384 research outputs found

    Le comité paritaire : anachronisme ou formule d’avenir

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    Cet article examine le concept paritaire et son application historique dans les relations du travail, ainsi que ses nouvelles applications, particulièrement dans le domaine de la santé et de la sécurité ainsi que celui de la formation des travailleurs.The parity committee, one of the oldest and most neglected institutions in the Québec industrial relations context, is being rediscovered, both for its traditional value and for its ability to meet our new needs. Recent legislation with regard to worker health and safety, and recent proposals by a Government Task Force on adult education both rely heavily on the parity framework. Similarly, new directions being planned for the Collective Agreement Decrees Act give hope for the future of this concept. Given this increase in awareness and interest, the purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of parity and its historical applications in the field of labour relations as well as its new applications in this particular area, and that of worker health and safety, and vocational training. Based on this examination, we will briefly present some observations concerning the successful uses and applications of parity.The parity committee is fundamentally a System of industrial government in which equal numbers of employer and employee representatives discuss issues of mutual concern and exercise joint decision-making powers within a cooperative, not conflictual, framework. The parity committee system operates as a complement to existing institutional arrangements, namely the collective bargaining process, and can be applied at a variety of levels: national, industrial, regional and local; and to a variety of subjects, or any single one.On an organizational level, the parity committee has three important components: a democratic function, an accountability function, and a permanent staff function. On an operational level, certain institutional and individual behaviour pat-terns influence the functioning and quality of the parity committee.In order to function properly a parity committee must respect certain guidelines. Basically, the parties must first recognize and accept each other as partners. Both have to accept the parity formula as an answer to their concerns. They must have institutional and factual equality. The subjects they discuss must be of mutual interest, and essentially non-conflictual in nature. The partners have to be held accountable. They should ensure continuity in their work through some form of permanent staffing.The concept of parity should be introduced gradually, and should not be used as a restrictive or discriminatory regulatory tool. Within a given industrial sector, a multiplicity of committees is to be avoided, though the basic approach should be a decentralized one. Finally, it is essential to remove all possibility of sanctions, in order to oblige the partners to cooperate, rather than engage in warfare.This approach, in turn, will bear positive results. The partners will develop a sense of belonging to a larger entity, and thus satisfy collective as well as egotistical needs. Industry will have given itself a means of attaining greater industrial peace as well as better quality of working life. This will also have a favourable impact on the conventional labour relations scène in Québec, both directly and indirectly, by ad-dressing itself to the problem of unorganized workers. Psychologically, this approach should also increase the self-actualization needs of workers and employers by allowing them to get away from the taxing practice of institutionalized confrontation.This paper basically contends that, as an institution, the parity committee is in-deed suited to play a role in today's context. At its inception in the 1930's, the parity committee was a feasible answer to unfavourable conditions, and the prevalent social doctrine of the Catholic Church with regard to labour relations. With massive industrialization, and all of its inherent advantages and disadvantages, Québec Society needed new institutions, more in line with those of the North American context it was at last participating in. This brought about the general marginalization of the parity committee, though it still survived in a handful of sectors. The System by which it was replaced sought to restore a certain balance in the relationship between employers and employees.In the present context, the balance has been largely attained. In addition, major social and economic changes in our society indicate the urgency of having our social partners cooperate. The concept of parity and its institutionalization is presented not as a panacea, but as a workable and adaptable alternative, capable of meeting today's new requirements. As the concept of parity gains acceptance in various other fields, such as worker health and safety and vocational training however, we should be aware of the need to coordinate these functions to allow them to develop fully

    Jalons pour une histoire du rôle de la CGT-FO dans les relations sociales en France (fin des années 1950-début des années 1980)

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    L'auteur présente cet ouvrage consacré au syndicat Force ouvrière aux grands heures de la croissance (1960-1980) où la pratique contractuelle et le paritarisme furent les voies privilégiées d'un réformisme revendiqué au même titre que l'anticommunism

    Status and Contracts in Industrial Relations: "La Refondation sociale", a new Bottle for an old (French) Wine?

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    "Seit 1999 betreibt der französische Arbeitgeberverband (Medef) eine radikale Umwandlung des institutionellen Rahmens der industriellen Beziehungen und des Wohlfahrtsstaats. Diese Initiative wird als soziale Neugründung bezeichnet. Um die Bedeutung dieses Vorgangs würdigen zu können, wird in dem Papier zunächst ein kurzer historischer Überblick über die Institutionen der industriellen Beziehungen in Frankreich gegeben. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird dabei den schändlichen korporatistischen Mechanismen geschenkt, die Arbeit und Kapital die Aufgabe übertragen, staatliche Normen in diesem Bereich anzuwenden, zu konkretisieren oder in definierten Fällen auch zu modifizieren. Die Autoren hinterfragen anschließend die Annahmen und Motive hinter dem Anspruch der sozialen Neugründer, die kollektive Autonomie der Sozialpartner gegenüber staatlichen Gesetzen zu stärken, indem sie zeigen, dass die dichotomische Konzeption von Gesetz und Vertrag nicht mit der komplexen institutionellen Wirklichkeit übereinstimmt. Abschließend wird die Annahme begründet, dass das wichtigste von Medef angestrebte Ziel in der Förderung der Vertragsfreiheit auf der untersten, der betrieblichen Ebene der industriellen Beziehungen besteht, um die dezentralen Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten der Unternehmen zu erweitern. Dies würde allerdings eine Rückkehr zum individualistischen Begriff des Einzelvertrags im bürgerlichen Recht als Basis der industriellen Beziehungen implizieren, also zum Gegenteil dessen, worauf Arbeitsrecht und industrielle Beziehungen seit dem späten 19. Jahrhundert aufgebaut wurden." (Autorenreferat)"Since 1999, the main French employers organisation (Medef) has been promoting a radical transformation of the institutional framework of industrial relations and the welfare state. This initiative, known as the Social Re-foundation agenda, has started to be implemented through a new cycle of inter-sectoral negotiations with the unions, on major issues such as the reform of the social security and unemployment insurance schemes: the ways and means for the development of collective bargaining , etc. Echoing the trends observed in many national industrial relations systems in Europe and also at the UE level, the Social Re-foundation represents the most ambitious attempt ever made in France at redefining the boundaries between legal and contractual rules in the regulation of employment relations. In order to assess the issues at stake with the Social Re-foundation , the paper first provides a brief historical overview of the French industrial relations institutions, focusing on the shameful corporatist mechanisms through which labour and capital were authorised to apply, spell out, in some cases also modify state regulations in this field. Then the authors question the assumptions and the motives of the social re-founders when they claim to promote the collective autonomy of social partners against state law, by showing how their dualistic conception of law and contract is not in accordance with the complex institutional reality. Finally, it is suggested that the main aim of the Medef s strategy is to favour contractual autonomy at the lowest levels of collective bargaining, so as to develop firms self-regulation. This would also mean a return to the individualist contractual philosophy of civil law, i.e the very opposite conception on which labour law and industrial relations institutions have been built up since the late 19th century." (author's abstract

    Status and Contracts in Industrial Relations : "La Refondation sociale", a new Bottle for an old (French) Wine?

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    "Seit 1999 betreibt der französische Arbeitgeberverband (Medef) eine radikale Umwandlung des institutionellen Rahmens der industriellen Beziehungen und des Wohlfahrtsstaats. Diese Initiative wird als soziale Neugründung bezeichnet. Um die Bedeutung dieses Vorgangs würdigen zu können, wird in dem Papier zunächst ein kurzer historischer Überblick über die Institutionen der industriellen Beziehungen in Frankreich gegeben. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird dabei den schändlichen korporatistischen Mechanismen geschenkt, die Arbeit und Kapital die Aufgabe übertragen, staatliche Normen in diesem Bereich anzuwenden, zu konkretisieren oder in definierten Fällen auch zu modifizieren. Die Autoren hinterfragen anschließend die Annahmen und Motive hinter dem Anspruch der sozialen Neugründer, die kollektive Autonomie der Sozialpartner gegenüber staatlichen Gesetzen zu stärken, indem sie zeigen, dass die dichotomische Konzeption von Gesetz und Vertrag nicht mit der komplexen institutionellen Wirklichkeit übereinstimmt. Abschließend wird die Annahme begründet, dass das wichtigste von Medef angestrebte Ziel in der Förderung der Vertragsfreiheit auf der untersten, der betrieblichen Ebene der industriellen Beziehungen besteht, um die dezentralen Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten der Unternehmen zu erweitern. Dies würde allerdings eine Rückkehr zum individualistischen Begriff des Einzelvertrags im bürgerlichen Recht als Basis der industriellen Beziehungen implizieren, also zum Gegenteil dessen, worauf Arbeitsrecht und industrielle Beziehungen seit dem späten 19. Jahrhundert aufgebaut wurden." (Autorenreferat)"Since 1999, the main French employers organisation (Medef) has been promoting a radical transformation of the institutional framework of industrial relations and the welfare state. This initiative, known as the Social Re-foundation agenda, has started to be implemented through a new cycle of inter-sectoral negotiations with the unions, on major issues such as the reform of the social security and unemployment insurance schemes: the ways and means for the development of collective bargaining , etc. Echoing the trends observed in many national industrial relations systems in Europe and also at the UE level, the Social Re-foundation represents the most ambitious attempt ever made in France at redefining the boundaries between legal and contractual rules in the regulation of employment relations. In order to assess the issues at stake with the Social Re-foundation , the paper first provides a brief historical overview of the French industrial relations institutions, focusing on the shameful corporatist mechanisms through which labour and capital were authorised to apply, spell out, in some cases also modify state regulations in this field. Then the authors question the assumptions and the motives of the social re-founders when they claim to promote the collective autonomy of social partners against state law, by showing how their dualistic conception of law and contract is not in accordance with the complex institutional reality. Finally, it is suggested that the main aim of the Medef s strategy is to favour contractual autonomy at the lowest levels of collective bargaining, so as to develop firms self-regulation. This would also mean a return to the individualist contractual philosophy of civil law, i.e the very opposite conception on which labour law and industrial relations institutions have been built up since the late 19th century." (author's abstract

    The Politics of Protest Avoidance: Policy Windows, Labor Mobilization, and Pension Reform in France

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    According to Paul Pierson and R. Kent Weaver, the "new politics of the welfare state" is about escaping the popular blame generated by cutbacks affecting a significant portion of the population. Although the concept of blame avoidance helps to explain the political logic of welfare state retrenchment, one can argue that a careful analysis of social policy reform should take into account a largely understudied phenomenon: protest avoidance. Especially present in countries with single party governments and politically active labor unions, protest avoidance is analytically distinct from blame avoidance because it occurs when policy-makers, facing direct and nearly inescapable blame, attempt to reduce the scope of social mobilization triggered by unpopular reforms. In recent decades, successive French governments have successfully introduced major--and unpopular--reforms in the field of pensions, despite the difficulties to frame blame avoidance strategies in the context of France's strong concentration of state power. Focusing on the 1993, 1995, and 2003 pension reform episodes, this paper seeks to demonstrate that right wing governments have generally tried to avoid protest rather than escape blame. We claim that the key element has been avoiding disruptive strike activities by the labor movement, which are highly political in France. We argue that right wing governments have attempted to divide the fragmented labor movement and overload the reform agenda while enacting its most controversial reforms during the summer holiday season. Protest avoidance thus represents a key political variable worthy of study in the literature on welfare state retrenchment. In the future, the concept of protest avoidance could be applied to other countries and policy areas in which elected officials attempt to impose unpopular reforms that trigger social mobilization.protest avoidance; pension reform

    Du gender mainstreaming au paritarisme : genèse d’un concept controversé

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    La transposition nationale du gender mainstreaming est tout sauf évidente. Sa traduction française par ‘approche intégrée de l’égalité’ puis par ‘paritarisme’ en témoigne, car elle souligne la tendance à occulter, voire à nier, la spécificité de cette notion transnationale. L’analyse de sa genèse, au niveau international et européen, a pour but de souligner la spécificité de ce concept-méthode à la fois valeur et principe d’action. Les controverses autour de cette notion questionnent ainsi les référentiels d’égalité de l’action publique au regard du dilemme de la complémentarité entre actions spécifiques et culture de l’égalité des chances.From gender mainstreaming to paritarisme: the birth of a controversial concept The national transposition of gender mainstreaming is anything but obvious. Its translation into French by “an integrated approach to equality” and then by “paritarisme” indicates this because it underlines the tendency to hide or even deny the specificity of this transnational notion. This analysis of its birth, at an international and European level, aims to emphasise the specificity of this concept-method as both a value and an action principle. The controversies around this idea challenge the references of equality in public action in relation to the dilemma of complementarity between specific actions and the equal opportunities culture.La transposición nacional del mainstreaming de género es todo salvo evidente. Su traducción francesa por “enfoque integrado de la igualdad”, después por “paritarismo” lo muestran, ya que marca la tendencia en ocultar, incluso negar, la especificidad de esta noción transnacional. El análisis de su génesis, a un nivel internacional y europeo, tiene por objetivo realzar la especificidad de este concepto-método, a la vez valor y principio de acción. Las controversias alrededor de esta noción cuestionan los referenciales de igualdad de la acción pública a la vista del dilema de la complementariedad entre acciones específicas y cultura de la igualdad de oportunidades

    La convention collective de travail et la paix industrielle en Europe

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    Dans un article précédent, l'auteur s'est efforcé de dégager le climat nouveau dans lequel s'inscrivent les relations de travail en Europe.Dans la présente étude il tente de dégager, à même les systèmes européens de relations industrielles, les caractéristiques les plus significatives ainsi que les institutions de droit et de fait informant la négociation et la convention collective de travail et concourant à la paix industrielle dans les pays étudiés.This article is not intended to give a descriptive and detailed account of the institutions and legal structures which, in each phase of labour relations, organize relations between the partners in every country under review. Such an analysis would be too long and too exhaustive in view of the scope of this study and, in any event, would only repeat what has already been done in many excellent publications readily accessible to and well known by those who may be interested in such matters. Instead, an attempt will be made to determine from the European industrial relations systems the most significant characteristics, the most interesting formula for Canadians, the institutions in law and fact which can best be compared to our own institutions in conformity with the purpose of our study. We will attempt to do this in respect of each of the main phases of labour-management relations as they operate in the countries under review.A — LABOUR COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTSIt should be noted at the outset that, in matters of negotiations and labour relations more generally, one distinction should first be made. Whereas some countries like Great Britain, Sweden and Denmark maintained almost intact their pre-war legislative and institutional frameworks, the collective negotiation systems of the countries of the European Economic Community, i.e., France, Belgium, Holland, West Germany and Italy, all underwent transformations, at times drastic since 1945, through new or renewed constitutional provisions or amended or entirely different legislation.Most of the changes were based on an increasing acceptance of the existence of trade unions and on a better defined and more liberal status for collective agreements. During the period of intensive reconstruction, from 1945 to about 1950, the liberty of the parties in determining salaries was obviously kept at a minimum by restrictive regulation.1 But, with the exception of this brief severely « controlled » period, the trend was generally in the direction mentioned above. Even in the Netherlands where controls are still relatively severe, because of the prevailing situation, some relaxation has become apparent in recent years. One indication is the substitution of the Labour Foundation to the State Mediators College for the approval of collective agreements. Also, and this may appear to be paradoxical at first sight but quite logical after proper examination, it was precisely during this period, from 1945 to 1950, that new formulas now accepted were tried out and underwent their first practical tests.The Status of Collective AgreementsIt must be pointed out that, for our purposes, collective agreements generally in European countries, in Great Britain and Scandinavia as well as in the Common Market countries, consisted primarily of extensive regulations covering individual labour contracts. It is not comparable to our local agreements which cover and control every detail of industrial life at the plant level and in day to day working relations. It is relatively free of substantial regulations governing working conditions in the various industrial units to which it applies.It is necessary to make these comments in view of the situation on this side of the Atlantic. It must be pointed out, however, that for the last fifteen years or so in Common Market countries and even longer in the Scandinavian countries, considerable progress was made in improving agreements either at the level where they are negotiated or through the development of enterprise agreements themselves, which are now much more prevalent than they were before the war.Agreements consist primarily of « minimum compulsory standards of individual contracts between each employer and his employees ». 2 This situation derives from the conditions in connection with industrial relations systems in Europe, but it also demonstrates the still powerful influence of common law in Europe generally on labour relations, in contrast with what one might surmise at first sight. If it is true that « sociologically » several countries such as Great Britain and Scandinavian countries as well as Belgium have,in practice, gone far beyond pure legal formalism, the fact remains that legally individual contracts regulate in the final analysis day to day working relations between individual employees and management. This is apparent, for example, in the settlement of disputes concerning general working conditions. In any event, collective agreements have no legal status of their own in several countries, notably in England, Belgium 3 and Italy. Evidently, however, they are often in practice more effective there than in countries where they have a real legal status. The fact remains however that, since they are designed as minimum standards often without substance and leaving a great deal to the sole discretion of management in determining most actual working conditions, they do not contribute significantly to sound co-operation in industrial relations at the local level. 4The Parties to AgreementsFrance and the Netherlands require that a union be a legal entity to sign collective agreements as defined in labour legislation. Other countries, such as Sweden and Germany, recognize the obligation for parties to an agreement to « keep the peace » while the agreement is in force and penalties are provided for in this matter.This point is interesting for industrial peace. In England, where trade unions are not legal entities, and are protected by statute from legal actions in their endeavours in pursuing their economic interests in labour relations, certain parties recently expressed the opinion that, in order to check non-official strikes which have been so numerous in recent years, trade unions should be given legal entities, respect agreements as contracts and therefore be legally responsible for the actions of their members, particularly the shop stewards, as is the case in Sweden and West Germany, for example, in the event of strikes or any other action taken in contravention of duly negotiated agreements.5But what is more important for the purposes of a study such as this one, in connection with parties to an agreement, is that, in Western Europe and in every country under review, collective agreements still come under the jurisdiction in the vast majority of cases not of labour units at the local level or individual employers, but of vast employer and labour groups, generally at the level of a complete industrial branch and, in some contries such as Sweden and Denmark, at the level of the economy as a whole. 6 On the whole, the statutes reviewed are very clearly directed in this manner. So much so in fact, that one could assume that legislators intended in those countries to center labour relations negotiations on the greater units (federations and confederations grouping wage-earners or management) so that the resulting agreements would be more readily integrated in general economic and social policies in these countries, and that agreements entered into would have a « community » feature and negotiating parties would consequently be more conscious of the implications of their decisions on working conditions for the economy as a whole in such countries.All legislative texts to define collective agreements as capable of being entered into by individual employers and trade unions without giving further details, but a wide range of provisions actually favour clearly negotiations beyond the local level, notably the industry branch level.The Extension of Agreements. There is the possibility provided for almost universally of the local extension of labour collective agreements in Europe, under certain conditions. It is in a sense the logical consequence of the negotiations system in these countries, which consider much more readily that the determination of working conditions results from vast regulations, undoubtedly negotiated for the greater part, but always designed to be used as standards for large sectors of the economy and therefore capable of being more readily integrated in the framework of general salary and working conditions policies, and one can only agree that this is somewhat opposed to the spirit of our North American industrial relations systems. With the extension procedure, public powers in almost all of the countries under review were able to obtain full participation of labour and management associations in the determination of working conditions, even in those sectors where they are not fully represented, and laying down at the same time certain conditions so that standards set by private parties are truly representative of the areas to which they apply and do not disrupt industrial sectors. The precautions taken in such countries before granting extension should be remembered if ever we attempted to follow this course more extensively.Briefly, what are these precautions ? In France, under the provisions of the statutes of February, 1950, only those associations representing management and labour can enter into an agreement capable of extension. Management representation must be an « association » under the terms of the act, i.e., have legal status. The same applies obviously to labour.De facto groups can enter into « ordinary » agreements but not an agreement capable of extension. This is all the more so for an individual employer who could never negotiate towards extension as can be done under the terms of the Collective Agreements Act of Québec. Furthermore, groups on both sides must be « representative » of the trade group or sector covered, be it local, regional or national. Nothing in the texts defines « representative », but the courts and administrative practice have provided for this. The detailed enumeration of the criteria would fall outside the scope of this study Furthermore, they must include a certain number of clauses whose provisions themselves obviously remain free. Generally, extension covers the whole of a pre-determined industry branch and even, in some cases, to the whole of the branches at the national level, for example, the national intertrade agreement on supplementary pensions.In Germany, at least 50% of the workers involved must already be covered by an agreement before it can be extended, and there are certain other conditions. In Italy, nothing in the texts positively provides for legal extension but in practice, under the constitution and the powers given in the 1959 statutes, the government has practised extension in certain cases, at least in matters relating to salaries. In Belgium, an agreement can only be imposed on non-contracting parties if it has been entered into within a joint parity commission where the parties involved must also be « representative ». In Holland, extension is not considered an exceptional procedure, because it applies automatically when an agreement is approved by the Labour Foundation, a consultative parity organization at the national level with which we will deal further on. As for Great Britain, we are familiar with their wages councils system, which can extend salary standards in trade union sectors to the whole of a branch or region. In Sweden and Denmark, this extension procedure is non-existent as such in law, but trade unionism is so powerful and the authority of negotiation parties is so effective that, in practice, the few employees not covered by agreements obtain the same advantages as the others. Furthermore, in Sweden, the provisions of the 1928 Labour Collective Agreements Act permit terms of an agreement to be in a manner of speaking « imposed » through pressures during negotiations disputes between an employer who is not covered and his employees, by those who are already covered (strike or sympathy action).It must be noted that extension procedure is not a new development achieved during recent years. The fact remains that it is always practised and that it is still in most European labour laws, and this is why we take note of it here without evaluating its chances of disappearance or survival during the next few years.Negociation Through Joint OrganizationsOne of the most common formulas used in Western Europe for collective negotiations, and for that matter for several other labour relations aspects (for example dispute settlements ) is what is called « paritism ». Paritism consists of any formula or any institution within which the social partners meet, discuss, negotiate and determine « jointly », generally without the help of a third party and without resorting to open dispute, the relations systems between them in connection with labour relations, and every other aspect of their relations on problems of any type. Paritism implies necessarily a certain equilibrium of forces, a mutual recognition of the diverging points of view of the partners, a determination to achieve compromise where possible, a certain consensus on the long-term objectives to be reached by each party, and, finally, a certain maturity which will incite the partners to make all possible decisions on their own, while limiting as far as possible resorting to arbitration and compulsory decisions by the public powers.In our opinion this constitutes the most spectacular post-war development in certain continental European countries in relation to institutionalized co-operation in labour relations.What differentiates the situation in negotiations co-operation as between Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries on the one hand and the countries of the European Economic Community on the other hand, is that in the former countries government abstention is almost total (joint decision procedures were developed in those countries as safeguards against state intervention) while in those countries of the latter group where they are most prevalent, measures were initiated following increased intervention of the public powers in the field of labour-management relations, after the Second World War. In such countries, paritism is not the same as in the former countries and is not the result of agreements between parties (free « contractual » system), but rather of co-operation with the public powers who included these matters in a « policy », by instituting them and by maintaining them with the support of the interested parties (accepted « statutory » system ).B — DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS AND INDUSTRIAL PEACEThe dispute settlement system in labour relations vary considerably from one country to another. It is therefore extremely difficult to sift out common features which could, by themselves, give a good idea of the overall situation in this connection. As for individual labour dispute settlements certain West European countries, at least from a legal point of view, have no other procedure than common law. In Holland, for example, there are labour magistrates, but they are operating within ordinary jurisdictions. In France, Germany, Sweden and Denmark, as well as in Belgium labour tribunals deal with these disputes. In Germany and Sweden for example, the decisions of these tribunals are final and without appeal. On the other hand, in France, beyond a certain amount, appeal can be made to appeal courts and to the social chamber of the Appeal Court. In England, nothing in the Act imposes recourse to labour tribunals which do not exist. An individual dispute is legally based on the individual labour contract (as is the case for the other countries mentioned above) and there can be, in theory, recourse to ordinary tribunals. In practice, a whole series of conciliation stages is provided between the parties from the local level up to the national level and, eventually, the dispute can be brought before the Industrial Court, whose decision in fact is not mandatory, unless the parties agree to it beforehand.As to the distinction between legal disputes and disputes in interests, i.e., the interpretation or the violation of an existing agreement, during negotiations or the renewal of an agreement, certain countries make a clear distinction between these two types of disputes while other countries make no distinction at all. In the former group, mention could be made of West Germany, Sweden and Denmark where any dispute arising on the interpretation of a collective agreement must be brought before a labour tribunal, whether it is collective or individual ; this springs from a principle recognized in these countries that the signatories must respect industrial peace when they are bound by an agreement. The second group includes Belgium, Italy, England and France, where nothing in the statutes, as far as we know, prevents the eventuality of a strike during the term of an agreement in connection with a collective dispute, unless the parties had excluded this action in the agreement.None of the countries have compulsory arbitration procedures for disputes of interests, at least as far as private services are concerned. Employer associations as well as employee associations were always firmly opposed to this, since, according to them, this would be tantamount to state salary controls, as is more or less the case in New Zealand and Australia. Management and labour representatives on the Belgian National Labour Council, during the study recently made by it of a proposed bill to organize collective social relations between workers and employers, were once again opposed to having a clause deal with this because « in connection with arbitration, the execution force results from arbitration compromise », achieved between the parties themselves if they deemed it advisable to submit to it.ConciliationIn most European countries, conciliation procedures are a purely voluntary matter subordinated to the will of the parties. Obviously most of the countries have placed at the disposal of the parties, for a long time in many cases, conciliation and mediation services and the social partners themselves have often developed such procedures either through basic agreements to this end or through collective agreement themselves. The fact remains, however, that it is interesting to note how, in Canada, our labour laws are by far more stringent than those of these countries in Western Europe. In England, Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, there is no legal obligation to resort to conciliation procedures.Only France, in spite of the fact that it liberalized significantly its legislation in this field since 1936, still maintains compulsory conciliation (without procedures) in case of industrial disputes. Section 5 of the statute of February 1950 states that all collective labour disputes must be submitted to conciliation. But this conciliation does not rule out strikes and can take place during strikes. Furthermore, no penalty is provided for in case this obligation was not fulfilled, except that a fine can be levied for failing to appear before the Conciliation Commission.If, as we have just seen, legislation is most summary and not compulsory in relation to conciliation or mediation procedures in European countries, this does not mean, and far from it, that conciliation and mediation are non-existent in their labour relations systems. Quite to the contrary, in most countries, conciliation is common practice on a voluntary basis. The social partners preferred to rely on their own initiative in this field rather than see the government intervene.Joint OrganizationsIt must also be said that where joint organizations exist at the level of the branch activity, as is the case for example in England, Belgium and the Netherlands, these organizations are expected not only to negotiate agreements but also to settle disputes arising between the parties and they constitute, because of this, the best channel through which these disputes are taken up and settled. Paritism plays an important role in this sector. Since collective agreements are generally centralized at their level, these joint organizations constitute the logical terminal for the settlement of disputes. In our opinion, this is an important example of institutionalized co-operation allowing the parties themselves, often without the help of third parties, to settle their own problems without resorting in most cases to tests of economic strength or violence. This is also due to the fact that, in Europe, management and labour confederations effectively control their affiliated bodies and members.England's experience in this field is quite revealing. This may be where the control of the central authority over the basic elements at the local level is at its weakest and least efficient both for employers and workers. The presence of the shop steward, who represents the union but holds his authority from the members he represents, often excludes any « real » presence of the confederation in the establishment. In Great Britain, the number of days lost through strikes or lockouts has increased in recent years in comparison to the other countries of Western Europe, in spite of joint industrial councils and long tested procedures for private conciliation at the industry branch level.All this tends to show that everywhere where control from top to bottom is even slightly effective, co-operation is made much easier when it is achieved at a higher level, where the dispute is out of the hands of the interested parties

    Des sentiers de dépendance pour la fonction publique territoriale : la situation des agents des communes, de la 3ème République aux années mille neuf cent quatre-vingt

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    Communication colloque sans acte colloque du LESSOR, Université de Rennes 2 Université de Haute Bretagne: " La fonction publique territoriale, vingt ans après"La communication retrace, plus d'un siècle de l'action publique, conduite à l'intention d'agents (publics) territoriaux, de la 3ème République aux années 1980 : d'abord à l'intention des agents communaux puis, plus récemment, à l'intention aussi des agents des départements, jusque là délaissés, et ceux des régions, peu nombreux. En réalité, ce sont surtout les agents communaux qui sont concernés par cette étude diachronique ; nous considérons que, lorsque dans les années quatre-vingt se construit progressivement un statut des fonctionnaires territoriaux et que sont posées des règles concernant leur recrutement, leur formation, leur carrière, les jeux étaient largement faits par des décennies de discussions, d'observations mutuelles, de négociations entre Etat, maires, associations et syndicats professionnels, et que, si le début des années quatre-vingt a pu donner l'impression d'un profond changement au travers des lois de 1983 et 1984 qui créent une authentique fonction publique territoriale, c'est aussi la loi du 13 juillet 1987, dite loi Galland, qui a fait le statut de la fonction publique territoriale tel qu'il s'applique encore 20 ans après l'édiction du statut. Celui-ci consacre un pari wébérien : une décentralisation réussie passe par un personnel compétent, recruté, formé, géré dans le cadre d'un statut objectif. Mais, la réforme ... de la réforme, intervenue en 1987 sous le gouvernement Chirac, l'inscrit dans une large dépendance au chemin déjà emprunté, particulièrement dans les années soixante/ soixante dix, et ce dans un sens favorable aux " élus patrons "

    La formation professionnelle des adultes : pour en finir avec les réformes inabouties

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    Ce rapport analyse le système de la formation professionnelle en France et propose des pistes de réformesFormation professionnelle, paritarisme
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