7,293 research outputs found
Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference
After some general remarks about the interrelation between philosophical and
statistical thinking, the discussion centres largely on significance tests.
These are defined as the calculation of -values rather than as formal
procedures for ``acceptance'' and ``rejection.'' A number of types of null
hypothesis are described and a principle for evidential interpretation set out
governing the implications of -values in the specific circumstances of each
application, as contrasted with a long-run interpretation. A variety of more
complicated situations are discussed in which modification of the simple
-value may be essential.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/074921706000000400 in the IMS
Lecture Notes--Monograph Series
(http://www.imstat.org/publications/lecnotes.htm) by the Institute of
Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org
The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Requirement of Total Evidence
According to the Fine-Tuning Argument, the existence of life in our universe confirms the Multiverse Hypothesis. A standard objection to FTA is that it violates the Requirement of Total Evidence. I argue that RTE should be rejected in favor of the Predesignation Requirement, according to which, in assessing the outcome of a probabilistic process, we should only use evidence characterizable in a manner available before observing the outcome. This produces the right verdicts in some simple cases in which RTE leads us astray, and, when applied to FTA, it shows that our evidence does confirm HM
The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma: Revisions of Humean thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits of Rational Religious Belief
This paper is the product of an interdisciplinary, interreligious dialogue aiming to outline some of the possibilities and rational limits of supernatural religious belief, in the light of a critique of David Humeâs familiar sceptical arguments -- including a rejection of his famous Maxim on miracles -- combined with a range of striking recent empirical research. The Humean nexus leads us to the formulation of a new âCommon-Core/Diversity Dilemmaâ, which suggests that the contradictions between different religious belief systems, in conjunction with new understandings of the cognitive forces that shape their common features, persuasively challenge the rationality of most kinds of supernatural belief. In support of this conclusion, we survey empirical research concerning intercessory prayer, religious experience, near-death experience, and various cognitive biases. But we then go on to consider evidence that supernaturalism -- even when rationally unwarranted -- has significant beneficial individual and social effects, despite others that are far less desirable. This prompts the formulation of a âNormal/Objective Dilemmaâ, identifying important trade-offs to be found in the choice between our humanly evolved ânormalâ outlook on the world, and one that is more rational and âobjectiveâ. Can we retain the pragmatic benefits of supernatural belief while avoiding irrationality and intergroup conflict? It may well seem that rationality is incompatible with any wilful sacrifice of objectivity. But in a situation of uncertainty, an attractive compromise may be available by moving from the competing factions and mutual contradictions of âfirst-orderâ supernaturalism to a more abstract and tolerant âsecond-orderâ view, which itself can be given some distinctive intellectual support through the increasingly popular Fine Tuning Argument. We end by proposing a âMaxim of the Moonâ to express the undogmatic spirit of this second-order religiosity, providing a cautionary metaphor to counter the pervasive bias endemic to the human condition, and offering a more cooperation- and humility-enhancing understanding of religious diversity in a tense and precarious globalised age
Subjective Causality and Counterfactuals in the Social Sciences
The article explores the role that subjective evidence of causality and associated counterfactuals and counterpotentials might play in the social sciences where comparative cases are scarce. This scarcity rules out statistical inference based upon frequencies and usually invites in-depth ethnographic studies. Thus, if causality is to be preserved in such situations, a conception of ethnographic causal inference is required. Ethnographic causality inverts the standard statistical concept of causal explanation in observational studies, whereby comparison and generalization, across a sample of cases, are both necessary prerequisites for any causal inference. Ethnographic causality allows, in contrast, for causal explanation prior to any subsequent comparison or generalization
What to believe about your belief that you're in the good case
Going about our daily lives in an orderly manner requires us, once we are aware of them, to dismiss many metaphysical possibilities. We take it for granted that we are not brains in vats, or living in the Matrix, or in an extended dream. Call these things that we take for granted âanti-skeptical assumptionsâ. What should a reflective agent who believes these things think of these beliefs? For various reasons, it can seem that we do not have evidence for such anti-skeptical assumptions. Are anti-skeptical assumptions, then, beliefs that one may rationally hold without evidence for them â indeed, even in the face of a positive judgment that one lacks evidence for them? I survey and criticize some prominent answers to this question, and then offer a positive view that blends externalism about evidence with a mild, qualified kind of pragmatism. The view I offer aims to do justice to the sense that anti-skeptical assumptions are evidentially groundless while also maintaining that one cannot rationally believe something that one judges oneself to lack sufficient evidence for
Skeptical Theism
Skeptical theism is a family of responses to the evidential problem of evil. What unifies this family is two general claims. First, that even if God were to exist, we shouldnât expect to see Godâs reasons for permitting the suffering we observe. Second, the previous claim entails the failure of a variety of arguments from evil against the existence of God. In this essay, we identify three particular articulations of skeptical theismâthree different ways of âfilling inâ those two claimsâand describes their role in responding to evidential arguments of evil due to William Rowe and Paul Draper. But skeptical theism has been subject to a variety of criticisms, several of which raise interesting issues and puzzles not just in philosophy of religion but other areas of philosophy as well. Consequently, we discuss some of these criticisms, partly with an eye to bringing out the connections between skeptical theism and current topics in mainstream philosophy. Finally, we conclude by situating skeptical theism within our own distinctive methodology for evaluating world views, what we call âworldview theory versioning.
A solution to Karttunen's Problem
There is a difference between the conditions in which one can felicitously assert
a âmustâ-claim versus those in which one can use the corresponding non-modal claim. But it
is difficult to pin down just what this difference amounts to. And it is even harder to account
for this difference, since assertions of 'Must Ï' and assertions of Ï alone seem to have the
same basic goal: namely, coming to agreement that [[Ï]] is true. In this paper I take on this
puzzle, known as Karttunenâs Problem. I begin by arguing that a âmustâ-claim is felicitous
only if there is a shared argument for its prejacent. I then argue that this generalization, which
I call Support, can explain the more familiar generalization that âmustâ-claims are felicitous
only if the speakerâs evidence for them is in some sense indirect. Finally, I sketch a pragmatic
derivation of Support
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