Parity-energy ATL for Qualitative and Quantitative Reasoning in MAS

In this paper, we introduce a new logic suitable to reason about strategic abilities of multi-agent systems where (teams of) agents are subject to qualitative (parity) and quantitative (energy) constraints and where goals are represented, as usual, by means of temporal properties. We formally define such a logic, named parity-energy-atl (peatl, for short), and we study its model checking problem, which we prove to be decidable with different complexity upper bounds, depending on different choices for the energy range

Discounting in Strategy Logic

Discounting is an important dimension in multi-agent systems as long as we want to reason about strategies and time. It is a key aspect in economics as it captures the intuition that the far-away future is not as important as the near future. Traditional verification techniques allow to check whether there is a winning strategy for a group of agents but they do not take into account the fact that satisfying a goal sooner is different from satisfying it after a long wait. In this paper, we augment Strategy Logic with future discounting over a set of discounted functions D, denoted SLdisc[D]. We consider "until" operators with discounting functions: the satisfaction value of a specification in SLdisc[D] is a value in [0, 1], where the longer it takes to fulfill requirements, the smaller the satisfaction value is. We motivate our approach with classical examples from Game Theory and study the complexity of model-checking SLdisc[D]-formulas.Comment: Extended version of the paper accepted at IJCAI 202

Enforcing equilibria in multi-agent systems

We introduce and investigate Normative Synthesis: a new class of problems for the equilibrium verification that counters the absence of equilibria by purposely constraining multi-agent systems. We show that norms are powerful enough to ensure a positive answer to every instance of the equilibrium verification problem. Subsequently, we focus on two optimization versions, that aim at providing a solution in compliance with implementation costs. We show that the complexities of our procedures range between 2exptime and 3exptime, thus that the problems are no harder than the corresponding equilibrium verification ones

Formal methods for analysing, coordinating, and controlling decisions in multi-agent systems

Multiagentensysteme sind verteilte (Computer)Systeme, die sich aus autonomen interagierenden Systemkomponenten, bezeichnet als Agenten, zusammensetzen. Sie bieten ein flexibles Framework zur Modellierung und Analyse von interaktiven Systemen, in denen Kooperation, Eigeninteresse und Autonomie eine entscheidende Rolle spielen. Dies ist zum Beispiel der Fall in Smart Grids. Eine Herausforderung in solchen Systemen ist die Kontrolle und die Koordination von Systemausführungen. Agenten handeln autonom und lassen sich daher oftmals nicht direkt kontrollieren, sondern bestenfalls beeinflussen. Aufgrund der Autonomie und des Selbstinteresses, ist es schwierig, angemessene Kontrollmechanismen zu finden. Die vorliegende Arbeit behandelt formale Grundlagen zu den Themen Entscheidungsfindung, Koordination und Kontrolle in Multiagentensystemen. Insbesondere werden in diesem Zusammenhang Logiken zur Analyse und Spezifikation von strategischen Fähigkeiten von Agenten, unter diversen Restriktionen, untersucht. Es werden formale Ansätze zur Beeinflussung und Überwachung von Systemausführungen eingeführt. In einem weiteren Teil der Arbeit wird mittels spieltheoretischer Verfahren analysiert, wie rationale Agenten interagieren und Entscheidungen treffen. Es wird argumentiert, dass formale Methoden und Werkzeuge zur Analyse und Kontrolle von autonomen Systemen entscheidend für deren verlässliche Entwicklung sind.Multi-agent systems (MASs) are distributed (computer) systems composed of autonomously (inter-)acting system components referred to as agents. MASs offer a flexible framework to model and analyse many real world settings in which cooperation, self-interest, and autonomy are crucial elements. A key challenge in such settings is the control and coordination of behavior. However, due to the agents' autonomy behavior can often not be controlled, but at best be influenced in some way or another. For example, agents can be given incentives in order to affect their decision-making in such a way that the emergent behavior of all actors is desirable from the system's perspective. The properties of self-interest and autonomy make it challenging to find appropriate control mechanisms. Existing coordination and control approaches from the distributed system literature are often not applicable due to the lack of direct control on the system components of MASs. New methods and tools are needed. In this thesis formal foundations related to the subjects of decision making, coordination and control in MASs are studied. In particular, we investigate (extensions of) temporal and strategic logics which capture specific capabilities of agents that influence their decision making. We also propose formal approaches to control, coordinate and monitor the emergent behavior in MASs. In the last part of the thesis we analyse how rational agents interact and make decisions using game theoretical methods. We argue that such formal approaches and tools to analyse and control autonomous systems are crucial for the development of reliable and flexible systems and will become even more crucial in the near future

Reachability games with relaxed energy constraints

We study games with reachability objectives under energy constraints. We first prove that under strict energy constraints (either only lower-bound constraint or interval constraint), those games are LOGSPACE-equivalent to energy games with the same energy constraints but without reachability objective (i.e., for infinite runs). We then consider two relaxations of the upper-bound constraints (while keeping the lower-bound constraint strict): in the first one, called weak upper bound, the upper bound is absorbing, i.e., when the upper bound is reached, the extra energy is not stored; in the second one, we allow for temporary violations of the upper bound, imposing limits on the number or on the amount of violations. We prove that when considering weak upper bound, reachability objectives require memory, but can still be solved in polynomial-time for one-player arenas ; we prove that they are in coNP in the two-player setting. Allowing for bounded violations makes the problem PSPACE-complete for one-player arenas and EXPTIME-complete for two players. We then address the problem of existence of bounds for a given arena. We show that with reachability objectives, existence can be a simpler problem than the game itself, and conversely that with infinite games, existence can be harder

Automatic Verification of Concurrent Stochastic Systems

Automated verification techniques for stochastic games allow formal reasoning about systems that feature competitive or collaborative behaviour among rational agents in uncertain or probabilistic settings. Existing tools and techniques focus on turn-based games, where each state of the game is controlled by a single player, and on zero-sum properties, where two players or coalitions have directly opposing objectives. In this paper, we present automated verification techniques for concurrent stochastic games (CSGs), which provide a more natural model of concurrent decision making and interaction. We also consider (social welfare) Nash equilibria, to formally identify scenarios where two players or coalitions with distinct goals can collaborate to optimise their joint performance. We propose an extension of the temporal logic rPATL for specifying quantitative properties in this setting and present corresponding algorithms for verification and strategy synthesis for a variant of stopping games. For finite-horizon properties the computation is exact, while for infinite-horizon it is approximate using value iteration. For zero-sum properties it requires solving matrix games via linear programming, and for equilibria-based properties we find social welfare or social cost Nash equilibria of bimatrix games via the method of labelled polytopes through an SMT encoding. We implement this approach in PRISM-games, which required extending the tool's modelling language for CSGs, and apply it to case studies from domains including robotics, computer security and computer networks, explicitly demonstrating the benefits of both CSGs and equilibria-based properties

Physics at the e+ e- Linear Collider

A comprehensive review of physics at an e+e- Linear Collider in the energy range of sqrt{s}=92 GeV--3 TeV is presented in view of recent and expected LHC results, experiments from low energy as well as astroparticle physics.The report focuses in particular on Higgs boson, Top quark and electroweak precision physics, but also discusses several models of beyond the Standard Model physics such as Supersymmetry, little Higgs models and extra gauge bosons. The connection to cosmology has been analyzed as well.Comment: 179 pages, plots and references updated, version to be published at EPJ

Girls in the physics classroom: a review of the research on the participation of girls in physics

A review of research spanning the past 15 years into the participation of girls in physics at secondary school level. The review was commissioned by the Institute of Physics in order to inform policy setting agendas for the Institute and to reveal important messages about participation in physics which the Institute could use to develop plans for action