The role and impact of mental simulation in design

Although theories of mental simulations have used different formulations of the premises of 'thought experiments', they can be fitted under a minimalist hypothesis stating that mental simulations are run under situations of uncertainty to turn that uncertainty into approximate answers. Three basic assumptions of mental simulations were tested by using naturalistic data from engineering design. Results from the design protocols showed (1) initial representations in mental simulation had higher than base-rate uncertainty, (2) uncertainty in mental simulations were lowered after simulation runs, (3) resulting representations had more approximations than base-rate or initial representations. Further, the reference to external representational systems (sketches and prototypes) was examined. It was found that prototypes had fewer technical/functional simulations compared to sketches or unsupported cognition. Although prototypes were associated with more approximation than unsupported cognition, the different external representation categories did not differ in information uncertainty. The results support the minimalist hypothesis of mental simulations. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

What’s in a text? Answers from frame analysis and rhetoric for measuring meaning systems and argumentative structures

Starting in the 1970s, frame analysis became a popular technique of textual analysis in different disciplines (communication, mass media, sociology). There is no agreed-upon definition of frame analysis or of ways of measuring its key concepts. This paper explores the relationship between frame analysis and rhetoric. The paper reviews all main concepts developed in frame analysis. Concept after concept, it maps the correspondence between frame analysis and rhetorical concepts. It shows how frame analysis stopped short of developing what was really required to measure frames: tropes and figures. The analysis of a specific text confirms the power of rhetorical analysis for teasing out meaning systems and argumentative structures

The structure of theoretical systems in relation to emergence

A thesis concerning the ontology underlying the formation of structural-dialectical systems based on the implications of the phenomenon of Emergence is presented. Emergence refers to the unexpected appearance of discontinuities which segment on-going traditions. The Western philosophical tradition is used as an example focusing on motifs introduced in the Phaedo, the transition from Hume to Kant, and contemporary ontology. Emergence (as structurally coded artificial novelty) is posited to be the opposite of the phenomenon of Nihilism (erratic change projected by the structural system rendering the formal system visible), and both are functions of the ideational process. The ontological basis of Emergence is sought by exploring the articulation of the form of the ideational process, through which structural theoretical systems are produced, called the 'ideational template'. It has three parts: 1) SHELL—The expanding wave of logical connections by means of triadic formalisms seen on the Nihilistic background; 2) CORE-—The unfolding structural dialectical underpinning to the formal system in which artificial emergences appear; 3) CENTRE OF THE CORE—Fragmentation of the concept of 'Being' which provides the ontological foundation for the Formal/Structural system. The ideational template is destructured in order to show the feasibility of an alternative metaphysical model based on disconnecting opposite qualities instead of focusing on form and structure as the ideational process does. This brings attention to the principle of 'No Secondary Causation' as a means of tracing back artificial emergence within structural systems to a genuine emergence of all entities and qualitative opposites to a single source (called by Plato 'the Good') indicated by the methodology of logical disconnection rather than syllogistic connection. The alternative to logical ideational connection is called the 'logic of disconnection'. The metaphysical basis of a qualitative science as distinct from quantitative Western science is posited