Mechanism design for eliciting probabilistic estimates from multiple suppliers with unknown costs and limited precision

This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that allows a centre to acquire a costly probabilistic estimate of some unknown parameter, by eliciting and fusing estimates from multiple suppliers. Each of these suppliers is capable of producing a probabilistic estimate of any precision, up to a privately known maximum, and by fusing several low precision estimates together the centre is able to obtain a single estimate with a specified minimum precision. Specifically, in the mechanism's first stage M from N agents are pre-selected by eliciting their privately known costs. In the second stage, these M agents are sequentially approached in a random order and their private maximum precision is elicited. A payment rule, based on a strictly proper scoring rule, then incentivises them to make and truthfully report an estimate of this maximum precision, which the centre fuses with others until it achieves its specified precision. We formally prove that the mechanism is incentive compatible regarding the costs, maximum precisions and estimates, and that it is individually rational. We present empirical results showing that our mechanism describes a family of possible ways to perform the pre-selection in the first stage, and formally prove that there is one that dominates all others

Mechanism design for eliciting probabilistic estimates from multiple suppliers with unknown costs and limited precision

This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that allows a centre to acquire a costly probabilistic estimate of some unknown parameter, by eliciting and fusing estimates from multiple suppliers. Each of these suppliers is capable of producing a probabilistic estimate of any precision, up to a privately known maximum, and by fusing several low precision estimates together the centre is able to obtain a single estimate with a specified minimum precision. Specifically, in the mechanism's first stage M from N agents are pre-selected by eliciting their privately known costs. In the second stage, these M agents are sequentially approached in a random order and their private maximum precision is elicited. A payment rule, based on a strictly proper scoring rule, then incentivises them to make and truthfully report an estimate of this maximum precision, which the centre fuses with others until it achieves its specified precision. We formally prove that the mechanism is incentive compatible regarding the costs, maximum precisions and estimates, and that it is individually rational. We present empirical results showing that our mechanism describes a family of possible ways to perform the pre-selection in the first stage, and formally prove that there is one that dominates all others

A Stochastic Hybrid Framework for Driver Behavior Modeling Based on Hierarchical Dirichlet Process

Scalability is one of the major issues for real-world Vehicle-to-Vehicle network realization. To tackle this challenge, a stochastic hybrid modeling framework based on a non-parametric Bayesian inference method, i.e., hierarchical Dirichlet process (HDP), is investigated in this paper. This framework is able to jointly model driver/vehicle behavior through forecasting the vehicle dynamical time-series. This modeling framework could be merged with the notion of model-based information networking, which is recently proposed in the vehicular literature, to overcome the scalability challenges in dense vehicular networks via broadcasting the behavioral models instead of raw information dissemination. This modeling approach has been applied on several scenarios from the realistic Safety Pilot Model Deployment (SPMD) driving data set and the results show a higher performance of this model in comparison with the zero-hold method as the baseline.Comment: This is the accepted version of the paper in 2018 IEEE 88th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2018-Fall) (references added, title and abstract modified

Chemotherapy-Response Monitoring of Breast Cancer Patients Using Quantitative Ultrasound-Based Intra-Tumour Heterogeneities

© 2017 The Author(s). Anti-cancer therapies including chemotherapy aim to induce tumour cell death. Cell death introduces alterations in cell morphology and tissue micro-structures that cause measurable changes in tissue echogenicity. This study investigated the effectiveness of quantitative ultrasound (QUS) parametric imaging to characterize intra-tumour heterogeneity and monitor the pathological response of breast cancer to chemotherapy in a large cohort of patients (n = 100). Results demonstrated that QUS imaging can non-invasively monitor pathological response and outcome of breast cancer patients to chemotherapy early following treatment initiation. Specifically, QUS biomarkers quantifying spatial heterogeneities in size, concentration and spacing of acoustic scatterers could predict treatment responses of patients with cross-validated accuracies of 82 ± 0.7%, 86 ± 0.7% and 85 ± 0.9% and areas under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve of 0.75 ± 0.1, 0.80 ± 0.1 and 0.89 ± 0.1 at 1, 4 and 8 weeks after the start of treatment, respectively. The patients classified as responders and non-responders using QUS biomarkers demonstrated significantly different survivals, in good agreement with clinical and pathological endpoints. The results form a basis for using early predictive information on survival-linked patient response to facilitate adapting standard anti-cancer treatments on an individual patient basis