Pandemic

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Influenza and the implications of a pandemic for Malta

An influenza pandemic is inevitable and recent reports from Southeast Asia on avian influenza viruses infecting humans have served to fuel worries that a new pandemic is near. The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the epidemiological and public health aspects of seasonal, avian and pandemic influenza through a literature review and to describe the possible effects of an Influenza pandemic on Malta using the FluAid model. The results of the model indicate that between 158 and 454 deaths would be expected for a 12-week pandemic causing clinical symptoms in 25% of the population. There would be between 432 and 1,488 hospitalisations and between 40,483 and 74,704 general practice consultations. Although the results of the model show a wide range of estimates and are limited by a lack of local parameters, the data presented in this article shows the severe effect of a pandemic on the Maltese health care system and will be useful for pandemic planning. Further research needs to be undertaken to determine local parameters to improve the model estimates and local health authorities need to ensure that adequate resources are provided to implement an effective pandemic preparedness plan.peer-reviewe

Pandemic Paradox: Early Life H2N2 Pandemic Influenza Infection Enhanced Susceptibility to Death during the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic.

Recent outbreaks of H5, H7, and H9 influenza A viruses in humans have served as a vivid reminder of the potentially devastating effects that a novel pandemic could exert on the modern world. Those who have survived infections with influenza viruses in the past have been protected from subsequent antigenically similar pandemics through adaptive immunity. For example, during the 2009 H1N1 "swine flu" pandemic, those exposed to H1N1 viruses that circulated between 1918 and the 1940s were at a decreased risk for mortality as a result of their previous immunity. It is also generally thought that past exposures to antigenically dissimilar strains of influenza virus may also be beneficial due to cross-reactive cellular immunity. However, cohorts born during prior heterosubtypic pandemics have previously experienced elevated risk of death relative to surrounding cohorts of the same population. Indeed, individuals born during the 1890 H3Nx pandemic experienced the highest levels of excess mortality during the 1918 "Spanish flu." Applying Serfling models to monthly mortality and influenza circulation data between October 1997 and July 2014 in the United States and Mexico, we show corresponding peaks in excess mortality during the 2009 H1N1 "swine flu" pandemic and during the resurgent 2013-2014 H1N1 outbreak for those born at the time of the 1957 H2N2 "Asian flu" pandemic. We suggest that the phenomenon observed in 1918 is not unique and points to exposure to pandemic influenza early in life as a risk factor for mortality during subsequent heterosubtypic pandemics.IMPORTANCE The relatively low mortality experienced by older individuals during the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus pandemic has been well documented. However, reported situations in which previous influenza virus exposures have enhanced susceptibility are rare and poorly understood. One such instance occurred in 1918-when those born during the heterosubtypic 1890 H3Nx influenza virus pandemic experienced the highest levels of excess mortality. Here, we demonstrate that this phenomenon was not unique to the 1918 H1N1 pandemic but that it also occurred during the contemporary 2009 H1N1 pandemic and 2013-2014 H1N1-dominated season for those born during the heterosubtypic 1957 H2N2 "Asian flu" pandemic. These data highlight the heretofore underappreciated phenomenon that, in certain instances, prior exposure to pandemic influenza virus strains can enhance susceptibility during subsequent pandemics. These results have important implications for pandemic risk assessment and should inform laboratory studies aimed at uncovering the mechanism responsible for this effect

Stochasticity in pandemic spread over the World Airline Network explained by local flight connections

Massive growth in human mobility has dramatically increased the risk and rate of pandemic spread. Macro-level descriptors of the topology of the World Airline Network (WAN) explains middle and late stage dynamics of pandemic spread mediated by this network, but necessarily regard early stage variation as stochastic. We propose that much of early stage variation can be explained by appropriately characterizing the local topology surrounding the debut location of an outbreak. We measure for each airport the expected force of infection (AEF) which a pandemic originating at that airport would generate. We observe, for a subset of world airports, the minimum transmission rate at which a disease becomes pandemically competent at each airport. We also observe, for a larger subset, the time until a pandemically competent outbreak achieves pandemic status given its debut location. Observations are generated using a highly sophisticated metapopulation reaction-diffusion simulator under a disease model known to well replicate the 2009 influenza pandemic. The robustness of the AEF measure to model misspecification is examined by degrading the network model. AEF powerfully explains pandemic risk, showing correlation of 0.90 to the transmission level needed to give a disease pandemic competence, and correlation of 0.85 to the delay until an outbreak becomes a pandemic. The AEF is robust to model misspecification. For 97% of airports, removing 15% of airports from the model changes their AEF metric by less than 1%. Appropriately summarizing the size, shape, and diversity of an airport's local neighborhood in the WAN accurately explains much of the macro-level stochasticity in pandemic outcomes.Comment: article text: 6 pages, 5 figures, 28 reference

Pandemic influenza control in Europe and the constraints resulting from incoherent public health laws

© 2010 Martin et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Background: With the emergence of influenza H1N1v the world is facing its first 21st century global pandemic. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and avian influenza H5N1 prompted development of pandemic preparedness plans. National systems of public health law are essential for public health stewardship and for the implementation of public health policy[1]. International coherence will contribute to effective regional and global responses. However little research has been undertaken on how law works as a tool for disease control in Europe. With co-funding from the European Union, we investigated the extent to which laws across Europe support or constrain pandemic preparedness planning, and whether national differences are likely to constrain control efforts. Methods: We undertook a survey of national public health laws across 32 European states using a questionnaire designed around a disease scenario based on pandemic influenza. Questionnaire results were reviewed in workshops, analysing how differences between national laws might support or hinder regional responses to pandemic influenza. Respondents examined the impact of national laws on the movements of information, goods, services and people across borders in a time of pandemic, the capacity for surveillance, case detection, case management and community control, the deployment of strategies of prevention, containment, mitigation and recovery and the identification of commonalities and disconnects across states. Results: Results of this study show differences across Europe in the extent to which national pandemic policy and pandemic plans have been integrated with public health laws. We found significant differences in legislation and in the legitimacy of strategic plans. States differ in the range and the nature of intervention measures authorized by law, the extent to which borders could be closed to movement of persons and goods during a pandemic, and access to healthcare of non-resident persons. Some states propose use of emergency powers that might potentially override human rights protections while other states propose to limit interventions to those authorized by public health laws. Conclusion: These differences could create problems for European strategies if an evolving influenza pandemic results in more serious public health challenges or, indeed, if a novel disease other than influenza emerges with pandemic potential. There is insufficient understanding across Europe of the role and importance of law in pandemic planning. States need to build capacity in public health law to support disease prevention and control policies. Our research suggests that states would welcome further guidance from the EU on management of a pandemic, and guidance to assist in greater commonality of legal approaches across states.Peer reviewe

Viral factors in influenza pandemic risk assessment

The threat of an influenza A virus pandemic stems from continual virus spillovers from reservoir species, a tiny fraction of which spark sustained transmission in humans. To date, no pandemic emergence of a new influenza strain has been preceded by detection of a closely related precursor in an animal or human. Nonetheless, influenza surveillance efforts are expanding, prompting a need for tools to assess the pandemic risk posed by a detected virus. The goal would be to use genetic sequence and/or biological assays of viral traits to identify those non-human influenza viruses with the greatest risk of evolving into pandemic threats, and/or to understand drivers of such evolution, to prioritize pandemic prevention or response measures. We describe such efforts, identify progress and ongoing challenges, and discuss three specific traits of influenza viruses (hemagglutinin receptor binding specificity, hemagglutinin pH of activation, and polymerase complex efficiency) that contribute to pandemic risk

Healthcare Workers in Peril: Preparing to Protect Worker Health and Safety During Pandemic Influenza

[Excerpt] An influenza pandemic is projected to have a global impact requiring a sustained, large scale response from the healthcare community to provide care to sick patients. Healthcare workers will be at very high risk of becoming infected when caring for patients with pandemic flu unless adequate health and safety measures are in place, in advance of the pandemic, that will protect them. There is no existing comprehensive federal OSHA standard with mandatory and enforceable provisions that require planning and preparation designed to protect healthcare workers from exposures to pandemic influenza. Nevertheless, it is essential that workplaces plan and prepare for safety and health issues before the flu arrives

Assessment of human influenza pandemic scenarios in Europe

The response to the emergence of the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic was the result of a decade of pandemic planning, largely centred on the threat of an avian influenza A(H5N1) pandemic. Based on a literature review, this study aims to define a set of new pandemic scenarios that could be used in case of a future influenza pandemic. A total of 338 documents were identified using a searching strategy based on seven combinations of keywords. Eighty-three of these documents provided useful information on the 13 virus-related and health-system-related parameters initially considered for describing scenarios. Among these, four parameters were finally selected (clinical attack rate, case fatality rate, hospital admission rate, and intensive care admission rate) and four different levels of severity for each of them were set. The definition of six most likely scenarios results from the combination of four different levels of severity of the four final parameters (256 possible scenarios). Although it has some limitations, this approach allows for more flexible scenarios and hence it is far from the classic scenarios structure used for pandemic plans until 2009

Population Disease Prevention Under Sovereign and Disciplinary Pandemic Authority

The history of collective action aimed at disease prevention amongst populations is replete with complexity in the operation of political power which has transformed in its deployment over time. This article draws upon examples from pre-modern and from modern European states to examine variations in the operation of biopower under pandemic authority. It concludes by contextualizing comparable models of political authority responding to the contemporary COVID-19 pandemic including the operation of pandemic biopower in the United States