impact of dark money -by taking a closer look at why judicial selection is a contentious mess and discussing how it might be fixed. First, I present the case for elective and appointive systems. Second, I show that the arguments for each system are exaggerated or flawed.Third, I explore why it has been hard for proponents of each system to perceive and acknowledge those exaggerations and flaws, and propose ways to narrow the divide. Although the divide can and should be narrowed, I conclude that it cannot be eliminated altogether. Ultimately, which system is best will unavoidably turn on which selection system\u27s core values take precedence in a given state at a given time

Why Popular Election Should Be Selected Over the Merit Plan Method of Judicial Selection

Judicial selection through the process of popular election, while not a perfect instrument, provides a higher degree of accountability and achieves the same level of independence from political forces as the merit plan. Moreover, the popular election process is more consistent with the overlying theme of a participatory democracy dictated by the founding fathers and implemented by following generations

Behavioral Public Choice and the Law

Behavioral public choice is the study of irrationality among political actors. In this context, irrationality means systematic bias, a deviation from rational expectations, or other departure from economists’ conception of rationality. Behavioral public choice scholars extend the insights of behavioral economics to the political realm and show that irrational behavior is an important source of government failure. This Article makes an original contribution to the legal literature by systematically reviewing the findings of behavioral public choice and explaining their implications for the law and legal institutions. We discuss the various biases and heuristics that lead political actors to support and adopt bad laws and describe how irrationality influences specific areas of the law, including tax, antitrust, consumer protection, corporate, and employment law. We also discuss various proposals for minimizing the effects of irrationality on public policy. Our goal is to introduce this new field of research to legal scholars, most of whom have previously ignored it. Familiarity with behavioral public choice will help legal scholars better understand the types of policies that are likely to emerge from real-world political processes and will facilitate efforts to promote realistic policy reform